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It is often assumed that rational agents are unified agents. As a normative feature
of agency, the idea that fully rational creatures are, in a certain sense, unified, suggests
that understanding ourselves as rational creatures requires understanding our reasons
for acting as reasons that can be represented with a single account of agency. In this
dissertation, I argue against such a view by showing that features of our own agency
preclude constructing such a representation. To be the type of creatures we are, we
have to act in ways that cannot be represented with a single, unified theory of rational
agency. Instead, making sense of ourselves as rational creatures requires a number of
different models that cannot be nicely fitted together. The upshot is that a unified
account of rational agency may not be possible.
For My Father
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To explain the natural order of things, it has been the habit of individuals to build
models. Ptolemy proposed a model of the universe to explain the movement of the
stars; Niels Bohr designed a model of the hydrogen atom to explain its associated
emission wavelength; James Watson and Francis Crick built the double helix model
of DNA to better understand how it functions as an information transfer mechanism;
and scientists, economists, engineers, and so on continue to build models in order to
investigate and understand a variety of phenomena.
The advantage of models is that they serve to simplify complexity, making it easier
to explore systems that are too messy or too complicated to be fully understood
intact and unmanipulated. This advantage is important when modeling features of
the human system. Consider, for example, the color-coded models used to show the
size, function, and arrangement of blood vessels constitutive of the human circulatory
system. Without such models, it would be too messy and too complicated for
anatomy students to explore that aspect of human physiology. Of course, the physical
features of the human system are not the only ones we aim to understand. In
addition to the way our physical parts fit together to form a functioning whole,
we also want to understand the way in which human beings function as rational
agents—or as creatures capable of producing actions for reasons. As with human
physiology, investigating human beings as rational agents can be a complex, messy,
and complicated affair, and it can be managed with models.
In the Republic, Plato demonstrates an awareness of this fact when he models
rational agency using the structure of a city. His aim was to determine the nature
of a just soul, and his method was to “first find out what sort of thing justice is
in a city and afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which
2the smaller is similar to the larger” (Plato, 1997b, Republic, 369a).1 What Plato
noticed was that agents are complex in a way similar to the way in which cities
are complex and, consequently, the former can be modeled using the structure of
the latter. Just as the parts of a city—for example, its rulers, merchants, police,
warriors, and academics—must work together to produce a city that acts justly, so too,
the parts of an agent—for example, desires, goals, emotions, and so on—must work
together to produce a just individual. Plato’s idea, then, was to use a representation
of the unity required for a just city in order to better understand the type of unity
needed to produce similarly just agents.
But Plato may not have realized, or adequately appreciated, that modeling one
thing with another introduces distortions. Indeed, in each of the models I have
mentioned so far, certain aspects of the target (the thing being modeled) become
distorted. For example, the DNA model developed by Watson and Crick distorts the
structure of DNA by representing its individual chemical components using cardboard
cutouts. Similarly, a physiological model designed to show the location and arrange-
ment of blood vessels distorts its target by using plastic parts. Such distortions,
however, are typically not problematic, since we do not expect models to be identical
to their targets. Nevertheless, if we fail to acknowledge the differences between a
model and its target, and ignore the distortions that arise in the model due to
those differences, we may confuse distortions for features of the target. The point
is especially germane to Plato’s urban model of agency. While it seems obvious that
there are clear differences between cities and individuals—for example, individuals
are not composed of subagents in the way that a city is composed of particular
individuals—unless we acknowledge those differences, we may confuse distortions of
the model for aspects of the target, ending up, rather implausibly, with views of
agency that appeal to homunculi.
Now, if it is true that modeling introduces distortions as an effect of representation,
we should expect that fully representing the various features of a complex target will
1References to the works of Plato are by dialogue title and standard Stephanus number. The date
in the main text refers to John M. Cooper’s Plato: Complete Works (1997), where the translations
used here are to be found.
3require a variety of models, each representing some features and distorting others.
This follows from the fact that no particular model can represent every aspect of its
target in every detail. If that is right, we should guard against the idea that a complex
system like rational agency can be represented with one, overarching model. Just as it
would be a mistake to think that a single model of human physiology can represent it
in every detail, or that a particular model of the DNA molecule can represent all of its
complexity, so too, it would be a mistake to think that a single model of agency—for
example, Plato’s urban model of justice—could represent it in every detail.
If we recognize that models have limitations and distortions built into them, why
use them to investigate rational agency? And what implications does a modeling
approach to agency have for a broader set of philosophical interests? In what remains
of this introductory chapter, I want to address these questions. Before I do, however,
we need to get clear on some terminology and also consider the different aspects of
rational agency that may need to be modeled.
1.2 Models and Theories
There are a variety of strategies for distinguishing models from theories. Which
is the right strategy and whether the distinction can be maintained once made are
issues that have generated a bulky body of literature. I am going to resist engaging
that literature and, instead, adopt a view that emphasizes the role of ‘theory’ and
‘model’ in scientific practice.2 Historically, philosophers of science have emphasized
2My way of speaking does not fully comport with either the received (syntactic) view of theories
or its more recent counterpart, the semantic view. The former is a historical relic that was a central
component of logical positivism. It is distinguished by its commitment to the idea that statements
of theory govern scientific thought and that theories are deductively closed sets of sentences. A
consequence of this way of thinking about theories and their role in scientific thought is that models
are viewed as subsidiary components of science, fully derivable from the content of specific theories
and not required for scientific investigation. The syntactic view was heavily criticized during the
latter half of the twentieth century, and contemporary theorists have all but dismissed it in favor of
one or another version of the semantic view, which is less a single view than a family of views. Two
notable proponents of the received view were Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel. For their views, see
especially Carnap (1939) and Hempel (1965). Suppes (1977) provides a collection of essays detailing
the history and eventual displacement of the received view.
In contrast to the received view, the family of semantic views share the idea that the received
view should be turned on its head. Rather than positioning theories at the center of scientific
thought, semantic views argue that models (and model building) govern how we think about scientific
problems. Influential theorists who have developed such views include Patrick Suppes (1960) and
4the relation between theory and model, and endorsed the idea that “good theory
already contains all the resources necessary for representation [or model construction]”
(Cartwright, 1999, 245). Confidence in that view has recently waned, however.
Margaret Morrison, for example, has argued that emphasizing the connection between
theory and model is a mistake.3 In coming to this conclusion, she seems to have been
influenced by Nancy Cartwright’s arguments to the effect that “the corrections needed
to turn the models that are provided by theory into models that can fairly accurately
represent phenomena in the physical world are seldom, if ever, consistent with theory”
(1999, 251).4 For Cartwright, theories lie, and must be manipulated to produce usable
models of local behavior.
Nevertheless, even for Cartwright, models and theories seem to be, in some sense,
connected. As a result, for her, the term ‘theory’, as with semantic and syntactic
views, ends up meaning something like “the general background ideas that influence
the construction of models.” I want to retain Cartwright’s idea that theories are
general and that they guide the construction of models, while remaining neutral about
the role and priority of ‘theory’ and ‘model’ in scientific practice. It is familiar, for
example, to think of plate tectonic theory as the background idea used by geologists
to build individual geological models. Nevertheless, even if theory and model often
Bas van Fraassen (1980). According to them, models are designed to address different scientific
problems, and theories act as background ideas connecting models with the systems or objects they
aim to represent. As such, the notions of ‘theory’ and ‘model’ remain tightly connected.
Initially, much effort was spent trying to explain how the relation between models and theories
was to be understood, but as these views have evolved, that task has faded from focus. This is
in contrast to earlier accounts. Whereas early proponents of semantic views targeted the older,
syntactic view by proposing alternatives focused on understanding the notion of theory, more recent
views have shifted that focus in an effort to understand and explain scientific thought. A nice
example of this transition can be found in Ron Giere’s Explaining Science. There he proposes
a semantic view of theories that is comprised of two elements: “1) a population of models, and
2) various hypotheses linking those models with systems in the real world.” After proposing the
view, however, he immediately acknowledges that for him, “scientific theory turns out not to be
a well-defined entity” (1988, respectively 85, 86). Most recently, semantic views amount to little
more than the claim that “model construction is an important part of scientific theorizing” (Downes,
1992).
3In “Models as Autonomous Agents” (1999, see especially, 43), Morrison argues that models are
functionally independent of theories in the production of scientific knowledge.
4The quote is Cartwright’s own characterization of the argument she put forward in How the
Laws of Physics Lie (1983).
5travel together, they need not: we can build models without relying on theories, and
we can have theories with no models.
So for my purposes, what is the difference? Following Mark Wilson’s5 suggestion
that “Mild-mannered ‘theory,’ in its vernacular and scientific employments, often
connotes little more than ‘an intriguing proposal’” (2006, 127), I want to suggest that
just about any interesting hypothesis can serve as a theory, if it is taken to be true.
Nevertheless, in the sense I want to adopt, theories are intended to provide principles
that govern objects. As it relates to the topic of this chapter, then, any interesting
view about rational agency can be understood as a theory, if it is taken to provide
a true statement about the principles that govern such agents. For example, if we
assume that instrumentalism—the view that all reasons for action are means-end
reasons—is a theory of rational agency, the principle of action governing such agents
will be one wherein agents act, and should do so, only in an effort to satisfy or move
closer to fulfilling specific desires.
In contrast to theories in this sense, models aim to represent only specific aspects
of their targets, and, as a result, distort others to one degree or another. One
consequence of the difference between ‘theories’ and ‘models’ in the sense I am using
them is that true theories remain true when conjoined, but models, because they
accurately depict certain aspects of their targets while distorting others, are not
amenable to conjunction. The difference can be stated as follows: true theories
conjoin to form consistent, unified wholes; accurate models, because they contain
distortions, do not. It follows that modeling all the features of a particular target will
require a number of different models.
1.3 Elements of Agency
Before proceeding, it is worth considering in slightly more detail what it is we are
trying to model. To be an agent is to be the kind of thing that can produce effects
in the world—that is, it is to possess a capacity for self-movement. Understood in
5The sense of ‘models’ I am endorsing is closely allied with Mark Wilson’s notion of ‘facades’. For
Wilson, facades resemble the “overlapping and fibered sets of maps included in an atlas” (2006, 293).
The idea is that just as an atlas requires a variety of representational facades to adequately cover
the interests of map users, so too, adequately representing any complex system requires disjoint, but
still connected, patches of representation.
6this minimal sense, there are many kinds of agents: insects, fish, and primates are
agents, but less obvious candidates include businesses, corporations, and government
institutions. Of course, human beings are agents too, but our agency has a peculiar
feature: its source can be traced to principles of rationality. That is, we are not agents
merely: we are rational agents whose movements can be initiated and governed by
reasons. As a result, we should look at the potential sources of reasons to get a better
sense of what we hope to model.
1.3.1 Instrumentalism
Agents are often moved to act in virtue of ends that they desire to achieve. In
fact, one need not look too far afield to see that many kinds of agents tend to be
motivated by their aims: spiders move in order to catch prey, apes beat their chest in
order to ward off competitors, and human beings drink coffee in order to stay awake.
In acting purposefully, even the simplest of agents do things in order to realize their
aims, wants, or goals.
Despite this fact, however, there seems to be a difference between the kind of
action exhibited by a spider and the kind of deliberative action characteristic of an
individual attempting to, say, realize his life’s ambitions. Yet impartially articulating
that difference has been notoriously difficult. As Harry Frankfurt warns:
While the general conditions of agency are unclear, it may well be that
the satisfaction of these conditions by human beings depends upon the
occurrence of events or states which do not occur in the histories of other
creatures. But we must be careful that the ways in which we construe
agency and define its nature do not conceal a parochial bias, which causes
us to neglect the extent to which the concept of human action is no
more than a special case of another concept whose range is much wider.
(Frankfurt, 1988, 78-79)
Even with this precautionary note, however, Frankfurt has argued that there is
something peculiar about the type of agency characteristic of persons. Indeed, that
idea has received significant uptake, and is now a familiar feature of hierarchical
models of rational agency. According to such models, human agents, as persons, are
unusual in that they are able to reflect directly on the desires, values, and reasons
that motivate them, and to change those desires, values, and reasons in an effort to
7align them with deeper, more stable aspects of their agency.6 Another way to frame
that point, which is more germane to the subject of rational agency,7 is to say that
human agents seem unique in their capacity to reflect on their individual motives
and to change them in the face of what seem to be deeper features of who they are
as individuals. On this way of thinking, what makes human agents rational is their
capacity to figure out who they really are, and to do things in an effort to satisfy
their deeper sense of self.
Such views of agency demand a fairly robust form of self-knowledge, because they
require that individuals acting for reasons be capable of explaining and justifying the
things they do by appealing to deep features of their own motivational psychology.
Put differently, for an individual like you or I to account for the things we do for
reasons, we must know some pretty deep things about our desires and how they
serve to satisfy or frustrate our own sense of who we are. It is by reflecting on the
motivational attitudes crucial to our own sense of self, then, that sovereign agents
locate a standpoint for rational action. But, how, exactly, does knowing information
about one’s own deep motivational attitudes justify particular actions? After all,
if self-reflection reveals a vicious agent, presumably that agent is still not justified
in acting viciously. To overcome that potential difficulty, we might hope to show
that reflection on one’s nature as a rational creature inevitably leads one to discover
motivational components that are nonvicious and shared by all rational creatures.
If knowing something about oneself as a rational agent reveals something about
6There are a variety of problems associated with both the reflective standpoint presupposed by
the capacity to reflect on lower-order desires and what the relation between that standpoint and
lower-order desires must be like to play a significant role in rational agency. In large part, the
controversies grow out of Frankfurt’s influential article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of
a Person” (1971). In that article, Frankfurt argues that a person is distinguished by higher-order
attitudes about first order desires.
Since his initial paper, a number of writers have weighed in on the debate. An up to date defense
of a hierarchical conception of agency can be found in Michael Bratman’s Structures of Agency
(2007b). And a notable exception to the idea that persons have hierarchically structured attitudes
can be found in Gary Watson’s “Free Agency” (2004).
7I do not want to confuse two different foci of work on agency. One has to do with our capacity as
free agents, the other with our capacity as rational agents. Whatever the difference between these
two different focal points turns out to be, it is the rational variety that is of interest here, and the
emphasis in the text is meant to stress that point.
8justified action, reflecting on one’s motives may serve to provide a peculiarly rational
standpoint for action.
Although such a strategy might sound promising, it is worth noticing the lack
of consensus about what the heart of our motivational psychology must amount to
in order to produce rational action. The values, desires, and preferences that are
supposed to frame the deeper sense of self characteristic of rational agents are not
obvious, and consequently, different theorists think that different features of who
we are as rational creatures should serve as the motivational foundation for rational
action. Indeed, when we, as individuals, reflect on what moves us to act, and on what
we think should move us to act, we often find that our own motivational psychology is
not unified—that is, the deeper sense of self that philosophers like Michael Bratman
and David Velleman appeal to as the standpoint of our own rational agency might,
in the end, result in disordered agents. How, in the face of such disorder, can we
determine what to do? And is there a way to accommodate the variability within
and between agents in a single, comprehensive model of instrumental agency?
I do not think so. When we reflect on the standpoint of our own agency to acquire
the knowledge needed to justify the things we do, it is far from clear whether a single
account can make sense of our instrumental reasons for action. And in fact, I want
to argue that it cannot. Instrumental agency is a disunified concept as it applies to
human agents. Consequently, to make sense of it requires a variety of models that
each depict one or another aspect of the deep reasons we have for doing the things
we do.
1.3.2 Emotions
Although instrumentalist conceptions of agency pervade the literature, there seems
to be more to the capacity to act for reasons than can be accounted for with such
accounts. For example, human emotions play an important role in the things we do,
but making sense of that role has frequently required ideas that seem at odds with
instrumentalist conceptions of agency. It has recently been argued, for instance, that
agents with impaired emotional functioning have difficulty responding to social cues,
because they fail to perceive certain important aspects of their social setting (Dama-
sio, 1994). That is not to suggest, however, that emotionally impaired individuals
9fail to have some set of relevant ends. Rather, it is to suggest that they become,
in a certain sense, blind to proper forms of emotional expression. To make sense of
that fact, we seem to need ideas that do not fit well with instrumentalist accounts of
rational agency.
Nevertheless, philosophers like Candace Vogler have still tried to make sense of
emotionally motivated action by appealing to the familiar framework of instrumen-
talism. She argues, for instance, that since acts of emotional expression unfold in
a manner typical of actions done to realize or accomplish specific ends, the reasons
behind them must be articulable with standard, means-end descriptive terminology.
Such an Anscombian view of action explanation presupposes that individuals under-
stand the nature of the actions being performed when acting from emotion. As a
result, when an individual gives expression to emotion through action, that agent
must know what he is doing while doing it. But such a model of emotional action is
mistaken, because it ignores the role of emotion in framing the thoughts that move
individuals to act. This observation is best understood by looking at acts of artistic
expression, and the emotionally loaded terminology used in the description of such
actions.
Let me fill that in a bit by saying more about what I have in mind. The metaphor
of vision (or perception) is particularly apt when explaining the role of emotions in
guiding actions that give expression to how we feel—for example, acts of artistic
expression. Emotions seem to have some influence on how agents perceive the world,
which is similar to the influence of the five senses on the perception of physical objects.
Just as we need beliefs derived from our perceptual apparatus to think, reason, and
act in the world—that is, to be rational agents—so, too, we need emotional perception
to think and act in a manner typified by forms of artistic expression. In fact, the idea
that emotions function as a form of perception, which itself is a precursor to rational
agency, has been emphasized by Ronald de Sousa. He writes:
the canons of rationality that govern [emotions] are not to be identified
with those that govern judgment, or perception, or functional desire.
Instead, their existence grounds the very possibility of rationality at those
more conventional levels. (de Sousa, 1987, 203)
The suggestion is that emotions are in some sense required for more considered forms
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of rational agency. This includes both practical and theoretical modes of rationality.
For de Sousa, an agent cannot figure out what to do or what to believe without
emotional input. If that is right, there must be a fairly robust connection between
emotions and rational agency: nothing that we can rationally do or believe is imper-
vious to the influence of emotion.
de Sousa is not unique in his commitment to the role of emotions in rational
agency. Many others working in the area have suggested a similar link between the
emotions we feel and the reasons we have for acting.8 Indeed, there is a growing cadre
of philosophers who think that emotions play an important role in our capacity to
figure out what we should, or should not, do. As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out:
the correct perception of a practical situation requires emotional . . . ac-
tivity, [and] the emotions have a valuable informational role to play within
the ethical life as forms of recognition. (Nussbaum, 1988, 230, emphasis
mine)
But Nussbaum may be understating things here. After all, it is clear that emotions
influence expressive actions—for example, forms of artistic expression—and that the
capacity to understand and express one’s emotions in an appropriate manner deeply
influences the shape of an individual’s life.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that we really understand the influence of emotion
on the things we do. If it is true that emotions lie behind, and give shape to, the
expression of our capacities as rational agents, it may not be possible to fully grasp
what we are doing when we are acting from emotion. Indeed, I will suggest that
because emotions shape how we see the world, their influence on what we do may
be all but invisible to us as intelligent agents. In fact, I want to argue that agents
who act from emotion do so without knowledge of what they are doing. This is in
sharp contrast to the type of Anscombian model endorsed by Vogler. When we act
to give expression to emotion, we are frequently coming to terms with unfamiliar
modes of thought, which are tied to the nature of emotions themselves, and require
8There is an ever-growing body of literature aimed at understanding the role of emotions in the
life of rational agents. A widely used and highly regarded starting place can be found by looking at
Amelie Rorty’s Explaining Emotions (1980). More recently, Peter Goldie’s collection, The Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (2010), deals with a number of philosophical issues related to
the emotions.
11
doing things without practical knowledge. If that is right, we should expect such
actions to require a different model of action explanation, one that makes sense of the
perceptual shifts characteristic of emotional experiences without requiring the type
of Anscombian knowledge built into Vogler’s view. Such actions stand as a class of
counterexamples to the idea that rational agents must act with practical knowledge,
and provide reason for Anscombians like Vogler to reconsider their commitments.
1.3.3 Practical Learning
A further feature of agency that needs to be considered when providing an account
of human agents as rational agents is the capacity to discover, learn, and develop into
the type of intelligent creatures that we seem to be. After all, an individual’s capacity
to be motivated by and act for reasons seems to be something that develops over time.
Yet explaining how we develop the capacity for rational action is a problem that does
not have an adequate philosophical explanation.
The problem of how we develop new capacities is, I think, analogous to one found
in more theoretical realms of philosophy. In particular, it is related to the familiar
problem used to motivate Plato’s Meno. The dialogue begins with Meno asking, “Can
you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught?” (Plato, 1997a, Meno, 70a). Eventually,
Socrates gets around to stating the full force of the problem as he sees it:
[A man] cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no
need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know
what to look for. (Plato, 1997a, Meno, 80e)
The puzzle presents a challenge for anyone trying to account for the capacity to learn
new truths. How can we find what is true, if we do not know what we are looking for?
Although we need not worry about this more theoretical version of the problem, or the
Socratic solution to it, we should notice that there is a related problem in the practical
realm. How do agents learn to perform actions they have never before performed?
This question is about the relation between what we already know how to do and
what is required to learn how to do new things—that is, how to develop our capacities
as agents. It makes sense, then, to look for answers to that question by looking at
work that explores that relation. Two areas of research suggest themselves: one is
tied to Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how; the
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other is the body of literature pertaining to practical knowledge, which has recently
received considerable attention from followers of Elizabeth Anscombe. Both areas
approach problems pertaining to an individual’s capacity to learn how to perform
new actions by emphasizing the role of knowledge in governing the things we do. For
example, writing in response to Ryle, Jason Stanley has recently suggested that:
knowing how to do something is the same as knowing a fact. It follows
that learning how to do something is learning a fact. For example, when
you learned how to swim, what happened is that you learned some facts
about swimming. (2011a, vii)
On Stanley’s view, facts, or true propositions, are what is known by an agent when he
or she knows how to do something. If that is right, knowing how to swim is knowing
the propositions relevant to swimming, and learning to swim is similarly a matter of
learning the relevant propositions.
The role of knowledge in learning new skills can also be found in the work of
recent followers of Anscombe. Sebastian Ro¨dl, for example, has argued for a very
strong connection between thought and action. Indeed, he believes that thought
and action are so securely connected that thinking about what to do may result in
the power to do it. Since knowing how to do something amounts to knowing the
information pertaining to doing it, and since information about how to do things can
produce knowledge-how, learning how to do new things may simply be a matter of
drawing a particular type of inference.
Such views seem to me to be mistaken because they depend too heavily on the
role of practical knowledge in action. The connection between what we know how to
do, how we learn to do new things, and our capacity to act as rational agents is one
that needs to be explored. In fact, I want to argue that the things we do to acquire
knowledge-how depend on a class of actions that have previously been ignored. What
I call ‘explorative actions’ are actions that agents perform without knowing what they
are doing. But such actions are not mere thrashing; they are governed by a practical
analog of induction, and they should be modeled in that way. Such a model promises
to provide insight about how we, as rational agents, learn to do things we have never
done before, and also promises to provide reasons for reconsidering the Anscombian
view that practical knowledge is a precondition of intelligent action.
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1.3.4 Autonomy
Finally, to model rational agency, we must account for our sense of autonomy—
that is, the sense that we are individuals capable of governing ourselves according
to principles of reason. To be autonomous as rational agents, the capacity for self-
governance must be tied, not just to reasons, but to reasons that are supported by
principles of rationality. Indeed, this is a point made famous by Kant. He writes:
Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of
laws—that is, in accordance with principles—and only so has he a will.
Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is
nothing but practical reason. (Kant, 1997, 80)
Or, a bit later:
The will is conceived as a power of determining oneself to action in
accordance with the idea of certain laws. And such a power can be found
only in rational beings. (1997, 95)
In these passages, Kant expresses the idea that a rational agent’s capacity to act
depends on recognizing law-like grounds for acting. In fact, this is the idea behind
Kant’s two-pronged universalizability test. Unless an agent’s maxims are both con-
ceptually and volitionally consistent, it is not rational for the agent to act on them.9
Another, more familiar, way of putting this point is to say that the principles of action
governing rational agents must be categorical.
Christine Korsgaard has taken up these Kantian points, putting them to work in
understanding problems of agency. She writes:
the principle of governing oneself by universal laws is the constitutive
principle of rational activity generally. For the requirement of universaliz-
ability governs every aspect of rational thought. To believe on the basis of
a rational consideration is to believe on the basis of a consideration that
could govern the beliefs of any rational believer, and still be a belief about
the public, shared world. To act on the basis of a rational consideration
is to act on the basis of a consideration that could govern the choices of
any rational chooser, and still be efficacious in the public, shared world.
(Korsgaard, 2008, 12)
For Korsgaard and Kant, our autonomy as rational agents—that is, our capacity
to rationally govern ourselves—is grounded in particular principles of rationality.
9One of the clearest discussions of Kant’s universalizability test, and its role in determining the
moral value of an action, can be found in Onora O’Neill’s “Universality Tests in Autonomous and
in Heteronomous Ethics” (2001).
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Only agents who act on the basis of considerations that are universalizable qualify as
autonomous beings.
But the idea that rational agents must be moved by maxims that meet certain
strictures of rationality raises a problem for an approach to agency that, like mine,
relies on models. As I have already noted, models have limitations and distortions
built into them. It is unlikely, then, that it will be possible to conjoin several models
to produce a single, coherent account of rational agency. In other words, given the
fact that the scope of models is limited, and that they distort their target in one way
or another, it is improbable that they will be able to be brought together to form
a single, coherent picture of rational agency. This is problematic if we aim to make
sense of autonomy, and rational agency more broadly, in terms of principles that are
universalizable. For, if nothing else, universalizable principles must be coherent and
unifiable under a single, overarching principle.
The concluding chapter will, to a small extent, address some of these worries.
For example, what hope is there for creatures like you and I to unify our agency
around principles of reason? And what are the prospects for integrating the models
of agency discussed in this dissertation? If they are not significant, as I will suggest,
what should we say about the control we have over the things we do as intelligent
creatures who act for reasons?
1.4 Is Agency Worth Modeling?
With a better sense of what it is we are aiming to make sense of using models,
we can now consider whether a clearer picture of rational agency will be worth the
effort. After all, if we are going to expend the energy, should we not expect some kind
of payoff? To answer that question, I want to look at what implications modeling
agency might have for related areas of philosophy.
1.4.1 Practical Reasoning
Since representations of rational agency purport to model features of rationality
that move us to act, they will, in one way or another, have implications for how agents
should think about what to do. This feature of the project brings it into close contact
with theories of practical reasoning. As a philosophical discipline, practical reasoning
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is about figuring out the patterns of inference legitimate for determining how one
should act. Presumably, these patterns are canons of rationality, which means that
reasoning done right is reasoning done according to these patterns.
Be that as it may, we need more information about human agents as rational
agents to determine how, exactly, theories of practical reason should be applied to
human beings. After all, to show that a pattern of inference is valid is not yet to
show that human agents can or should use it to figure out what to do. For instance,
if the patterns of inference necessary for realizing long-term plans are too complex
to use, it would hardly make sense to insist that they be used to determine what to
do. Similarly, if the joint application of incompatible patterns of inference cannot be
ruled out, we may not be justified in using either one when figuring out what to do.
If these speculative comments are right, then recognizing that a pattern of inference
is rational is not sufficient to show that we should use it.
If we acknowledge that specifying a form of inference is not sufficient to show
that it should be used, we need to figure out a way to determine which inferential
patterns we should use when thinking about what to do. To my mind, a good way
to proceed with that task is to get a better sense of the type of creatures we are, the
type of agency we possess, and the limitations we face as rational agents. By better
understanding ourselves as creatures who act for reasons, we might gain a better
sense of what forms of practical inference should or should not be implemented by
distinctively human agents. One way to do that is to design a variety of models to
capture the seeming variation amongst human agents.
1.4.2 Ethics
In contrast to practical reasoning, which is the project of determining the patterns
of inference needed for thinking about what to do, ethics is about what agents should
do. More colloquially, practical reasoning is about how individuals should think,
ethics is about how individuals should live. Put in those terms, there seems to be
a natural link between the two: if living a good life requires thinking about what
to do, figuring out the patterns of inference useful for determining what one should
do seems important. Consequently, to the extent that models of agency will inform
practical reason, it will also improve our thinking about peculiarly ethical problems.
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Aside from that connection, however, the idea that we should use models to better
understand agency has more direct implications for the field of ethics. For some time,
ethicists have been faced with a division between two unyielding camps. On the one
hand, there are those who insist on the idea that rational agents should act only
with an eye toward the likely consequences of their actions. Accordingly, only if an
action is likely to produce the best potential outcome is one justified in performing
it. On the other hand, there are those who think that rational agents should act
only on intentions that are properly formed. According to this line of thought, only
if an agent’s intentions are determined by principles of rationality is an individual
justified in acting from them. But notice that these two approaches to ethics rely on
different ideas about the nature of rational agency. Indeed, they rely on peculiarly
narrow conceptions of the nature of rational agency. To the extent that we can gain
a better understanding of ourselves as rational creatures using a variety of models,
we will be better positioned to engage a range of ethical debates, and maybe shake
up traditional approaches to ethical questions.
1.4.3 Social and Political Philosophy
Modeling agency also has implications for social and political philosophy, which
are areas of philosophy largely concerned with the social institutions and practices
that influence the shape and quality of human life. Indeed, as Plato noticed early on,
the design, structure, and function of social institutions—for example, the governing
body of a city—are similar to the design, structure, and function of human agents:
both are constituted of competing parts that must work together as a unit. Under-
standing human agency, then, might help us to gain a better understanding of social
institutions.
In fact, the agent-like features of corporations, government institutions, and other
social and political actors make this area of philosophy dependent on a robust un-
derstanding of rational agency. If these large institutions are in fact agents who
do things for reasons, then understanding what moves them to act will depend
on understanding the forms of rational agency relevant to them. Of course, like
their human counterparts, social and political institutions are not simple systems.
17
They too are complex. And as I have been suggesting, when dealing with complex
systems, modeling proves beneficial. For these reasons, then, the kind of approach I
am proposing should be useful for social and political philosophy.
1.5 Why the Modeling Approach?
Granted that a better understanding of agency has implications for a variety of
philosophical projects, why use models and modeling as the method of investigation?
If models represent only certain aspects of a target, inevitably contain distortions,
and are each insufficient to provide a complete picture of agency, why bother? Should
we not prefer a strategy that promises a comprehensive and undistorted picture of
our nature as rational creatures?
Possibly, but a method sold with that promise may be over-selling itself. Consider
the nature of representation itself. As Plato suggests in the Republic, and as I pointed
out earlier on, representations have limits. Indeed, Plato argues that a single painting
of a bed cannot truly depict the features of an actual bed, because a representation
cannot represent aspects of the thing it is supposed to depict (Plato, 1997b, Republic,
especially 598c). As that point applies to our topic, we should be wary of a strategy
that promises a single, comprehensive, and undistorted picture of rational agency.
That point is trivial if all I mean by it is that we should be wary of written accounts
of rational agency because they cannot, for example, truly depict the movement of
agents without themselves being in motion. But that is not what I mean. My point,
rather, is that no matter how we choose to represent ourselves as rational agents, we
will inevitably be forced to leave things out that are necessary for a complete picture.
Consider, for example, the fact that we are self-conscious agents: we are aware of
the fact that we are creatures who know how to move ourselves. Suppose I want to
represent that feature of agency, and so build a model to do so. Well, in virtue of
focusing on that feature of agency, I may have to give up representing other features
of agency that are not compatible with it. For example, I may have to abandon
the hope of representing the influence of the subconscious, the influence of emotions,
or the influence of factors external to an agent’s psyche on the reasons that move
individuals to act. But if these alternative influences play an active role in shaping
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agency, designing a model to represent our self-consciousness may end up being only a
partial representation. In fact, it seems that frequently what we know about ourselves,
and our nature as rational creatures, is only part of the story. Consequently, we should
be cautious of approaches to agency that promise a comprehensive and undistorted
picture.
Let me try to make that point a bit differently while sticking to the example
from Plato. The Platonic form of being a bed and paintings of beds seems to bear
something of an analogous relation to the idea of rational agency and representations
of rational agency. Just as a representation of a bed cannot capture aspects of the
Platonic form of being a bed, so too, representations of agents as rational cannot
capture certain aspects of what is required to be a rational agent. The difficulty
stems, I think, from the fact that human agents must sometimes act without fully
understanding what they are doing. There are aspects of our nature as rational agents
that are, to one degree or another, hidden from our own sense of what it takes to be
rational. Yet they are required for us to be the type of rational creatures we presume
to be. As a result, standard representations of rational agency tend to leave these
features out.
So how do we overcome the difficulty? One way is to use a multitude of representa-
tions to capture all the features of the thing being represented. In the case of Plato’s
bed, this means getting a better idea of actual beds by, for example, representing
them from a variety of angles using a variety of artistic media in an effort to portray
a multitude of features. This, of course, runs parallel to the strategy I propose to
use in this dissertation. But the alternative I am criticizing promises something
different: it promises to bring representations of rational agency together to form a
comprehensive, undistorted account of what it means to be a rational agent. This
seems to me to be an implausible alternative. After all, what principle of unification
could bring a variety of representations of a bed together to form a unified whole?
And, similarly, what principle of unification could bring a variety of representations
of agency together to form a unified whole?
These potential difficulties, however, are not the only reasons to be cautious of
views that promise comprehensive and undistorted representations of rational agency.
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In addition to the fact that such strategies are unlikely to succeed, they also tend to
stifle philosophical innovation. There are at least two reasons for believing this.
First, features of rational agency that are accepted as true tend to lead to the
rejection of accounts that are incompatible with those presumed truths. So, for
example, if rational agents must have consistent beliefs, it would seem absurd to
accept an account that is incompatible with such a presumed truth. Consequently,
any potentially innovative model at odds with it would tend to be dismissed out of
hand. If rational agents must have consistent belief sets, and a model is proposed that
does not meet this condition, why take it seriously? If one is committed to arriving
at a comprehensive and undistorted representation of rational agency, the answer to
that question is that one should not. But by pursuing a model-based strategy, we can
avoid this problem, since such a strategy requires individuals to recognize that their
own models cannot be entirely correct.
Another reason to think that approaches that are not model-based will stifle
innovation is because they tend to be top-down. Too often, philosophy begins with a
fairly simple idea and attempts to explain as much as possible given that idea. But
such a strategy often ignores nuance for the sake of simplicity, and tries to deal with
complex issues by fitting them to precast philosophical molds. This is particularly
evident, as I have suggested, in ethical debates. A stubborn commitment to either con-
sequentialism or deontological perspectives frequently drives philosophical thought.
Rather than letting counterexamples to either perspective drive more nuanced views,
we try to fit the counterexamples to the top-down perspective. But since we are
nuanced agents, representing the sophistication of ethical creatures will likely be
handled better by a method that is suited to deal with complexity. By designing
models that represent particular features of rational agency, we let the problems
drive our thinking rather than our preconceived thoughts drive the problems. If we
are forced to think about what our models are for, what features of a target we want to
represent, what distortions will result from our representations, and how they might
be improved, our philosophical views promise to be more rich, innovative, and useful
than their top-down alternatives.
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1.6 Prospectus
It is frequently assumed that rational agents are unified agents. As a normative
feature of agency, the idea suggests that understanding the things we do requires
understanding our reasons for doing them as reasons that can be represented with a
single, comprehensive view. But I do not think that any such comprehensive view
can be provided, and I want to show why by arguing that features of our own agency
undermine attempts to do so. To be the type of creatures we are, we have to act in
ways that cannot be captured by a single account of rational agency. Indeed, making
sense of ourselves as rational agents requires a number of different models that cannot
be nicely fitted together. If I am right, the upshot is that a unified representation of
rational agency may not be possible.
In the next chapter, Instrumental Facades, I focus on a collection of views that
require agents to act with practical knowledge—that is, with an awareness of what
they are doing when doing it. I argue against three proposed theories of instrumental
agency by arguing that they are in fact better interpreted as models that represent
importantly different aspects of rational agency. After sketching the views of Michael
Smith, David Velleman, and Michael Bratman, I argue that the heart of each view is
needed to represent human agents as instrumentally rational. We cannot give these
views up without giving up resources needed to explain how we deal with practical
issues we all have an interest in managing. Yet each view is normatively incompatible
with the others. This leads to a puzzle: how should we represent nonoptional features
of human agency that prescribe actions that are at odds? In answer to that question,
I argue for a model-based perspective for thinking about instrumental agency, and
provide support for the idea that it is a disunified concept.
In contrast to instrumentalist views that require agents to act with practical
knowledge, Modeling Expressive Actions aims to develop an account of rational agency
that does not require knowing what one is doing when acting. This third chapter is
meant to challenge the Anscombian view that intentional actions presuppose practical
knowledge. The challenge depends on locating a class of actions that agents purpose-
fully perform without such knowledge. I use acts of artistic expression as an example
of agents who act without knowing what they are doing, and argue that many of
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the things individuals do from emotion are similar to the actions of artists. I call
these actions ‘expressive actions’ and show that they tend to resist being described
in a manner that demonstrates an awareness of what is being done while doing it.
Indeed, I suggest that giving expression to emotion is an act of clarifying and ordering
what one feels through action, and that the clarity that comes through such action
cannot be explained using Anscombian views like the one developed by, for example,
Candace Vogler.
In Chapter 4, Acquiring Knowledge-How, I take the idea that we sometimes must
act without practical knowledge a step further by arguing that explaining the capacity
of rational agents to acquire practical know-how—that is, for agents to learn how to do
things they have never done before—we need another model of agency built around
the idea that we perform intelligent actions without knowing what we are doing.
Again, this presents a new challenge to the Anscombian view that the only way to
act intelligently is to act with practical knowledge. Indeed, I argue instead that much
of what we do when learning how to do new things requires acting without that type
of knowledge. Only in this way can we develop the skills we need to be the rational
creatures we are.
In the short concluding chapter, I develop the implications of the previous chapters
for the idea that we must, in some sense, be unified agents in order to act intelligently.
To make sense of a variety of features of our own agency, we need distinct models that
cannot be nicely conjoined using a broader framework of representation. I suggest
that this fact is an indication that we are both unified and disunified in a peculiar
sense, and conclude with an argument to that effect. If I am right, we have some
reason to be skeptical of views that require that rational agents act according to




What are the grounds of rational agency? Instrumentalists answer that ques-
tion by appealing to pro-attitudes and beliefs, which together are thought to cause,
explain, and rationalize the things we do for reasons (Davidson, 1980, 3-4). Thus,
when an individual acts for a reason, she intentionally1 x’s in order to y, where an
inclination towards realizing y, along with the belief that x-ing is a means to achieving
y, causes, rationalizes, and explains her action. But that is only half the story. In
addition to describing the grounds of action, accounts of rational agency are meant to
be normative—that is, they aim to show what it means to be right, correct, justified,
or rational in acting. A view of rational agency, then, has two aspects: one explains
what rational agents in fact do by describing their reasons, the other explains what
rational agents should do by prescribing standards of correctness.
Attempting to square these two aspects of rational agency in order to account for
the reasons that do and should move us to act is difficult. Indeed, describing the
central attitudes and capacities that move creatures like you and I to act tends to
produce a variety of views of agency that conflict in a range of cases. Yet many of these
attitudes and capacities seem to be nonoptional—that is, we need a variety of them to
make sense of problems that we all have a stake in managing. The result is a collection
of views that rely on seemingly nonoptional features of agency and provide conflicting
normative guidance. If that is right, how should we think about human agents as
instrumentally rational? I am going to argue that we should think in terms of models.
1The concept of intentionality carries with it significant philosophical baggage. Despite this fact,
however, I want to simply assume for now that when an individual acts in order to accomplish an
end, goal, or aim, he acts intentionally—that is, with an awareness of what he is doing when doing
it. I am going to call that awareness in action ‘practical knowledge’ and, as we proceed through this
chapter, I will point out where it crops up in the views to be surveyed.
23
To understand human agents as instrumentally rational requires a variety of different
representations, which are needed to show the connection between what we in fact do
and what we should do. These different models, or facades of representation, cannot
be integrated into a single, unified view. The upshot is that a complete account of
instrumental agency, one that explains human agents as instrumentally rational, will
be disunified.
To make the argument, I am going to use three different views of instrumental
agency to show that different intellectual capacities and pro-attitudes are needed to
describe human agents as instrumentally rational. Michael Smith, Michael Bratman,
and David Velleman each provide views of rational agency that rely on capacities and
attitudes that are important for understanding our own instrumental rationality. I
spell out what this means and defend my reasons for believing it in Section 2.2 of
this chapter. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I argue that the views of Smith, Bratman,
and Velleman provide conflicting normative guidance in a range of cases, and that,
nevertheless, they are each nonoptional in the sense that, if instrumentalist views are
going to have any chance of fully explaining the reasons that do and should move
human agents to act, the features built into these views need to be accommodated.2
This leads to a puzzle: how do we square the fact that nonoptional features of our own
instrumental agency lead to normative theories that conflict on particular occasions?
I argue that the puzzle cannot be resolved by integrating these views into a single
view of instrumental agency. Instead, responding to it means recognizing our own
complexity as agents and the disjoint facades needed to represent that complexity.
I use insights from the philosophy of science to support that idea. As it happens,
there is often hidden complexity in the things we aim to understand, which is best
represented using a patchwork of facades.
2Notice that I am not suggesting that these specific accounts are themselves necessary for
understanding rational agency. Nor am I endorsing the broad contours of instrumentalist views
of rational agency. Rather, I am simply pointing out that, to the extent that instrumentalist views
of agency successfully account for human agents as rational agents, the features at the heart of each
of the views I survey in this chapter will be needed.
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2.2 Three Views of Instrumental Agency
For each of the following views, their descriptive and prescriptive aspects depend
on intellectual capacities and psychological attitudes that are nonoptional. In this
section, I describe the capacities and attitudes at the heart of each view. In the
sections that follow, I argue that the accounts provide incompatible normative guid-
ance, and that the psychological attitudes around which they are built cannot be
abandoned—that is, they are nonoptional. If I am right, the heart of each view is
indispensable for a complete picture of human agents as instrumentally rational, and
each view is also in normative conflict with the others.
Standard instrumentalism is a view centrally committed to the means-end relation
and tied to an agent’s psychology via beliefs and desires. The latter (desires) provide
agents with motivation; the former (beliefs) show what agents must do in order to
get what they want. Such a minimalistic picture of rational agency might lead one
to wonder: where is the rationality? Bernard Williams provided one kind of answer
to that question. He argued that reasons that explain action must be tied to an
agent’s subjective motivational set—that is, to the set of things an individual could
find worth doing by reflecting on what she already finds desirable (Williams, 1981a,
102). On his view, an agent’s rationality is evident when she reasons cogently from
her particular set of motives to determine what she has reason to do (1981a, 102–103).
The result, as Michael Smith puts it, is that Williams’s
conception of reasons, like Hume’s own, is predicated on a scepticism
about the scope for reasoned change in our desires; predicated on denying
that, through a process of rational deliberation . . . we could ever come to
discover reasons we all share. (Smith, 1994, 165)
In other words, it is rational to do whatever we want to do as long as we figure out
what we want to do in a rational way—that is, as long as we use correct forms of
inference and true beliefs to determine what we want to do.
The picture offered by Williams is one in which what an agent is moved to do,
and what the agent should do, relies on an individual’s beliefs and desires: an agent’s
nature as a rational creature is described by the psychological states that justify
his actions. Anything anyone does for a reason can be described and justified by
appealing to the states of the individual: if an action is done because of a motive
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arrived at via rational processes of deliberation, it is a rational action. This feature
of Williams’s view has resulted in a good deal of criticism because it fails to explain
important aspects of our nature as rational creatures.3 As a result, each of Smith,
Velleman, and Bratman has put significant effort into avoiding the sort of difficulties
found in Williams’s view.4
2.2.1 The Rational Ideal
I begin with Smith’s view. Contrary to Williams, he argues that the very idea of
a normative reason is incompatible with a relativistic perspective. Smith writes:
what my actual desires are to begin with is, on this [Williams’s] relative
conception of reasons, an entirely arbitrary matter, one without any nor-
mative significance of its own. [The desirability of a consideration] thus
turns out to be an entirely arbitrary fact about it. But arbitrariness
is precisely a feature of a consideration that tends to undermine any
normative significance it might initially appear to have. (1994, 172-173,
emphasis in original)
The point is that if normative reasons depend on an arbitrary set of desires, an agent
may have a normative reason to do anything. But having a normative reason to do
anything is incompatible with the idea that individuals should do some things and
not others.
To overcome this problem, Smith argues for a view that grounds normative reasons
in beliefs about what fully rational agents would desire. He thinks that by reflecting
on the concept of desirability, less-than-fully rational agents will converge on beliefs
about what categorical desires are necessary for organizing and living life. Again,
from Smith:
The epistemology of value . . . requires the individual to see herself as one
among a group of individuals who are trying to answer a common set of
3See, especially, Christine Korsgaard’s “Skepticism about Practical Reason” (2001), as well as
Elijah Millgram’s “Williams’ Argument Against External Reasons” (1996).
4Each view also depends on a fairly robust notion of what I am calling ‘practical knowledge’,
which is the idea that when acting rationally, individuals must understand what they are doing while
they are doing it. The idea that we act with such knowledge will be important as a point of contrast
between instrumentalist models and those that I will be developing later in the dissertation. But for
now, the issue of knowledge in action can in large measure be placed on the back burner in order to
focus on the attitudes and capacities necessary for understanding human agents as instrumentally
rational.
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questions, questions whose formulation does not require reference to any
one of them in particular. . . . In deciding which desires to begin from
in the attempt to find a systematic justification of our desires, then, we
have no choice but to look for desires that are . . . widely shared. We
have no choice given two key assumptions: first, that the goal is to find
a single set of desires that all rational creatures would acknowledge to
be systematically justifiable, and second, that none of us has any special
epistemic gifts that would justify us in privileging our own desires and
judgements over the desires and judgements of others . . . . (1994, 176–177)
The method is a version of reflective equilibrium. By considering the widely shared
background desires of agents, and denying privileged epistemic status to the desires
of particular individuals, Smith thinks that less-than-fully rational agents can figure
out what there is normative reason to do.
While we can ignore the difficulties associated with Smith’s view about the origins
of normative reasons, we should notice that he relies on intellectual capacities associ-
ated with pro-attitudes shared by all agents to connect the descriptive and normative
aspects of his conception of rational agency. In particular, it is in virtue of shared
desires, and a capacity to reason subjunctively, that less-than-fully rational agents are
able to determine what fully rational agents would desire. Such subjunctive reasoning
results in beliefs that then shape the desires of less-than-fully rational agents, because,
Smith believes, an agent’s desires are sensitive to beliefs about the desires of their
fully rational counterparts. In this way, the desires of human agents can, according to
Smith, be used to determine the counterfactual desires of fully rational agents, which
set the normative standard for agents like you and I.
But the movement from the desires of less-than-fully rational agents to those of
fully rational agents is only possible if we assume shared intellectual capacities and
a deep understanding of our own desires. It is because human desires are similar to
those of their fully rational counterparts, and because we know what they are and
can reason subjunctively about them, that Smith thinks we can derive normative
reasons for action from the desires typical of human agents. The claim that “if we
believe that we would desire to φ if we were fully rational then we rationally should
desire to φ” (Smith, 1994, 177) hinges on our capacity to reason subjunctively about
desires and beliefs similar to the desires and beliefs of fully rational agents (1994, 165,
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for example). And of course, that requires a fairly robust understanding of our own
motivational psychology and the reasons that move us to act when acting on purpose.
2.2.2 Autonomous Agents
For Smith to make good on the normative aspect of his view, he will need to say
more about why an individual’s desires should be sensitive to her subjunctive beliefs
about the desires of rational agents. Furthermore, even with that issue addressed,
Smith owes us a substantive account of normative reasons. He cannot escape that
obligation by simply suggesting that “substantive convergence [on normative reasons]
is always assumed to be available, in so far as we converse and argue about the
reasons we have” (Smith, 1994, 173). If conversation and argument could guarantee
convergence on what counts as a normative reason for action, we would expect
some convergence after 2,500 years of philosophy. Since we do not see that type
of convergence, we should be skeptical that Smith can furnish what he owes.
Velleman seems to agree. He suggests that providing an account of normative
reasons from an independent conception of rationality is not likely to be forthcoming
(Velleman, 2000, 179). How, then, does Velleman hope to provide an account of
rational agency with prescriptive content? Rather than trying to formulate a sub-
stantive account of rationality, Velleman aims to locate a feature of agency that can
establish the correctness of actions as such. The idea is to determine an object at
which all actions must aim in order to be successful as actions. By locating such
an object, Velleman thinks he can establish an action’s correctness by determining
whether it satisfies this aim. Put differently, Velleman’s hope is to determine what
feature of agency could establish an action as justified by determining what feature
of agency all actions must aim to realize. Rather than trying to forge a connection
between what agents are motivated to do and what they should be motivated to
do by locating features of rationality, Velleman’s aim is to bring the descriptive and
prescriptive aspects of his view together by locating a feature of agency shared by all
agents capable of doing things for reasons.
What, then, does Velleman think the feature of agency is that establishes the
correctness of actions? The short answer is that it is the higher-order inclination for
self-understanding. As Velleman writes:
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As a human being, you are naturally endowed with a theoretical in-
telligence, which is not a passive receiver of information but an active
synthesizer, striving to make incoming information hang together so as to
represent an intelligible world. You are also endowed with an objective
self-awareness, a concept of yourself as a part of the world to be under-
stood. These two endowments inevitably combine to yield the aim of
understanding yourself, which inevitably motivates you to do what you
can understand . . . . (2009, 136)
This passage is a toned-down version of more controversial themes Velleman explored
in The Possibility of Practical Reason (2000). There he writes:
Suppose you have an inclination toward being in conscious control of your
next move. This inclination will inhibit you from doing anything out
of other motives until you’ve accepted that you’re going to—precisely so
that you’ll do it only after and because you know it, and hence under
conscious control. Once you accept that you’re going to do something,
however, the inclination toward being in conscious control will reinforce
your other motives for doing it, since doing what you’ve accepted you’ll do
is what puts consciousness in control. Your inclination toward conscious
control is thus converted, from an inhibition against doing something into
a motive for doing it, by your accepting that you’ll do it. (Velleman, 2000,
196)
According to these passages, it is by reflecting on what we believe our desires and
preferences to be that we come to have the desires and preferences we have. These
desires and preferences, in turn, lead us to act in ways that are intelligible to us.
The thought is that by forming beliefs about oneself and one’s place in the world,
individuals are led to do whatever it is they believe about themselves.5 This concep-
tion of rational agency, of course, requires a fairly robust commitment to practical
knowledge. Indeed, on Velleman’s view, it is by acting from an understanding of what
one knows about oneself that agents take control of their actions as rational agents.6
For example, suppose I believe that I am the kind of person who prefers staying home
Friday nights to play World of Warcraft. Reflecting on myself and realizing that this
belief represents my preferences, I am led to do what I prefer as I reflect on what I
5The terminology being used here might lead the reader to believe that Velleman endorses the
idea of a “self” as an essential part of agency. He does not. For Velleman, the self is just “a word
used to express reflexivity” (Velleman, 2002, 111).
6The role of what I am calling practical knowledge in Velleman’s account of rational action is
admirably characterized and challenged by Kieran Setiya in “Practical Knowledge” (2008).
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believe. So when Friday comes around and I am thinking about what to do, my belief
about myself influences what I do, and, sure enough, I find myself comfortably doing
what I believe I wanted to do all along. As Velleman puts it:
because I want to do whatever makes sense to me, I can jump to the
conclusion that I prefer to do something, since doing it will then make
sense to me, and I shall therefore prefer to do it. If my conclusion
represents itself accurately, as a self-fulfilling belief adopted out of a desire
for its fulfillment, then it will constitute a full-blooded intention. (1989,
181)
For Velleman, what an agent wants to do is determined by deliberating on what
she believes about her own desires and preferences.7 Once an agent knows what
she believes about herself—that is, once she possesses knowledge of her desires and
preferences—a higher-order desire to act only on what is intelligible to her engages her
beliefs and causes her to act. Only in this way is an action fully in one’s conscious
control: what an agent does is done intentionally only when she knows what she
desires and is motivated to do what she understands her desires to be. On the
view proffered by Velleman, rational agency is agency directed at the aim of self-
understanding.
But why should an agent act in order to achieve self-understanding? In other
words, what is the connection between what we are in fact moved to do and what we
should be moved to do on Velleman’s account? We already have the answer: it is the
capacity of an agent to be self-intelligible along with the higher-order desire to act
intelligibly. An action is done correctly when it is done to realize the aim of acting
intelligibly to oneself. Again, from Velleman:
I claim that the criterion of correctness for action is how it would make
sense to behave, because action consists in behavior that aims at making
sense, by being sensitive to considerations of its own intelligibility, which
therefore qualify as reasons for acting. (Velleman, 2009, 135)
An agent has a justified reason to act when what she wants to do is intelligible to her
as a reason because of what she knows about herself. Rational human agency, then,
7A peculiar result of this move by Velleman is that deliberation about what to do reduces to
theoretical deliberation—that is, for Velleman, practical reasoning properly construed is theoretical
reasoning. As a result, the mechanism for rationally determining an individual’s ends will be the
relation between an individual’s beliefs and the consequences of those beliefs according to valid forms
of theoretical inference.
30
is explained by a particular intellectual capacity associated with a higher-order desire
shared by all rational agents.
2.2.3 Planning Agents
Following Velleman, Bratman explains the grounds of rational agency using intel-
lectual capacities and attitudes that are required for intentional action. In contrast to
Velleman, however, Bratman thinks these aspects of agency are more varied, complex,
and subtle than those argued for by Velleman. Indeed, Bratman emphasizes a trio of
features—an agent’s reflectiveness, planfulness, and self-conception as a temporally
extended creature—that produce a collection of pro-attitudes at the core of agency,
which he uses to argue for an account of rational agency with normative content. In
particular, Bratman’s account relies heavily on the fact that self-reflective, temporally
extended agents must be capable of cross-temporal organization in order to achieve
their long-term goals. The picture relies on a fairly robust notion of self-knowledge:
when an individual acts on purpose for reasons, the action is performed from an
understanding of the cross-temporal attitudes responsible for holding the agent to-
gether. As a result, what agents are in fact motivated to do and what they should be
motivated to do are connected by Bratman via the capacities and attitudes required
for cross-temporal persistence as an organized agent.
Let me explain. The fact that we are reflective beings allows us to make judgments
about ourselves. In particular, it allows us to see ourselves as creatures who are
temporally extended, which in turn fosters the idea that we must live with an eye
toward the future. Thinking about what to do often is planning for what we will do
in the future. To persist through time and to effectively realize one’s future plans,
certain psychological attitudes are required. These attitudes, along with the capacity
to reflectively organize oneself through time, are required to act for the short, and
long-term, future. So, from the fact that agents are reflective, planful, and temporally
extended, Bratman argues for a collection of higher-order attitudes that require the
capacity for cross-temporal self-organization, which serve to hold the agent together
through time.
Of particular concern are the higher-order attitudes that are the basis of an agent’s
identity over time. These ‘self-governing policies’ fit together to produce the Lockean
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ties that hold individuals together as the same agent. Bratman writes:
[Self-governing policies] support the cross-temporal organization of basic
forms of practical thought and action in ways that involve associated
Lockean ties of cross-reference and continuity. And this is part of their
characteristic functioning. In this characteristic functioning, they help
organize the practical life of the agent: they help organize, over time, the
agent’s practical thinking (including forms of deliberation and planning),
the agent’s activity, and the complex interrelations between such thought
and action; they help constitute and support the temporally extended,
interwoven, interlocking structure of coordinated practical thought and
action. And they do all this in part by way of constituting and supporting
relevant Lockean ties, Lockean ties that help constitute the persistence
of that agent as one and the same over time. In functioning in these
ways, they help constitute the metaphysical backbone of our temporally
extended practical thought and action. And it seems to me reasonable to
say that it is in playing these Lockean roles in organizing the temporally
extended practical thought and action of one and the same agent, that
these attitudes earn the authority to speak for that agent. These attitudes
have agential authority at a time in virtue of their roles in constituting
and supporting the interwoven, interlocking, structures of agency of that
person over time. (2007c, 245)
According to this picture, the higher-order attitudes responsible for an agent’s per-
sistence over time organize thought and action in a manner that speaks for the agent.
As a result, when agents think or act according to them, those thoughts and actions
proceed from a standpoint that is uniquely the individual’s own. In this sense, an
agent’s higher-order policies justify the things she does.
This is only true, however, if the agent is, in a certain sense, satisfied with her
higher-order policies. The idea that higher-order policies justify an agent’s actions
only if she is satisfied with them provides a path for Bratman to say more about
rationality and its role in agency. In particular, since higher-order policies are the
attitudes that tie an individual agent together over time, “they differ in basic ways
from ordinary desires: in particular, they are subject to distinctive rational norms
of consistency, coherence, and stability” (Bratman, 2007a, 27). To hold themselves
together over time, agents must resolve potential conflicts between attitudes that
define them as the same individual. This, of course, requires knowing what the
motivational attitudes that hold one together are. Cross-temporal organization, then,
requires self-knowledge. Once these conditions are met, norms of rationality serve to
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constrain the attitudes of individuals through time, because “to be satisfied with
a self-governing policy . . . is for that policy not to be challenged by one’s other
self-governing policies (Bratman, 2007a, 44). The picture we have from Bratman,
then, looks something like the following: the higher-order policies that tie us together
as individuals and organize our thought and action through time require certain
demands of rationality to be met. When we are aware of these policies, act in accord
with them, and do so with an awareness that we are doing so, we act as rational
agents. If that is right, rational agency requires practical knowledge as a temporally
persisting agent.
As we see, Bratman’s self-governing policies parallel Velleman’s higher-order desire
for control. Just as the higher-order desire for control brings actions done to achieve
lower-order desires under the constraints of rational norms, Bratman’s policies provide
ends that establish the conditions for acting on what one desires. Because of this,
Bratman has a story to tell about when an action is justified. He writes:
To endorse a desire is, roughly, for that desire to be endorsed by attitudes
whose role it is to support the temporal organization of agency by way of
constituting and supporting Lockean ties characteristic of [one’s] temporal
persistence. (Bratman, 2007a, 31)
Now, since the attitudes that support the temporal organization of agency through
time are self-governing policies with which the agent is satisfied, Bratman can claim
a few pages later that:
An agent’s reflective endorsement of a desire is ensured by a self-governing
policy—a policy with which the agent is satisfied—of treating that desire
as providing a justifying end in motivationally effective practical reason-
ing. (Bratman, 2007a, 40)
In other words, an agent is justified in treating a desire as something worth acting on
to the extent that it accords with higher-order policies, which meet specific demands
of rationality and are responsible for holding the individual together as a temporally
persisting agent.
So from the fact that we are temporally extended beings with the capacity to
reflect and plan our lives, Bratman derives a conception of rational agency that has
normative content. We should intentionally x in order to y when y is endorsed by
policies with which we are satisfied. In this way, the things we do for reasons stand in
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the service of psychological attitudes required for our own temporal persistence. The
descriptive and prescriptive components of Bratman’s account, then, depend on an
agent’s knowledge of the higher-order policies at the heart of agency and a capacity
for self-organization.
2.3 Prescriptive Discord
I have argued that Smith, Velleman, and Bratman rely on specific intellectual
capacities, and their associated pro-attitudes, to connect what we are moved to do
with what we should be moved to do. In each case, it is because agents possess certain
capacities, which are tied to the standpoint of their own motivational psychology, that
they are able to figure out what they should do and to act with an understanding of
what they are doing as rational creatures. To recapitulate: for Smith, the grounds of
rational agency are determined by the intellectual capacity of agents to think coun-
terfactually about desires. By determining what desires the fully rational agent would
have, an individual can figure out what desires she should have. Velleman, on the
other hand, appeals to the capacity for self-intelligibility and the higher-order desire to
understand one’s actions. Because intentional action requires the higher-order desire
to do what one understands, intentional actions occur only after an individual has
made herself intelligible to herself. In contrast, Bratman’s more nuanced account is
centered around an agent’s capacity for cross-temporal organization and higher-order
attitudes necessary for temporally extended agency. It is in virtue of the fact that we
are reflective, planful, and temporally extended that we adopt policies, values, plans,
and intentions to organize our thought and action over time. In each case, when an
individual acts, he acts with and from an awareness of what he is doing when doing
it.
The intellectual capacities peculiar to each view are straightforwardly distinct.
Not only do they each describe substantively different capacities, they also deliver
conflicting normative guidance for rational creatures. The result is three discordant
portraits of rational agency.8 Despite this fact, however, the capacities and attitudes
8One natural response to this point is to suggest integrating the discordant views into a single,
comprehensive view of instrumental agency. I address this issue in Section 2.5 of this chapter.
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at the heart of each view are needed to manage practical issues important to the
lives of human agents. I will take up that latter point—that is, the idea that the
central attitudes and capacities put forward by Smith, Velleman, and Bratman are
nonoptional when portraying the instrumental rationality of human agents—in the
next section. For now, I want to provide support for the idea that these substantively
different capacities result in discordant normative demands.
2.3.1 Smithian Agents
For Smith, less-than-fully rational agents figure out what they should do by
determining what fully rational agents would desire to do. As he writes:
our φ-ing in circumstance C is right if and only if we would desire that
we φ in C, if we were fully rational, where φ-ing in C is an act of the
appropriate substantive kind : that is, it is an act of the kind picked out in
the platitudes about substance. (Smith, 1994, 184, emphasis in original)
The emphasized portion of that quotation is a gesture at a promise that Smith does
not fulfill: without an account of substantive rationality, Smith is not in a position to
tell anyone what they should do. Nevertheless, the point is clear enough: by thinking
subjunctively about the desires of fully rational agents, Smith thinks we can figure
out what we should do on any particular occasion. An example will be useful to bring
out the features peculiar to Smith’s view.
Suppose an individual is trying to figure out what to do. Imagine, for example,
that Mary, a genuinely selfish individual with a policy of acting only when it will
advance either her immediate or long-term ambitions, is confronted with a practical
problem. The airplane she is in has encountered some technical difficulties. It is going
to attempt an emergency landing in a nearby river, and everyone has been asked to
put on a life-jacket. But the woman sitting next to Mary, who confesses that she
does not know how to swim, is without one. Mary, who is an excellent swimmer,
understands the situation and must decide what to do. On Smith’s account, the way
to figure out what it would be right to do is to think about what a fully rational
agent would do. If we assume that such an agent would give up her life-jacket in such
a situation, Mary should give up her life-jacket.9 And, furthermore, if Mary thought
9Again, since Smith does not provide a substantive account of rationality, all we can go on to
make the case that an individual is acting rationally (or not) are intuitions. There are obvious
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subjunctively about a fully rational agent, she would see that she has a normative
reason to give up her life-jacket.
Provided certain assumptions about rationality, Smith’s portrait provides norma-
tive guidance that is different from what would be required of Mary by the other
accounts. On Velleman’s view, rational agency is acting in order to be intelligible to
oneself. Since we have assumed Mary is genuinely selfish, giving up her life-jacket
would be unintelligible to her, and as a result, she should not do it. Similarly, for Brat-
man, an individual has reason to x when x-ing would be endorsed by the pro-attitudes
responsible for her cross-temporal organization. Since the central pro-attitude that
organizes Mary through time is her selfishness, and since her selfishness could not
endorse such an action, she should not give up her life-jacket.
Now, I do not mean these points to be objections to any of these views. Whether
Mary should give up her life-jacket does not matter to the point I am making. All that
matters is that Smith’s account suggests a different course of action for Mary than
those of Velleman and Bratman. We may cringe at the idea of a person not giving
up her life-jacket for such selfish reasons, but we still understand such an action as
reasonable—as something that, though cringeworthy, Mary could find reason to do.
If all this is right, it looks like Smith’s view is not concordant with those of Bratman
and Velleman: there are occasions when Smith’s agent should do things differently
than the agent’s portrayed by the latter two theorists.
2.3.2 Deep Desires
But what about the views of Velleman and Bratman? Are their views consonant
with each other? To see that they are not, a couple of additional examples will be
helpful. Consider Velleman’s view first. The opening line of his early book, Practical
Reflection, is a question. He asks: “what do you see when you look at your face
in the mirror?” (1989, 3). The question is significant because it frames the idea
that agents must look at themselves in order to make their actions intelligible. It is
also informative in that it shows how Velleman thinks about the distance between an
problems with that fact. As a result, I have tried to be as neutral as possible about rationality while
still making the examples work.
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agent and her sense of agency: as though moving closer to the mirror could move me
closer to my sense of self. The view is, I think, peculiar in that sense. A glance in the
mirror may not tell me much about myself, but if I really stare, I can discover things
about myself that were previously unnoticed. The metaphor is an apt expression of
his view.
Suppose, then, that I have a tendency to avoid risk. I prefer to stay away from
high places, I prefer not to speed, I do not swim in the ocean, I do not ski, I only
ride my bicycle while wearing a helmet, and so on. Acting in accordance with these
desires and preferences, I decide to go traveling through Zimbabwe with a friend who
is much riskier than I am. During our travels, she decides to go bungie jumping over
the Zambezi River. I decide to tag along without intending to participate. At some
point, however, I am asked, “Would you like to have a go?” Initially, I refuse (since
I know what I prefer), but after a bit of internal reflection I find that deep down I
do desire to do something risky, just this once. It is as if I pull the mirror of myself
slightly closer and see that, in fact, I do desire to take a significant risk. Although I
had been unaware of this feature of myself, now, once I pay attention, I see clearly
that I do have such a desire. But I know bungie jumping over the Zambezi River
is one of the more unsafe locations to take on such risky behavior. Nevertheless, I
believe the desire reflects what I want to do.
Intuitively, such risky behavior might seem irrational in the sense required of
Smith’s view.10 Indeed, if we consider the risky behavior to be something a Smithian
agent would not desire to do (because it cannot be derived from the desires of a
sufficiently large set of other agents), Smith’s view is going to have a difficult time
representing the idea that I should go bungie jumping. Similarly, since the behavior is
straightforwardly incompatible with pro-attitudes that organize my agency through
time, it is not something that Bratman’s account can portray as a justifiable action.
Since my policies, which have been responsible for organizing my agency over time,
10In other words, taking on such risk might not reflect the widely shared desires that could, on
Smith’s account, be used to determine the counterfactual desires of fully rational agents. To avoid
confusion, I will use the phrase ‘Smithian agent’ to refer to the counterfactual ideal characteristic of
Smith’s view. A Smithian agent, then, is an agent whose counterfactual desires have been established
by subjunctively reasoning from the desires of a large enough group of individual agents.
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clearly conflict with such a desire, Bratman has no way of making sense of the idea
that I should go bungie jumping on this occasion. But on Velleman’s account, my
desire to do what I understand about myself, and my capacity for understanding
myself, provide a normative reason for jumping. Since taking the plunge is the only
way to make myself intelligible to myself, and since I have a higher-order desire to
do what makes myself intelligible to myself, I should jump. If that is right, then, as
with Smith’s view, Velleman offers a portrait of agency that provides substantively
different normative guidance on particular occasions from the other two.
2.3.3 Planning Agents
Another example, which will bring out the idiosyncrasies of Bratman’s view, will
prove helpful as well. Consider, then, an agent who knows she does not want to x
because x-ing is something a Smithian agent would not want to do. Nevertheless,
x-ing is an action that is endorsed by pro-attitudes that organize and give authority
to her agency over time. For example, Joy has always valued learning, has made it a
policy of hers to learn as much as she can in life, has plans of becoming a professional
philosopher, and has recently been accepted to graduate school. She knows that state
and federal budgets have cut funding to higher education, she knows that these cuts
tend to hit disciplines in the humanities the hardest, she knows that the job market
for philosophy is over-saturated with qualified people, and she knows that graduate
school does not pay much. Indeed, thinking about these facts, she realizes that she
is going to be poor for several years to come, that she will likely have a difficult time
finding a job, and that even if she does find a job, it will be one that, given funding
priorities, may be difficult to keep. But Joy does not want to be poor, she does not
want to have a hard time finding employment, and she does not want a potentially
unstable job. What should she do?
Again, it does not matter for my purposes what the right answer is, or whether
there is a right answer. Rather, all I want to point out is that the different theorists
must provide substantively different answers to this question. Assuming that desiring
to pursue a discipline that has small (and diminishing) hope for future employment
is not a widely shared aim of agents, a Smithian agent would not desire to do such a
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thing. As a result, it would be difficult on Smith’s account to claim that Joy should
go to graduate school. Similarly, if Joy realizes upon deep reflection that she does not
desire (or prefer) to be poor, out of work, and in an unstable job, Velleman cannot
represent the idea that Joy should go to graduate school. Indeed, on Velleman’s
account, doing so would be an act of estrangement. Yet, for Bratman, Joy does have
justifying reasons for going to graduate school. Since she has organized her agency
according to these plans, policies, and values, continuing on with them is part of what
it would be for her to continue to persist as the agent she is. Bratman’s portrayal of
rational agency, then, can prescribe actions for Joy on this occasion that cannot be
prescribed by the other two theorists.
The discordance I am emphasizing with these examples should not be particularly
surprising. Views that depend on distinct intellectual capacities associated with
different pro-attitudes will naturally result in normative principles that diverge in
a range of cases. But that divergence suggests something interesting. In particular, it
suggests that instrumental agency is not a uniform concept. Since in each case what
we are moved to do and what we should do according to the individual views depends
upon capacities and pro-attitudes that are different, the guidance afforded by those
views varies as well. Yet despite the difference between the normative aspects of these
views, most of us, I think, can recognize the reasons provided by each as compelling
reasons for action.
2.4 Nonoptional Capacities of Agency
At this point, we have on our plate a collection of views that are normatively
incompatible: on particular occasions, what an agent should do according to one
view will not necessarily transfer to the others. If that is right, we are faced with
a problem: we can either embrace one account while rejecting the others, adopt a
strategy that can integrate the incompatible views, or reject them all.
In this section, I am going to argue that we should not accept the first or third
options11 by showing that the intellectual capacities and pro-attitudes emphasized by
Smith, Velleman, and Bratman are nonoptional in the sense that, if instrumentalist
11I turn to the second option in Section 2.5 of this chapter.
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views fail to account for the different capacities and attitudes used by each theorist, we
are left with a distorted conception of ourselves as instrumentally rational creatures.
This is due to the fact that the capacities and attitudes at the heart of each view are
needed to deal with practical issues human agents have an interest in managing. In
this sense, each account is nonoptional. If I am right, we are faced with a further
puzzle: how should we square the fact that three presumptive theories of instrumental
agency appear to be nonoptional, yet result in normative demands that conflict?
2.4.1 Subjunctive Thought
Consider Smith’s view first. To dismiss his view in favor of those proffered by
either Velleman or Bratman would mean abandoning—or at least consigning to a
subordinate role—subjunctive thought as a strategy for determining what one should
do. But subjunctive thought serves an essential role in resolving a variety of practical
problems, problems that are unlikely to be addressed using the modes of reasoning
typified by the views of Velleman and Bratman. In other words, there are cases where
asking, “what would a rational agent do?” is the only way to figure out what one
should do. Asking whether my desires accord with the plans and policies responsible
for my cross-temporal organization, or whether what I want to do is intelligible to me
as something that it makes sense for me to do, cannot provide the right answer.
Suppose, for example, that an individual is trying to overcome something of a
compulsion, say, an urge for cleanliness. It is not a particularly negative compulsion;
the individual cleans mostly when others are not around, he does not do it to excess,
and he does not hurt anyone by doing it. In fact, cleaning is something that he really
enjoys: it is something that he is happy to do, an aspect of himself with which he is
satisfied, something that organizes him and his life over time, and something that,
even after deep reflection, he desires to do and is motivated to do in the light of his
own self-understanding. In short, his compulsion is, given the views of Velleman and
Bratman, something that he should keep doing. But it is still a compulsion.
A representation of rational agency that grounds practical normativity in sub-
junctive thought is in a unique position to provide practical direction in such a case.
It provides a resource for thinking about what to do that does not depend solely on
an individual’s own motivational attitudes. In this way, an individual compelled to
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clean can ask, “What would an individual without such a compulsion do?” and in
asking that question, he can find real practical guidance. The value of the mode of
thought, then, is to be found in the fact that an individual who recognizes something
about himself, something that he enjoys, identifies with, and finds deeply satisfying,
can still recognize that it is not a particularly virtuous feature of his own agency.
In such a case, he needs a way to think about what he should do—that is, how
he should live—that does not rely on his own higher-order attitudes. Subjunctive
thought provides the necessary resource.
The point generalizes: since we all have features about ourselves that we like—
features that we use to organize our agency over time, things that we enjoy, find
satisfying, and believe to reflect desires that we really endorse—yet recognize to be
less-than-ideal, we need a way to think about what to do that does not depend on
those features. We all have habits, ticks, compulsions, urges, and dispositions that
we thoroughly identify with, find satisfying, and enjoy, yet recognize that we need to
change. But an account of normativity that is grounded solely in the attitudes of our
own agency will lack the resources for thinking about how to change them.
Changing aspects of ourselves that we like because we think they are less-than-
ideal is not the only reason we need the capacity for subjunctive thought in our
practical repertoire. Consider, in addition, its role in practical instruction—that is,
in instruction about how to do things. In order to learn how to perform new tasks,
or to learn how to perform tasks better, agents frequently rely on their capacity to
imagine and think about what is not the case, or what is only possible in an imagined
scenario. Suppose, for example, that an acting student is trying to learn how to
convincingly portray the Scarecrow from the Wizard of Oz in an upcoming play. To
do so, she must think about an imagined scenario: in what way would a creature
without a brain behave? Only by reflecting on such an impossible scenario will she
learn how to convincingly act like Scarecrow. Of course, this mode of thought is not
just used to learn how to play-act. It is also used to do a variety of other things:
even top athletes learn to play better by imagining what their heros would do. Tiger
Woods, for example, might try to improve his golf game by imagining what Jack
Nicklaus would do. The parallel with Smith’s normative claims is transparent. It
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seems, then, that subjunctive thought plays a significant role in determining what
one should do in a variety of cases that are important to the practical management of
human agency. To give it up would require giving up important aspects of our own
lives.
We cannot subordinate the normative role of subjunctive thought to the accounts
put forward by Velleman or Bratman either. Since their accounts rely solely on an
individual’s own sense of agency to provide normative guidance, their accounts are
unable to make sense of an individual setting out to make changes to his agency if
he is satisfied with them. If we know who we are and are satisfied with who we are,
there is no reason, on the views of Bratman and Velleman, to change.12 To make such
changes, we need the kind of practical normativity that we get from counterfactual
thinking about other, more ideal agents.
2.4.2 Self-Intelligibility
So there seem to be good reasons for endorsing Smith’s commitment to subjunctive
thought as the means for determining one’s normative reasons for action. But the
capacity and attitude at the heart of Velleman’s view seem necessary too. Indeed,
as with Smith’s account, if we give up on acting to be intelligible to ourselves, we
give up on an essential feature of our own agency, one that is needed to manage
practical problems we all (at one time or another) have an interest in managing.
These problems, I want to suggest, cannot be managed using the views of Smith or
Bratman. In other words, sometimes it is only by asking “how can I act to make
myself intelligible to myself?” that we can figure out what to do.
To make the case that the heart of Velleman’s view is needed to forestall a distorted
view of ourselves as instrumental agents, consider the type of practical problem it is
particularly adept at addressing. For nearly all of us, there comes a time in life when
we must figure out what we want to do with ourselves by reflecting on our desires
and preferences. Frequently, such self-reflection marks a sharp break in the direction
12One might suggest that a Bratmanian agent could adopt, as a cross-temporally organizing policy,
the practical mode of thought characteristic of Smith’s view. In this way, the normative role that
such thinking plays in Smith’s account could be subordinated to Bratman’s view. The worry is a
version of the integration problem that I have been putting off for some time now. I will return to
that problem soon.
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and fortunes of our lives, because it reveals aspects of our agency that are at odds
with the aims, ambitions, and hopes that others have instilled in us. Despite the
best intentions of our mothers, we do not all hope to become (as Willie Nelson notes)
doctors and lawyers and such. Indeed, after reflecting on what we want, many of us
are compelled to abandon the plans, hopes, and ambitions that have to that point
defined us. This is due, I take it, to the fact that we recognize that such plans, hopes,
and ambitions are incongruous with our own preferences and desires. Similarly, when
we are trying to figure out what to do with our lives, reflecting on the counterfactual
desires of a Smithian agent is of no help. We do not want to know what some
hypothetical collection of counterfactual desires would do, we want to know what we,
as individuals, should do. To figure that out, we have to determine our actual desires
and preferences about how to live by looking inward.
The idea is a familiar one. Consider, for example, a college dropout who abandons
his plans to become a lawyer in order to make it big as an artist in New York City.13
Such a decision, we can assume, is motivated by deep reflection and the type of soul
searching typical of a college student trying to figure out which of his desires and
preferences really reflect his actual desires and preferences about how to live. After
reflection, he acts in order to be intelligible to himself. In other words, he adopts a
course of living that, to anyone other than himself, seems to be both out of touch
with who he has been and out of line with the counterfactual desires of Smithian
agents, yet he seems justified in doing so. If he did not go to New York after figuring
out what he really desires and prefers to do, he would betray himself—that is, his
actions would be unintelligible to him as his actions.
Of course, it is not difficult to imagine situations of this type—situations where
an individual acts intelligibly to himself by acting spontaneously on the desires and
preferences he discovers after deep self-reflection—and the reason such situations are
not difficult to imagine is that they are familiar. Velleman’s view, of course, has
13The story I am telling parallels one told by Bernard Williams in “Moral Luck” (1981b). Williams
uses the story for entirely different purposes, however. My point, of course, is not about the role of
luck in the lives of agents, but, rather, about the need of instrumentalist views to account for agents
that act in order to be intelligible to themselves. I assume that what makes that need compelling is
an intuition similar to the one used by Williams to drive his discussion of Gauguin.
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the resources to make sense of the actions typified by such cases as actions that the
agent should perform. The other views are not in such a comfortable position. Human
agents who are committed to their past policies, plans, and values as definitive aspects
of who they really are will have difficulty making sense of such actions as actions they
should perform. Similarly, someone who acts only on the presumed counterfactual
desires of a Smithian agent will have difficulty making sense of the idea that one
should spontaneously go to New York, since it is unlikely that such counterfactual
desires could be derived from the collection of desires typical of others. Such views,
then, do not provide a way to make sense of acting in an effort to be true to ourselves
in the way Velleman’s view does.
The example may seem slightly unusual, but to the extent that it is, it is only
to make a point. Instrumentalist views of rational agency need to make sense of
the capacity for individuals to justifiably do things that are out of line with the
plans, policies, and goals that have sustained and organized their lives. Conversion
to a new cause, or to a new mode of life, after engaging in deep personal reflection
is a substantive event in the lives of human agents, and theories that fail to make
sense of such events distort the way we understand the reasons we have for doing
the things we do. Sometimes we feel compelled to give up on our planned lives;
sometimes the only way to be intelligible to ourselves (after taking a closer look at
our actual desires and preferences) is to move to New York in order to be an artist.
The mode of thought leading to such actions cannot be represented as being authored
by a Bratmanian agent, and, similarly, if our self-intelligible actions are motivated
by desires and preferences that are out of line with the counterfactual desires of a
Smithian agent (and it is not a stretch to assume that they frequently are), they
cannot be represented in that way either.
It is precisely because deep reflection on what we really want often promotes
actions that we feel compelled to perform that ignoring that aspect of our agency
would distort our understanding of instrumental human agency. Indeed, I take that
aspect of Velleman’s view to be one of its most appealing features. It is committed
to the value of self-knowledge and the importance of acting in accordance with what
one knows about oneself. To give up on the mode of reasoning, and the actions that
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stem from it, is to abandon something of deep practical importance to the lives of
human agents. Consequently, we need the capacities at the heart of Velleman’s view.
Sometimes the only way for an individual to control his own life is to figure out what
he really believes about his desires and preferences, and to act in an effort to make
himself more intelligible to himself.
2.4.3 Temporal Organization
As with the accounts of Smith and Velleman, so too with Bratman’s: understand-
ing ourselves as instrumental agents requires incorporating the heart of his view.
Without it, we give up on representing aspects of human agency important to our
practical lives. This way of thinking seems to be endorsed by Bratman himself.
His early work rested on the idea that we would be different kinds of creatures if
the capacities and attitudes at the heart of his view were not part of our cognitive
makeup (Bratman, 1987), and these ideas have been expanded in Structures of Agency
to include values, policies, and other higher-order pro-attitudes. If we try to abandon
these features of our agency, or subordinate them to the alternatives of Smith or
Velleman, we abandon part of our practical repertoire, which is needed to manage
our lives as human agents.
Again, to see this, consider the kind of practical problems that a Bratmanian view
of agency is particularly adept at addressing. It is difficult to deny the importance
of values, plans, and policies when explaining and justifying the things we do for
reasons. Indeed, some of the things we do seem to be done solely because of the plans,
policies, and goals we possess. Suppose, for example, that an individual possesses a
self-governing policy to be temperate and sober. His father was an alcoholic, so he has
been committed to not drinking his entire life, and, in fact, the policy is an aspect of
his agency with which he is satisfied. Yet suppose that one morning, such an agent is
asked by a group of coworkers to go out for a drink that evening. After an afternoon
of deep reflection on what he really desires and prefers, he realize that he really does,
deep down, want to go out drinking with his coworkers. And in fact, he also believes
that going out for a drink would be what a Smithian agent would do. After all, the
boss will be there, and he will be able to chat with him about his latest project. As a
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result, the night promises to help his career. (Certainly, the desire to help one’s career
must be, if anything is, contained in the counterfactual desires of a Smithian agent.)
Nevertheless, when the time comes, he turns down the offer. When asked why he does
not want to go out, he responds (maybe a little stiﬄy), “Because I value temperance
and have a policy against alcohol consumption.” The response, I take it, explains
and justifies his action. Appealing to the temporally persisting policies and values
with which we identify seems straightforwardly reasonable, and asking someone to
act against them, even if such an action is something a Smithian agent would do, or
something you know the individual really, deep down, desires to do, is an affront. It is
asking them to give up on who they have been. If that is right, instrumentalist views
need to account for this aspect of human agency when accounting for our instrumental
rationality, and it does not look like Smith and Velleman are in a position to do so.
But such actions, and the reasons that motivate them, might, with a little twisting
and turning, still be explained by Velleman and Smith. In order to see the peculiarity
of Bratman’s account, then, we need an example that runs contrary to what an agent,
after due reflection, prefers to do, and which also is not something a Smithian agent
would desire to do. Consider, then, the family traditions to which many of us are
beholden, traditions which express the values, policies, and plans peculiar to ourselves
and the families to which we belong. These familial attitudes often play important
roles in holding us together as individuals and as members of particular family units.
I am thinking, for example, of the traditions that guide actions solely on the basis of
their being traditions of the Mosdell family, or the White family, or the Sawyer family,
or whatever. Being committed to such traditions, and performing their associated
actions whenever they come up, often serves to define us as members of the particular
families to which we belong—that is, the performance of such traditional actions are
essential for understanding ourselves as Mosdells, Whites, Sawyers, or whatever.
Consider the actions that stem from such traditions, actions that are not motivated
by reflecting on the counterfactual desires of a Smithian agent, and do not serve to
satisfy any desire or preference of the individual. (For example, the tradition may
involve baking a Thanksgiving turkey using a peculiar sort of homemade stuffing that
no one really seems to enjoy.) That last condition may seem like a sticking point.
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After all, if an agent does not really desire or prefer to do x, why should he do it?
The answer, I am assuming, is because he is a Mosdell, or a White, or a Sawyer, or
whatever. In fact, despite the fact that we often prefer and desire not to perform
the actions associated with such traditions, we do them anyway because, in some
deep way, they are tied to the temporally extended nature of our being members
of the family with which we identify. My point, then, is that human agents feel
compelled to perform actions associated with any number of traditions, not because
they really prefer and desire to perform the relevant actions, and not because the
actions should be performed given the counterfactual desires of a Smithian agent,
but, rather, because agents identify with the families and traditions that hold them
together as temporally persisting members of particular families.
In the face of such an observation, one might simply claim that in doing such
things, we are simply acting irrationally. Well, maybe. After all, if we do not like
performing such actions, if the performance of certain aspects of some traditions are
unpleasant, undesirable, or otherwise disagreeable, why perform them? The point,
however, is meant to be agnostic about the substance of rationality, and, instead, is
designed to simply emphasize that being moved to perform traditional actions plays
a substantive role in the lives of human agents. To the extent that that role is tied
to holding us together as members of particular family units, instrumentalism needs
to make sense of the actions that stem from it as something human agents can and
should do. To act from tradition simply because it is traditional to do so is sometimes
the only way to figure out what we should do. If that is right, Bratman’s view provides
a solution to a set of practical issues that most of us have an interest in managing,
and if we give up on that view, we give up on a valuable resource for explaining and
justifying such behavior.
2.4.4 Nonoptional Views
To recapitulate: I have tried to show in this section that the heart of the accounts
put forward by Smith, Velleman, and Bratman are nonoptional when accounting for
human agents as instrumentally rational. We cannot give them up without giving up
important resources for explaining how we deal with practical issues we all seem to
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have an interest in managing. If that is right, the capacities and attitudes central to
each account are necessary for making sense of ourselves as instrumentally rational
agents. Yet as we saw in the previous section, the normative guidance derived from
each of these accounts conflicts on particular occasions. While one theorist’s account
justifies doing x on a particular occasion, the accounts of the other two prescribe
doing not-x on the same occasion. But surely, accounts of agency that prescribe
conflicting actions on the same occasion cannot each be correct. As a result, we are
faced with a puzzle: how are we to square the fact that 1) the core aspects of three
presumptive theories appear to be nonoptional, and 2) the prescriptive guidance they
offer is incompatible?
2.5 Models of Agency
One strategy for dealing with this puzzle is to move to a more general conception
of agency. By formulating the rational grounds of instrumental action without relying
on any particular feature of human agency, one might hope to formulate a normative
principle for acting that is more general. Such an approach, however, divorces these
views from their normative implications. This observation, I take it, is what motivated
these theorists to move away from the general instrumentalist conception of rational
agency proposed by Williams. An alternative strategy is to integrate. But why
should we think that the grounds of instrumental agency can be integrated into a
single, unified principle of agency? I do not think we should.
2.5.1 Against Integration
There are, I think, several reasons to believe that we cannot integrate these
instrumentalist views into a single, unified account. Before beginning in on those
arguments, however, let me emphasize that my aim in this chapter has been to
understand the motivational attitudes and rational capacities at the heart of human
agency. The emphasis is meant to contrast the aim of understanding ourselves with
the aim of understanding some ideal notion of rational agency. It is because of the
deep complexity of our own agency that I think an integrated view of instrumental
agency is unlikely to be in the offing. When trying to make sense of the relation
between what actually motivates creatures like you and I to act and what should
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move us to act, there is a gap that needs to be filled. I have tried to show that
that gap cannot be filled with a single view. We need to account for the different
attitudes and capacities of actual human agents in order to understand our nature
as instrumentally rational creatures. To that end, I have argued that each of the
views we have surveyed is nonoptional. I have also argued that these views are
normatively incompatible in a range of cases. And the question before us now is,
can this incompatibility be overcome by integrating the different views into a single,
unified principle of instrumental agency?
Of the accounts we have looked at, the most likely prospect for integrating the
others to it is Bratman’s, because the higher-order self-governing policies charac-
teristic of his account are very flexible. (Recall that such policies are second-order
attitudes that, to the extent that agents are satisfied with them, provide reasons for
treating a lower-order desire as an end to be pursued.) Given such liberal constraints
on the notion of a self-governing policy, why not simply integrate the views of
Smith and Velleman into Bratman’s? In other words, why cannot an individual
possess a self-governing policy to act when he believes that his desires align with the
subjunctively derived desires of a Smithian agent. Or, for that matter, why cannot
an agent possess a self-governing policy to act only when he has determined what
he believes his desires and preferences to be? I want to suggest that it is because
instrumental agency looks to be at best a patchwork of disjoint models, and each of
which is needed to represent human agents as instrumentally rational.
If the alternative views we have surveyed in this chapter can be integrated into
a single, overarching view of agency, the psychological attitudes and intellectual
capacities at the heart of each will have to be unified around one or another capacity
or attitude.14 If the different capacities and pro-attitudes that motivate action work
against each other, it will not be possible to coherently integrate them. As I suggested,
Bratman’s view holds the most promise for integration. Is it possible, then, to bring
together the attitudes and capacities at the heart of the views of Smith or Velleman
14Of course, the type of unification I am discussing is unlikely to be possible with more than one
agent. Consequently, integrating the psychic economy of more than one agent in an effort to provide
a single principle of instrumental agency, which applies to all human agents indifferently, seems to
be an unlikely prospect.
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with Bratmanian self-governing policies?
To answer that question, we need to understand what is required for integration,
or unity, of this type. Bratman follows Harry Frankfurt15 in suggesting that the unity
of an individual’s psychological attitudes depends on his being satisfied with the self-
governing policies that direct his agency. To be satisfied in Bratman’s sense, however,
means that any particular policy with which one identifies is not incompatible with,
or challenged by, other self-governing policies.16 Of course, being satisfied in this
sense cannot occur if an agent adopts both Velleman’s higher-order desire to act on
self-evaluative beliefs and a policy to act in line with the counterfactual desires of
a Smithian agent. As we have seen, if an individual tried to adopt both views as
self-governing policies, it would result in normative tension. The two views conflict
in a range of cases, and, consequently, an agent who tried to act in accord with both
would eventually find himself internally at odds with himself. Trying to realize a
Smithian agent’s counterfactual desires and trying to be true to one’s own desires
and preferences would, over time, pull an individual in two incompatible directions.
But what about incorporating either Smith or Velleman into Bratman’s view?
Is it possible to adopt a self-governing policy to be either a Smithian agent or an
agent who has a higher-order desire to act on self-evaluative beliefs about what he
desires and prefers? I doubt it. Consider, first, trying to merge Velleman’s view with
Bratman’s. As we have seen, it is crucial to Bratman’s view that we are temporally
extended creatures. Indeed, it is at the very heart of his account that self-governing
policies with which an agent is satisfied serve to organize and sustain the Lockean ties
necessary for an agent’s temporal persistence as a single individual. But as we have
seen, the view has difficulty making sense of spontaneity. It is for this reason that,
15In “The Faintest Passion,” Frankfurt writes that “the essence of rationality is to be consistent;
and being consistent . . . means proceeding so as not to defeat oneself” (Frankfurt, 1992, 7).
According to Frankfurt’s view, an agent whose higher-order desires are not at odds with each other,
one who is, to use Frankfurt’s terminology, not ambivalent is “wholehearted in his higher-order
attitudes and inclinations, in his preferences and decisions, and in other movements of his will”
(1992, 7). Such an agent is, again to use Frankfurt’s language, satisfied with who he is, and has
no interest in changing his agency, because the attitudes that make it up are not internally at odds
with each other.
16See Section 2.2.3 of this chapter for details.
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for example, Bratman’s view struggles to explain the decision to go bungie jumping if
such a decision is out of line with an agent’s risk-avoidance policies. Of course, such
spontaneity is not a problem for Velleman’s view, or so I have argued. As long as an
agent acts on his beliefs about what his actual desires and preferences are, he acts
rightly. Similarly, Velleman’s view cannot make sense of an individual being motivated
to act purely from tradition. If an individual possesses no desires or preferences to
perform some action—that is, if his action is unintelligible to him as something he
would like to do—yet feels compelled to do because it is traditional, Velleman’s view
cannot make sense of it as something the agent should do. Attempting to merge
the views of Velleman and Bratman, then, results in principles of action that are at
odds. Consequently, an agent could not reasonably adopt both while aspiring to be
an integrated agent.
Ignoring that difficulty for a moment, what about adopting a self-governing policy
to act like a Smithian agent? Is integrating the Smithian view with Bratman’s
possible? Again, I do not think so. The problem is not that such an agent is
conceptually impossible;17 rather, the problem is that adopting a self-governing policy
to act like a Smithian agent requires a type of cognitive dissonance, since it requires
trying to govern one’s actions with two disparate psychological perspectives. To
see this, suppose we try to integrate Smith’s view of rational agency with Bratman’s.
The resulting self-governing policy would be to act on one’s subjunctively determined
beliefs about the counterfactual desires of purely rational agents. Aside from the fact
that we do not have any idea what those counterfactual desires might be, adopting the
Smithian view as a higher-order self-governing policy would mean adopting a policy
to act as one believes an ideal agent would act. But committing to such a policy is
tantamount to adopting a policy to act in a manner that is essentially beyond human
capabilities. Human agents cannot reasonably aspire to act like ideal agents because
human agents cannot, in the face of our cognitive limitations, acquire the psychic unity
necessary for being an ideal agent. Consequently, adopting a higher-order policy that
says to act as though one has become an ideal agent is tantamount to adopting a
17Whether it is conceptually possible to merge Bratman’s view with Smith’s, however, depends
on Smith’s substantive account of rationality, which he does not provide.
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policy to pretend that the perspective of a form of agency that is not possible for
human agents can move one to act.
A different way of framing the complaint I am making here is to say that Bratma-
nian agency essentially requires looking inward—looking, that is, toward the motiva-
tional attitudes that hold us together as agents—for normative guidance. Smithian
agency, on the other hand, requires looking outside of ourselves for such guidance.
To act as a Smithian agent, an individual does not ultimately look to his desires to
figure out what to do, he looks to the hypothetical desires of a purely rational agent.
But it is just the opposite for Bratman: to figure out what I should do, I look to the
self-governing policies that hold me together as the individual I have been and aim to
continue to be. Now, although it is conceptually possible that those two perspectives
could be integrated—if somehow it turned out that the attitudes that hold me together
just were the attitudes of an ideally rational agent—the fact that we are mere human
beings seems to preclude that possibility. It is not very likely that my attitudes and
desires will just turn out to be the attitudes and desires of the conceptual ideal. To
try to adopt both perspectives as grounds for rational action, then, demands a type
of cognitive dissonance. It requires looking for normative guidance by looking both
inward and outward at the same time. To the extent that these two perspectives
point in different directions, attempting to act in harmony with both will pull one
in conflicting directions. Of course, since the normative grounds of Bratman’s view
depend on a sufficiently high degree of psychic unity, trying to adopt a policy that
leads to this sort of cognitive dissonance would undermine the normative basis of his
view.
None of this is meant to suggest that we cannot have a variety of different policies
that are each tied to different aspects of our own agency. It may be that we have
policies that are deeply incongruous. Nor am I trying to suggest that Bratmanian
policies cannot accommodate a variety of potentially discordant self-governing poli-
cies. It may be that we do act according to policies with which we are not fully
satisfied but which, nevertheless, serve to more or less hold us together through time.
Be that as it may, I want to insist that to the extent that the self-governing policies
with which we identify are not fully compatible, we cannot integrate them into a
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single, overarching view of agency. If we require policies and attitudes that are not
fully harmonious in order to deal with practical problems we all, as human agents,
have a stake in managing, when we act to satisfy one of them at the expense of the
others, we inevitably act in a way that frustrates aspects of ourselves with which we
identify.
In an effort to provide a unified principle of instrumental agency, self-governing
policies sound like a good idea. But, in fact, they do not serve to provide the
necessary unity for making sense of instrumental agency as it is found in human
agents. Instead, they serve at best to conceal a number of different and conflicting
models of instrumentally rational agency. In fact, we see this by comparing the
different views side by side: to the extent that making sense of both our spontaneity
and our commitment to tradition are required for understanding ourselves as human
agents, we have to give up on the idea that we can integrate the presumptive theories
that try to make sense of such actions. Similarly, to the extent that making sense
of our nature as instrumental agents depends on actions that rely on counterfactual
conceptions of ideal agency and our own psychic unity, we will have to abandon the
notion that we can integrate the different views of agency. When we look closer,
instrumental agency is not a single thing. It is a patchwork of disjoint models that
represent different capacities and attitudes required for understanding ourselves as
the rational creatures we seem to be.
2.5.2 Facades of Representation
That we cannot integrate different views of instrumental agency should not be
surprising. Indeed, consider that unifying principles that explain complex objects
are something of a rarity, and are often only described by a lattice of models.18 A
couple of examples, one from Nancy Cartwright and one from Mark Wilson, will help
to make this point. In How the Laws of Physics Lie, Nancy Cartwright argues that
the general laws of physics do not state the truth. To support this claim, she argues
that there is a trade-off between truth and explanation. For general laws to describe
the behavior of particular objects, they must ignore the variety of composite causes
18See, for example, Ravetz (1971).
53
that go into explaining what the objects actually do. But when composite causes are
taken into account in order to explain an object’s behavior, general laws fail to be
true of it. In other words, since the general laws of physics ignore complexity, they
do not explain how things actually behave. Their truth, then, is had at the cost of
explanation. As Cartwright puts it:
The laws of physics, . . . to the extent that they are true, do not explain
much. We could know all the true laws of nature, and still not know how
to explain composite cases. Explanation must rely on something other
than law. (1983, 72-73)
Indeed, to explain complex phenomena, physicists use models, which represent certain
aspects of a things behavior while ignoring others. Again, from Cartwright:
We construct different models for different purposes, with different equa-
tions to describe them. Which is the right model, which the true set of
equations? The question is a mistake. One model brings out some aspects
of the phenomenon; a different model brings out others. Some equations
give a rougher estimate for a quantity of interest, but are easier to solve.
No single model serves all purposes best. (1983, 11)
The point, then, is that due to their simplicity, general laws do not actually represent
how things behave. To do that—that is, to actually represent how physical objects
behave—we need a variety of models designed for different purposes, each of which
is designed to explain different aspects of the behavior in question.
Mark Wilson makes related points in Wandering Significance (2006). There he
argues that the meanings of linguistic predicates wander for a variety of reasons. Only
with considerable effort can we hold them constant. Indeed, one reason meanings
wander is that we overlook the more complex behaviors hiding behind their seemingly
straightforward surface meanings. Consider an example that Wilson develops at
length. The predicate ‘light intensity’ is used to describe how incoming light scatters
at the tip of a completely reflective razor blade. It represents a physical quantity that
seems to correlate with a single analytic function. But, as it turns out, the analytic
function used to characterize what ‘light intensity’ means is not unitary. Rather,
it covers a patchwork of facades—or fragments of representation that correspond to
different analytic functions—that are used to determine ‘light intensity’ for different
segments of the razor’s tip. These facades have, to use an apt metaphor, cracks
between them—that is, regions of ‘light intensity’ that are too complex to be worth
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calculating. To get around the cracks, theorists ignore them, moving abruptly between
facades in order to calculate ‘light intensity’ for well-defined segments around the
razor. The different analytic functions that go into distinguishing each facade are
then, through brute force, welded together to “provide a reasonable facsimile of the
way light actually scatters around a razor blade (2006, 322). In other words, the
complexity involved with understanding the predicate ‘light intensity’ is generally
ignored, giving its meaning the appearance of relying on a seemingly unitary analytic
function. What the predicate actually means, however, is more complex.
The examples developed by Cartwright and Wilson are not unusual: often seem-
ingly simple principles conceal hidden complexity that does not nicely conform to
the overarching idea espoused in the principle. As Cartwright says, “things are made
to look the same only when we fail to examine them too closely” (Cartwright, 1983,
19). These points apply to Bratmanian policies and to the question of determining
the grounds of our own instrumental rationality. As we have seen, the capacities and
pro-attitudes needed to explain an individual’s instrumental reasons are unlikely to be
represented with a single theory. If that is right, it looks like trying to understand the
grounds of our own instrumental agency is like trying to understand ‘light intensity’
or the behavior of other physical phenomena. Broad principles fail to reflect the
complexity of the phenomena, and when we dig deeper, what we find is not a unitary
principle, but rather, a patchwork of models stitched together by their common aim
to explain some complex subject matter.
2.5.3 Disunified Models
The views of Smith, Velleman, and Bratman depend on capacities and pro-
attitudes that we cannot do without if we hope to explain the range of instrumental
reasons that move human agents to act. Yet there are obvious conflicts between the
portrayals of agency proffered by each theorist. However, rather than abandoning the
tools needed to explain ourselves and the capacities and attitudes that move us to
act, or trying to formulate a unitary principle that can represent everything we do at
the cost of explaining it, we should adopt the stance of a modeler: represent specific
aspects of rational human agency by using a variety of models.
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2.6 The Disunity of Instrumentalism
Let me wrap this chapter up by pulling the threads together. Accounts of agency
aim to explain what human agents are motivated to do as well as what they should
be motivated to do. Smith, Velleman, and Bratman provide portrayals of agency
with both aspects of explanation. Yet the normative guidance they provide conflicts
in a range of cases. Despite these conflicts, however, I have argued that the features
used to develop their accounts should not be ignored. The result is a puzzle: how
do we square the fact that three different accounts provide different prescriptions
for action while acknowledging that the capacities and attitudes used to derive their
prescriptive content cannot be ignored? In response to that puzzle, I have argued
that these discordant representations of agency should be understood as models, or
localized patches of representation that portray certain aspects of end-oriented action,
but not others.
But there are two problems that seem to result from this conclusion. First, since
the normative components of the different models conflict, they cannot be conjoined
to form a nice overarching theory. This means that the idea of instrumentally rational
agency is, in a certain sense, disunified: what we mean by it cannot be represented
with a single, normatively compelling principle of action. Rather, as we have seen,
to be instrumentally rational means to be moved by normative reasons grounded
in one’s cross-temporal organization, self-intelligibility, and subjunctive thought. Of
course, we may need other models as well, but if I am right, at least these three will
be needed to account for the variety of reasons we can and should be moved by. But
this need not be alarming. Complex phenomena—such as our own agency as rational
creatures—are rarely explained by simple, unified principles. And if that fact has not
impeded our capacity to represent and explain the natural world, there is little reason
to think that it will hinder attempts to represent and explain ourselves.
Nevertheless, there is an additional problem to worry about. If we give up on
the idea of finding a single, unified account of instrumentally rational agency, one
that can provide universal normative reasons for acting, do we not need some other
principle to determine when one model is to be preferred over another? Well, that
depends. I have suggested that general principles are hard to come by and agreed
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with Cartwright and Wilson that when they are found, they often do not explain
much. If that is right, we should expect a general principle aimed at determining
when one model should be used over another to meet with the same problem. This
fact undermines attempts to provide a single, unified account of the things we do





In “A Plea for Excuses,” J.L. Austin warns that representing the variety of things
we do with a single model may distort the finer filagree of human action. He writes:
We take some very simple action, like shoving a stone, usually as done
by and viewed by oneself, and use this, with the features distinguishable
in it, as our model in terms of which to talk about other actions and
events: and we continue to do so, scarcely realizing it, even when these
other actions are pretty remote and perhaps much more interesting to us
in their own right than the acts originally used in constructing the model
ever were, and even when the model is really distorting the facts rather
than helping us to observe them. (1961, 150, emphasis in original)
The sense of ‘model’ being used by Austin is not entirely clear,1 but the warning is:
relying on simple representations of action may lead us to overlook, ignore, or distort
alternatives that may be just as philosophically interesting. Indeed, despite Austin’s
warning, contemporary philosophers tend to represent action using only a handful
of very simple models. According to one such model, whenever an agent performs
intelligent actions—that is, actions done on purpose, for reasons—he knows what he
is doing and why he is doing it. Central to this conception of action is the idea that
rational agency—or the capacity to act for reasons—presupposes practical knowledge,
or an understanding of how to do the things one is in the process of doing.2 In this
1For my purposes, it does not matter what Austin means by ‘model’, but since the term will be
used throughout this chapter, let me remind the reader of its sense. Models represent by accurately
portraying some of an object’s features while distorting others. Since models contain distortions, to
represent every aspect of a complex object with models, more than one model is required. For more
details on the sense of ‘model’ being used, see the introductory chapter.
2Knowing what one is doing while doing it is what I called practical knowledge in the last
chapter. My chief aim in this chapter is to challenge the idea that such knowledge is required for
intelligent action. ‘Practical knowledge’ is distinct from ‘knowledge-how’. Indeed, the latter, which
is typically used to characterize a type of knowing that is different from knowledge-that, is used to
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chapter, I want to challenge that model of action by identifying a class of actions that
are, I will argue, done on purpose, but without practical knowledge.
To do so, I am going to focus on a class of actions that I will call expressive actions.3
Characteristic of them is that they express or reveal an agent’s feelings or emotions.
I begin, however, by articulating the Anscombian view I aim to challenge. Once
that view is on the table, I use recent work by Candace Vogler as an Anscombian
foil for my alternative. What I hope to show is that the simple model of action
explanation adopted by Vogler fails to represent expressive actions—at least it fails
to do so without considerable distortion. If I am right, this class of actions stands in
need of an alternative model, one that can represent thoughtful forms of emotional
expression.4
3.2 Describing Intentional Action
The Anscombian view of rational agency is unfriendly to the more familiar philo-
sophical tradition. According to that tradition, beliefs and desires work together,
causing agents to do things for reasons. Desires provide ends, goals, or aims to be
mark dispositional capacities, or capacities to do things. For example, the capacity of insects to walk
is typical of knowledge-how: it is knowing how to do something without knowing any potentially
corresponding truths about how to do it. In contrast, the term ‘practical knowledge’ is used to
distinguish the awareness an agent has of what he is doing when he is doing something on purpose.
In this sense, ‘practical knowledge’ is had only by rational agents. When an individual has practical
knowledge, he is aware of his action and can demonstrate that fact by articulating what he is doing
and what he hopes to accomplish by doing it.
3I use the phrase ‘expressive action’ (and, from time to time, ‘emotional action’) to refer to
actions that are explained in the first instance by appealing to emotions. So, for example, “Why are
you punching your locker?”might be answered by “Because I’m angry.” In this instance, the action
gives expression to an emotion and is an expressive action. In contrast, I will use ‘end-directed
action’ to mark actions explained in the first instance by appealing to an end the individual is
trying to accomplish. So, for example, “Why are you punching the locker?” might be answered by
“Because my locker is stuck and punching it tends to get it open.” In this instance, the action is
an end-directed action. More frequently, however, I will simply use the term ‘action’ and let the
context determine the type of action. All of this is meant to avoid the ambiguities, implications,
and technicalities of the more familiar, and widely used phrase ‘intentional action’. Finally, I should
mention that this distinction is closely related to one made by Rosalind Hursthouse in “Arational
Actions” (1991). Indeed, the distinction depends on taking seriously the arguments of that paper.
4It is important that such actions are more than mere emotional outbursts. Unlike the example
from the previous footnote, the type of expressive actions with which I will be concerned are
constrained and controlled by an agent in the act of emotional expression. In contrast to punching
one’s locker, then, an emotion like anger might be thoughtfully expressed by going for a run or, more
pensively, by writing a poem.
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achieved, beliefs show what is required for realizing them, and when combined in just
the right sort of way, they cause individuals to act. As this tradition would have it,
the right way to investigate the knot of problems associated with intelligent action is
to determine the causal antecedents of rational behavior.5
Anscombe, however, thought that such an approach could not get off the ground
until the notion of causality became much clearer. As she writes, “the topic of
causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that [acting] is one of the
places where we do use the word ‘cause’ ”(2000, 10). That Anscombe thought the
notion of causality too confused to explain how mental states cause action, however,
is not to suggest that she was not concerned with causes. Indeed, the idea that
“practical knowledge is the cause of what it understands” (2000, 87) is a central
thesis of the Anscombian view. Despite that fact, however, Anscombe and her recent
followers6 are not concerned with the causal question as it is usually understood.
They are not trying to determine the causal antecedents of action, but instead, the
causal unity of thought and action, where that means that what an agent is thinking
is what he is doing.
But what does suggesting that Anscombians are trying to understand the causal
unity of thought and action really mean? The short answer is that they are attempting
to articulate what thought and action must share in order to be unified in rational
agency, and they argue that the shared component is a particular logical relation
typified by intention. When agents do things on purpose for reasons, the form of
description used to articulate what they are doing reveals the logical order shared by
thought and action. Agents that rely on thought to govern what they do describe
their actions according to a particular pattern shared by both thought and action. In
5The Anscombian view of action is unfriendly to the hierarchical views of agency we looked at
in the previous chapter as well. Nevertheless, both Anscombian and hierarchical views require that
agents who act intelligently have practical knowledge. It is this similarity that I aim to be arguing
against in this chapter.
6Recently, there has been surge of interest in the philosophical work of Anscombe. Prominent
philosophers have taken up her way of speaking about intention in an effort to expand, clarify, and
deepen the insights first propounded by her in Intention. I have in mind philosophers like Candace
Vogler, Michael Thompson, and Sebastian Ro¨dl. But there are others. See especially the recent
collection of papers in Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (2011) for philosophers who have taken up
the torch.
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terms more familiar to Anscombians: the unity of thought and action is had through
intention.7 Because acting on purpose presupposes practical knowledge—that is, the
capacity of an agent to understand, without looking, what he is doing—when an
agent does something intentionally, he can describe what he knows about what he is
doing according to a particular form of representation. In such cases, what the agent
does and what the thoughts that describe what he is doing share is a specific formal
structure.
That, however, is a very short answer. To make sense of it, I need to say more
about the notion of ‘intention’, its relation to practical knowledge, and how those two
ideas fit with the view that thought and action are unified. Anscombe writes:
the term ‘intention’ has reference to a form of description of events. What
is essential to this form is displayed by the results of our enquiries into
the question ‘Why?’ Events are typically described in this form when
‘in order to’ or ‘because’ (in one sense) is attached to their descriptions.
(2000, 85)
When things are done intentionally in this sense, the way actions get articulated
conforms to a particular pattern, which is revealed by the phrases ‘in order to’ or
‘because’. This pattern is shared by thought and action and is what marks it off as
end-directed action. For example, when my niece asks me why I am grading a stack
of exams, and I respond that I am doing so in order to figure out final grades for
my course, my response describes the order of action and shows that my thoughts
conform to it. Since calculating final grades depends on exam grades, I must grade
the latter to determine the former. When my thought and action share this order
and are unified by it, the thought represented is the action performed. ‘Intention’,
then, is the form of description that unifies what an agent thinks and what he does.
7I need to say a bit more about terminology here. ‘Intention’ is, for Anscombians, a term of art.
It refers to the form of description used to describe all actions that are done on purpose for reasons.
I disagree, however, with the claim that all ‘intentional’ actions can be described using that form
of description. There are some actions that are done on purpose, which cannot be articulated with
the form of description to which Anscombians use the term ‘intention’ to refer. To avoid confusion,
then, I will replace that technical term with my own, more neutral phrase, ‘end-directed’. I will
only use ‘end-directed’ to refer to thoughts or actions that share the structure typically reserved,
at least by Anscombians, for intentional actions. When speaking more generally of actions that are
done on purpose (a set that includes, but is not limited to, end-directed actions), I will speak of
‘intelligent actions’. That phrase is meant to be neutral about the form of description appropriate
for describing actions done on purpose while, at the same time, emphasizing the connection between
what agents think and what they do.
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Since the order that unifies thought and action is, for Anscombians, an order
of explanation, for the two to be unified, an agent must have the power to under-
stand what he is doing—that is, he must have practical knowledge. It is only by
understanding how one’s actions fit together in the service of one’s aims—which may
include specific ends, more complex actions, life plans, and so on—that individuals
are capable of acting intentionally. Again, from Anscombe:
‘Intentional action’ always presupposes what might be called ‘knowing
one’s way about’ the matters described in the description under which an
action can be called intentional, and this knowledge is exercised in the
action and is practical knowledge. (2000, 89)
An agent who acts intentionally is able to provide a description of what he is doing
that places his action within an end-directed order. If an agent is unable to articulate
what he is doing according to the relevant form of description, whatever it is the
individual is doing is not being done on purpose for a reason.
Now, the type of descriptive awareness required for intelligent action does not
depend on an agent’s observations about what he is doing. So, for example, if an
individual is opening a bottle of soda, he can describe what he is doing, and thereby
know what he is doing, without looking to see that his hands are grasping the cap,
that they are rotating, that his arm is moving, that he is flexing certain muscles, or
any other observations. What he knows is what he is doing because it is being done as
end-directed action: his thought and action are unified by a logical order independent
of observation. This capacity to know without looking at what one is doing by
representing in thought what is being done in action is practical knowledge, which
“is the ‘cause of what it understands’ ” (2000, 87). Acting with practical knowledge,
then, is what distinguishes end-directed action, or actions done with thought, from
other, non-end-directed actions.
We might wonder, however, what the content of an agent’s knowledge must be
if he is to act in this manner. What must an agent know when his actions are
done on purpose, for reasons? There are an indefinite number of answers to that
question: the content of an agent’s knowledge, and the description an agent gives
of his knowledge, may include anything individuals do. The content, then, is not
what determines whether an action is end-directed. What does is the form that
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one’s knowledge must take—that is, the logical order displayed, or represented, in
practical knowledge. This form of representation is, of course, what Anscombe called
‘intention’, and what I have been calling ‘end-directed’. When an individual’s action
is end-directed, then, he knows what he is doing, and why doing it is an appropriate
step to the realization of one or another aim.8 It is because the agent’s knowledge
conforms to the end-directed structure that his thoughts and actions are unified.
3.3 Vogler On Acts of Expression
Vogler endorses the general view I have just described, but she has a particular
way of talking about what the structure of practical knowledge amounts to. For
her, the form of description unique to end-directed actions displays a calculative or
part-whole order. When an agent is doing something on purpose, we can ask “Why
are you x-ing?” and anticipate a certain form of response. Vogler writes:
When Anscombe’s hypothetical questioner asks “Why are you A-ing?” or
“Why did you A?” or “Why are you going to A?” he forces his interlocutor
to look to the calculative form. . . . “In order to B,” given in response to
the characteristic question “Why?”, describes what is taking place. (2002,
130)
So, end-directed actions have a certain calculative or part-whole structure, which is
revealed when an agent responds to the question “Why are you x-ing?” Notice, too,
that this form of describing what one is doing picks out the means-end or part-whole
relation. Again, from Vogler:
What it is for the question “Why are you A-ing?” to have its characteristic
[Anscombian] sense . . . is for it to be answerable and made intelligible
in terms of how A-ing serves a further end, in terms of the pleasure of
A-ing, or in terms of what’s fitting or suitable about A-ing under these
circumstances given some larger scheme in one’s life. (2002, 47)
8Anscombe allows for the possibility that an agent can act intelligently “for no particular
reason”—that is, for no particular end. In such cases, it may appear that the agent does not
know why his action is an appropriate step for realizing one or another aim. In large measure, this
appearance is illusory. When pressed, the agent will eventually provide the point of his action as
something that is either useful, befitting, or pleasurable to do. Indeed, if there really is no reason
for the action, it is not an intelligent action. In other words, an agent who cannot provide a reason
for his action because he is unaware that he is acting is not acting intelligently. Similarly, if an
individual cannot offer a reason for his action that makes its aim something to be desired—that is,
if an agent cannot characterize the point of what he is doing as desirable—it is difficult to believe
that he has a reason to act in an effort to achieve it. See, for example, Anscombe’s “saucer of mud”
example in Intention (2000, 70-72).
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Or, again:
Let A and B be actions of different types. One has reason to A only if
one takes it that A-ing is a means to (or part of) attaining (or making
it possible to attain) a further end, B-ing, and one wants to B (for no
particular reason, or because B-ing is pleasant, useful, or fitting). (2002,
48)
Vogler’s view, then, is that when acting on purpose, an agent can describe what she is
doing as the means to an end, which she wants to do for no particular reason, because
it is pleasant, befitting, or useful. The thought is that since doing anything at all
requires taking the means (parts) necessary for realizing the end (whole), this relation
must figure in the explanation of action if it is to be characterized as intelligently
performed. This structure is revealed in response to a single, simple query: when the
question ‘Why?’ is given application by an agent, the answer displays the form of
thought characteristic of end-directed actions, which, of course, reveals the agent’s
practical knowledge. If that is right, then on Vogler’s view, as with Anscombe’s, when
acting on purpose, an agent knows what he is doing, and why doing it is an appropriate
step to the realization of one or another aim. The Anscombian model endorsed by
Vogler couples thought to action via a particular form of description. It is when an
agent’s action and thought share in the calculative form that what an individual does
is what the individual thinks he is doing. As Vogler writes: “the calculative form
revealed in answer to Anscombe’s “Why?” question belongs to intentional action as
such” (2002, 130).
3.3.1 The Challenge of Expressive Acts
Given Vogler’s commitment to the Anscombian question ‘Why?’ as a marker of
end-directed action, the possibility of thoughtful action decoupled from the form
of description called ‘intention’ might seem to threaten the Anscombian model. If
agents are capable of acting on purpose without being able to articulate what is being
done or why it is a step toward their aims, the Anscombian model may, as Austin
hints, ignore, overlook, or distort other interesting forms of action. Indeed, Vogler
worries that expressive actions—that is, “purposive acts born of mood, sentiment, or
temperament which primarily express the agent’s state of mind” (2002, 233)—may
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threaten the view that all intelligent actions are governed by the calculative form.
She writes:
Expressive action is supposed to pose a problem [for the calculative view]
because the reasons don’t go deep enough. Expression is supposed to
be essentially spontaneous. . . . [And] action that appears a spontaneous
expression of temperament, character, or feeling . . . seems to elude the
calculative form of description because calculation truly is not in the spirit
of the thing. (2002, 233-234)
Vogler worries that expressive actions, because they seem to be done without calcu-
lative thought, threaten the link between thought and action that depends on that
structure. Her response is to argue that:
Strong emotion can take various primary ends (for instance, to get hold of
a photograph or to smash things). The kind of calculation that happens
in expressive action with such ends happens when one, say, takes aim in
smashing things or uses some means to get hold of a photograph. What
matters is that the calculative articulation of events is in place here. If
we station our “Why?” questioners at various points along the path of an
agent acting expressively, this becomes clear. (2002, 235)
To the objection that the connection between thought and action may be threatened
by expressive actions, Vogler responds by insisting that if we forced individuals to
think about what they were doing, they would provide a calculative articulation of
their action. Whether an agent actually thinks before acting is beside the point; the
structure of action ensures that if the individual were to think, that thought would
take the calculative form.
3.3.2 Art as Expressive Action
Vogler is mistaken, however, to characterize expressive action as essentially spont-
aneous—that is, as essentially removed from thought—and she is mistaken to think
that the articulation of expressive actions must conform to the calculative structure.
If that is right, thought and action may be connected in other ways, which require
other forms of representation—that is, other models of intelligent action—in order to
be understood.
To see that expressive actions are not essentially spontaneous, consider that much
of what we do from mood, temperament, or sentiment is not merely perfunctory
outburst of emotion. The use of art to express oneself, for example, is commonly
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held to be more than merely emotional eruption. Indeed, it is typical to regard a
variety of types of works of art as displaying thoughtfully controlled expressions of
deeply felt emotion. This is evidenced by the fact that individuals perform and hear
music as melancholy, joyful, or angry; we also create and see paintings as depressing,
lively, or terrifying; the ballet can be moving, calming, or haunting; and so on. To
convey mood through art, to express the reality of one’s emotion in art, it must be
performed well and in a manner that requires thought. If that is right, expressive acts
need not be essentially removed from thought. Consequently, they stand as a class of
counterexamples to the idea that expressive actions are essentially spontaneous.
But if expressive acts are not spontaneous, must the form of thought governing
them display the calculative structure? In other words, must the form of thought and
action governing artistic expression display the part-whole, or means-end, structure
typified by end-directed action? No, not if they can be shown to be done without prac-
tical knowledge—that is, not if it can be demonstrated that they resist articulation
according to the logical order characteristic of such actions.
To see that they are not governed by that order, consider a few examples. When
asked by David Sylvester to explain his artistic process, the American painter Philip
Guston responded:
you know, it’s terrible to rationalise about painting because you know
that, while you’re creating it, you can have all sorts of things in your
mind consciously that you want to do and that really won’t be done . . .
yet, when the thing comes off . . . it arrives at a unity that I never could
have predicted and foreseen or planned. (Sylvester, 2001, 88, emphasis
mine)
Similarly, consider Robert Rauschenberg’s response to a comparable question from
Sylvester:
it happens quite often that I think what the painting needs is a little red
right over there and by the time I get the red on the brush and get back to
the picture I can’t remember where I thought it was to go. But there I am
with red and there’s the picture and I put it down. And then that’s much
more interesting for me than sort of building a picture as one might build
anything. I prefer the attitude of the picture just evolving rather than
working towards some kind of conclusion. (2001, 137, emphasis mine)
In another interview, Sylvester asks Willem De Kooning, “So in these paintings what
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sort of an idea do you begin with?” Kooning’s response: “I don’t think I set out to
do anything” (2001, 54).
And finally, when asked to explain his work, Francis Bacon responds:
I don’t really know how these particular forms come about. I’m not by
that suggesting that I’m inspired or gifted. I just don’t know. I look
at them—I look at them, probably, from an aesthetic point of view. I
know what I want to do, but I don’t know how to do it. And I look
at them almost like a stranger, not knowing how these things have come
about and why have these marks that have happened on the canvas evolved
into these particular forms. . . . [Painting] will only catch the mystery of
reality if the painter doesn’t know how to do it. And he’s carried along
by his passion and he doesn’t perhaps even know quite what these marks
will make. (Sylvester, 1980, 100–102, emphasis mine)
The number of quotations suggest that it is not unusual for artistic expression to resist
articulation according to the calculative form. In fact, each artist explicitly refrains
from providing a description of what he does in terms of the calculative structure.
For these artists, there are no specifiable ends to which their efforts are directed that
would explain what they are doing and, in fact, they seem to lack practical knowledge
about what they are doing. Consequently, it would be a mistake to insist that if they
really thought about what they were doing, their thinking would connect up with
their action in virtue of the calculative structure. So much, then, for Vogler’s view
that expressive actions really must be, at the end of the day, calculative in nature.
The thought and action of artists do not seem to be unified by that logical order.
3.4 Befittingly Artistic
But Vogler has something to say about artistic expression as a counterexample to
her Anscombian model of action. Indeed, she develops a lengthy example to address
complaints like those I have just been raising. Vogler’s discussion is framed by Jack
Spicer, a twentieth-century poet who articulates a view of the poetic process similar
to the one expressed about painting by Guston, Rauschenberg, Kooning, and Bacon.
For Spicer, writing good poetry is being moved along by something seemingly foreign.
He writes:
you start seeing whether you can clear your mind away from the things
that are you, the things that you want, and everything else. Sometimes
it’s a twelve-hour struggle to get a ten-line poem, not changing a single
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word of it as you’re writing, but just as it goes along, trying to distinguish
between you and the poem. (1998; 2002, 7 and 120, respectively, emphasis
mine)
Writing poetry, Spicer suggests, is not about pursuing what one wants; it is, instead,
about ridding oneself of one’s wants. That is not to say, however, that one’s mind is
blank. Indeed, during a conversation with James Reid, Spicer is asked, “do you have
any idea . . . where your poem’s going to go? I mean, do you have any ideas in your
own mind, or any feelings?” Spicer’s response: “I try not to.” Reid tries to press him
on this point by asking him if his mind is a blank. Spicer expands his thought:
No, it isn’t [a blank], unfortunately. It’s trying to be a blank. And trying
to be a blank is utterly different from being a blank. . . . you can’t really
make your mind a blank. You can’t really get to receiving God, which St.
Ignatius wanted, or poems, or doing anything. You can’t. It’s impossible.
There’s this utter animal spirit which is coming out and saying, well, gee,
I can lay this person if I write this line, and all sorts of things like that.
It’s just impossible to make your mind a blank. (Vogler, 2002; Spicer,
1998, 118-119)
The point, as far as we are concerned, is that on Spicer’s view, writing poetry is not
a matter of doing things according to the part-whole or means-end structure that
seems to govern end-directed actions. When writing poetry, one does not have any
idea where things are going. Instead, as with the views about painting expressed by
Guston, Kooning, Rauschenberg, and Bacon, Spicer’s conception of poetry is one in
which the individual frees himself of his ends, and instead, allows the poem to simply
“come through” his pen, as though it were being dictated by him with no end in view.
Rather than treating actions with this sort of description as counterexamples to
the Anscombian model, Vogler argues that a poet’s actions are ultimately governed
by that structure.9 Let me explain. Although she grants that an artist’s reasons
9There is, I think, genuine ambiguity in Vogler’s discussion of the relation between a poet’s
thought and action. On the one hand, she is clear that she is attempting to frame a type of
counterexample to her own calculative view of practical reason. Accordingly, the reasons from and
for which a poet like Spicer acts are supposed to have no calculative structure. Given that she
believes the calculative structure of practical reasons are to be read off the structure of actions,
her discussion of the reasons from and for which poets like Spicer act implies that the actions of
poets have no calculative structure either. On this way of understanding her example, a poet’s
action of writing a poem would be something like a basic action, or a series of basic actions with
no internal structure—that is, they would be actions with no parts. On the other hand, however,
Vogler talks in several places about a poet’s actions being guided by the ends of poetry, which are
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for acting—for example, the reasons from and for which Spicer writes poetry—are
deeply noncalculative, the poetic process is nevertheless one governed by a “patterning
principle” that is ultimately structured by an awareness of ends. Such ends, however,
are internal to the patterning principle, which is itself not conditional on achieving
any other ends. As she writes:
A befitting-style consideration is radically interminable if the only ends it
generates and serves are internal to the principle in question (for example,
if I pursue art for art’s sake alone, then the whole order lent to my life
by aesthetic concerns is only intelligible as an aesthetic order pursued for
the sake of its aesthetic merit). (2002, 101)10
In this case, the patterning principles of poetry are what organizes the life of a poet
qua poet. Vogler writes, “What poets do qua poets . . . is done solely from and for the
ends of poetry” (2002, 123). On this way of seeing things, the action of writing a poem
by a poet is an instance of intelligent action because the poet can give application
to Anscombe’s ‘Why?’ question in terms of what it is befitting for a poet to do. For
example, asking Spicer, “Why are you x-ing?”, where x-ing is writing a poem, he
can give application to that question by answering, “I am x-ing because I am a poet
and it is befitting for poets to x.” According to Vogler, then, the ordering principle
of thought and action—that is, the form of description or ‘intention’—that unifies
Spicer’s thought with the act of writing poetry is the ordering principle of his life as
a poet. Why are you writing poetry? Because I am a poet, and it befits a poet to
write poetry.
internal to the patterning principle befitting the life of a poet. In this sense, the poet’s actions
have internal structure and are nonbasic actions, which, presumably, means they can be modeled
with the Anscombian view. The poet’s reasons, however, do not have this structure and cannot
be modeled with it. On this interpretation, then, the reasons from and for which agents act do
not share the structure of the actions being performed. I do not know which of these two possible
interpretations is correct, but whichever it turns out to be, my points will apply, because either
way, there is an important class of actions that cannot be modeled with the Anscombian structure
endorsed by Vogler.
10Following Anscombe, Vogler distinguishes three different types of considerations that can serve
as the point of action. Another way to say this is that Vogler distinguishes three regions of the good,
at which actions can aim. Useful-style considerations give the point of action in terms of what will
help an individual achieve a future aim. Pleasure-style considerations provide the point of action
in terms of enjoying what is being done in the moment. And, finally, befitting-style considerations
give the point of action in terms of its role in patterns that shape one’s life. Radically interminable
befitting-style considerations, then, give the point of an action by showing that what is done conforms
to a pattern that is, in some sense, self-contained. Such a pattern may shape one’s life and actions,
but it does not make use of any other region of the good. The pattern is good in itself.
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In response to my worry that artistic expression cannot be articulated in a manner
that can be modeled with the Anscombian view, Vogler seems to suggest that poets
see their lives, and the actions that make their lives up, as organized by the ends of
poetry. Consequently, the Anscombian model, which requires all intelligent action to
be done with practical knowledge, gains a foothold on the activities of artists and
other agents who cannot articulate their specific ends: although they do not perform
their actions with the aim of achieving any further end, they organize their lives
and actions according to the patterning principle suited to being an artist, poet, or
whatever. It is the ends internal to that patterning principle that govern a poet’s
action and serve to unify the things a poet does with his or her thoughts.
3.4.1 Against Befitting Explanations
Vogler’s argument that the actions of poets, to the extent that they are end-
directed, are governed by the patterning principles befitting the life of a poet, warrants
consideration. Indeed, I want to suggest that modeling the activity of poets and
artists in the way suggested by Vogler—as activity governed by ends internal to the
patterning principle befitting a poet’s life—really distorts their activities rather than
help us to understand them.
So what ends are internal to poetry as a patterning principle to which poets are
suited? Consider the following passage from an introductory textbook on poetry.
Poetry enables us to know what it “feels like” to be alive in the world.
What does it “feel like,” for instance, to be in love, to hate somebody, to
be conscience-stricken, to watch a sunset or stand by a death-bed, to be
willing to die for a cause or live in a passionate devotion to some chosen
ideal? Only poetry . . . can help us to answer such questions, and help
us, thus, to an understanding of ourselves and of our own values. . . .
Poetry, it is clear, is not cut off from life, but is basically concerned with
life—that is, with the lived fullness of the world. It extends our own
limited experience by means of imagination. By imagination, it sharpens
our sense of the physical world on the one hand, and on the other, it
deepens our sense of the emotional, intellectual, and moral implications
of human situations and actions. (Brooks and Warren, 1976, 9)
If we interpret writing poetry as intelligently performed action—that is, as something
70
a poet does purposefully—its aims include expressing what it feels like to be alive,
understanding ourselves and our values, and deepening our sense of the human
situation. On Vogler’s view, the life of a poet is patterned after these ends because
poets perceive them as internal to the patterning principle befitting the life of a
poet—that is, it befits a poet to act like a poet, which means pursuing ends internal
to the patterning principle of poetry. In terms of the model she endorses, then, poets
A because it befits a poet to A, where A-ing is an end internal to a poet’s life and
the agent is or aspires to be a poet (Vogler, 2002, see, for example, 114).
Now the problem with such a view is not so much that it is an impossible model of
the actions of poets (or artists), but that it represents the guiding thought of the poet
as something that is unlikely to produce poetry (or art). To put that differently, the
actions of artists can certainly be modeled in the way proposed by Vogler, but such
a model distorts, rather than illuminates, the expressive character of art. Remember
that the point of the Anscombian model is to show the unity between what we do
and what we think by portraying the shared formal structure of thought and action.
According to that model, thought is action when practical knowledge is the cause of
what it understands. To produce the unity required by that model, then, the poet
must know what he is doing and why doing it is an appropriate step to the realization
of one or another aim. In this case, the poet must know what he is doing when writing
poetry and understand why doing it is an appropriate step to the realization of the
ends internal to the patterning principle that befits a poet’s life. But in the case at
hand, it looks as though poets cannot have either component of practical knowledge.
In the first place, it is implausible to suggest that knowing, or having the thought
“writing poetry is an appropriate step to the realization of the patterning principle
that befits a poet’s life” is what produces poetry, and it is equally implausible to
believe that that knowledge can guide action in a way that results in poetry. To be
poetic, it is not enough to try to be a poet—by, for example, getting one’s words to
rhyme, or getting rhythm into the writing, or organizing the writing into stanzas.
The art of poetry is not found in merely writing poems and acting like a poet;
rather, the art is had by, apparently, being carried along without really knowing
what one is doing. For a poet to write a poem that attains the ends internal to the
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patterning principle that befits the life of a poet, the thought that goes into it cannot
be controlled by the aim of acting like a poet. If it could, the thought governing
the action would be at the fore of the poet’s mind, and the poet would not struggle
to articulate what he is doing and thinking when writing poetry. Indeed, if merely
acting like a poet by writing poems were sufficient to produce poetry, writing poems
and being a poet would be the same thing. That they are different is betrayed by
the fact that many individuals have spent considerable time and effort writing poems
without being mistaken for poets.
But that is not all that is wrong with modeling expressive actions with the view
endorsed by Vogler. Again, the point of her model is to show that thought and
action are unified when one is engaged in intelligent action. But on Vogler’s view,
the thought governing acts of poetry is at a level of control different from the one
needed to govern the act of writing a poem. Consider that on Vogler’s model, the
form of thought that governs acts of poetry—that is, the movement of thought and
action that produces poetry—is tied to considerations of befittingness. The form of
thought, then, would have to be something like “Write a poem (A) because that
is what befits the patterning principle of a poet’s life (B).” That form of thought,
however, is not a plausible reflection of the thought needed to produce poetry. If one’s
thought and action in writing a poem are to reflect the other’s structure—that is,
if the Anscombian model is going to get any traction on the things poets do—there
must be a finer-grained level of control. The thought that produces poetry cannot be
that it befits a poet, because that thought does not have the structure needed to, for
example, control the movement of the pen. Consequently, if the Anscombian model
is going to work, if the actions of poets are going to be describable as intelligent, the
poet’s thoughts will have to exhibit a finer-grained level of control. A thought like
“Do A (write these two lines this way) in order to do B (express a feeling of grief)”
might do the job, but there is no room for that level of control on a befitting-style
characterization of such actions. And, anyway, to get Vogler’s model to that level of
control, she would have to ignore Spicer’s description of the poetic process (which, I
should emphasize, is something to which Vogler is trying to stay true). She is aware
of this fact and, as a result, tries to retain Spicer’s description. But by taking this
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route, we are left without any explanation of poetic actions: applying the model at
the lower level does not capture the phenomena described by poets, and applying it
at the higher level cannot account for the control needed to produce the action of
writing a poem. What we end up with, then, is either no explanation at all or a
distorted view of the poetic process.
3.4.2 A Dilemma
Let me be clear that I am not arguing that the means-end, or calculative, structure
cannot be read into these activities and used to model them. Certainly artists and
poets are doing things, and certainly what they are doing—that is, the process of
artistic expression—is composed of parts that together constitute the finished prod-
uct. Nevertheless, the thought that goes into the activity cannot be modeled with an
end-directed form of thought. If it could, its practitioners would not struggle and resist
formulating their activities in a manner consonant with that model. Consequently, we
should reject the idea that the actions of artists are governed by practical knowledge
of the kind espoused by Anscombians. To insist otherwise is to insist on a distorted
representation of that form of action.
This argument presents a dilemma for Vogler (and the Anscombian model more
generally): she can either stick to that model and lose the connection between thought
and poetry (and other forms of artistic expression), or give up the model and try
to locate some other form of thought governing such actions. To do the former
would be a mistake because it would suggest that writing poetry is not an intelligent
action. If a philosophical account of action forces us to say that artistic expression
cannot be intelligent because the thought that goes into it is not of the right form,
it seems that we are giving up on the task of explaining action in order to retain a
particular philosophical view. This leaves the second horn of the dilemma: to find a
different model to represent expressive actions. I will have something to say about
that alternative in due course, but before I do, I want to bring in a couple more
examples of expressive action—examples that do not depend on interpretations of
poetry, painting, or art—that do not fit well with the Anscombian model.
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3.4.3 Emotional Expression
To see what I have in mind, consider modes of emotional expression that resist
articulation with the calculative form, because they are not governed by ends-in-view.
Imagine, for instance, actions that express the grief of losing a loved one. One might
go on long, listless walks in the evening, sit at the gravesite and verbalize one’s feelings,
become somber in one’s dress and style, and so on. Such actions seem to be done
under the control of the agent, and in that sense, on purpose, but they do not seem to
be governed by a form of thought that is directed by one’s aims, goals, or ends. The
bereaved do not listlessly wander through the streets to get anywhere, or verbalize
their feelings in order to communicate, or dress down in order to mourn. Rather, they
do these things as acts of emotional expression.11 If that is right, this variety of action
seems to be governed by thoughts that give expression to emotion in the same way
that an artist expresses his emotion through painting: as non-end-directed actions
that express one’s feelings. As a result, the unity of thought and action that makes
their performance intelligible will not best be modeled by representing the agent as
trying to accomplish something.
Indeed, it would be odd to suggest that agents undertake the actions associated
with grief in order to achieve one or another type of end. If asked, for example, “Why
do you wander through the streets at night?” the bereaved might respond, “Because
I feel lost,” or because “I’m sad,” or because “I do not know what else to do.” But
the reasons for acting are not governed by the thought that “wandering through the
streets at night is befitting to my loss,” or the thought that “wandering is pleasant
and helps to relieve the sadness,” or “it is useful for me to wander aimlessly in order
to x.” The wandering is not governed by an end-directed form of thought, and it is
11One might worry that actions like long, listless walks, dressing in a somber manner, verbalizing
one’s feelings, and so on seem to have the structure typical of the Anscombian model. After all, if
an agent does not put one step in front of the other on his long, listless walks, he is not going to go
anywhere. Similarly, if an individual does not put his pants on one leg at a time, he is not going to
get dressed. But that worry applies to painters, poets, and artists too. I am not denying that we
can represent actions like these as actions governed by the calculative form of thought—that is, as
actions done with one or another end in view. Sure we can represent things that way. My point is
not that all actions cannot be modeled with the Ansombian model; my point, rather, is that there
are certain types of action that if modeled in that way leads to a distorted understanding of the
relation between the things we think and the things we do.
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not done to accomplish anything. Indeed, if the actions of the bereaved were governed
by such a form of thought, we could not see them as expressions of grief.
Similarly, imagine giving expression to the feeling that comes from learning that
the one with whom you have fallen in love reciprocates that feeling. What does one
do to express how one feels? Write a poem, perhaps. Or, more sensationally, prance
whimsically through the streets, swinging from lamp posts, and generally making
a lighthearted fool of oneself (I’m thinking of the kind of behavior typified by, for
example, Gene Kelly in the 1952 movie “Singin’ in the Rain.”) Such actions are
not governed by thoughts directed toward ends. Imagine, for example, asking Gene
Kelly’s character as he is dancing through the streets, “What are you doing?” The
answer, I believe, is unlikely to be anything other than something that appeals directly
to the emotion he feels. When an individual is overwhelmed by love, he does not go
dancing through the streets for any reason other than to express emotion. And such
actions need not be seen as merely thoughtless outbursts of emotion. Although the
things we do on such occasions do not have the coordination and sophistication of
Gene Kelly’s performance, they still require thought. Such thought, I am suggesting,
is different than the end-directed thought governing other forms of intelligent action.
It is thought governed by the emotion it expresses. If that is right, then, as with
expression through art and poetry, thoughtfully acting to express how one feels should
generally resist the form of description typical of Anscombian views.
Furthermore, even if expressive actions like those of the bereaved were governed
by the end-directed structure, they would require the agent to have absurd beliefs
about his ends. As Rosalind Hursthouse argues in “Arational Actions,” there are
no “nonabsurd candidates for appropriate beliefs to ascribe to agents performing
[expressive] actions” (1991, 60).12 Consider again a bereaved individual listlessly
wandering through the streets of his town because he is saddened by the death of
his lover. What could such an action be aimed at trying to achieve? It is not as
12Hursthouse uses “arational actions” in place of my “expressive actions.” Other than the
terminological difference, there is very little to distinguish them. Indeed, Hursthouse argues that
acts of emotional expression (her “arational actions”) stand as a class of counterexamples to the
thought that all intentional actions can be described with means-end relations. The argument of
this paragraph relies heavily on the strength of that argument.
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though his wandering is going to bring the loved one back or make the sadness go
away. And it is not as though such wandering is done because it is befitting, useful,
or pleasurable. One does not listlessly drift through the streets because it befits one’s
grief.
Indeed, even if such wandering is befitting of the emotion, it is not as though a
bereaved agent wanders in order for his action to be befitting of his grief. If he did, we
would see his action as, in some sense, disingenuous, as something done in a playacted
manner rather than as a genuine expression of emotion. An agent who acted in a
manner characteristic of the bereaved because it befit his grief would be displaced
from his emotion; it would be the action of someone who acted because he thought
that such actions were what someone who feels what he is supposed to feel would do.
It is a confusion, then, to think that such expressive acts are governed by ends of any
sort. In fact, interpreting the actions of an agent in the grips of a particular emotion
as governed by ends befitting the emotion forces us to attribute to them modes of
expression that are alien to anyone who has genuinely acted from the relevant emotion.
Adopting Vogler’s position to model expressive actions, then, forces us to insist on
representing the actions of individuals as though they were alien. Put differently, if
expressive actions must be articulated according to the Anscombian model of action,
and if they often aim at ends removed from the emotions they express, then for an
agent to act expressively requires that she take steps to realize ends that she cannot
understand.
But to the extent that such actions are intelligent, the Anscombian model endorsed
by Vogler is forced to represent them in this way. As a result, on that model, such
actions must be articulable according to the end-directed form. When asked, “Why
are you wandering aimlessly through the streets?” or “Why are you singing in the
rain?” the answer must be something on the order of “I’m A-ing in order to B, and
I want to B because it is fitting, useful, or pleasant.”13 But articulating expressive
13As I have mentioned, Vogler’s view also makes room for an agent to respond to the Anscombian
question “Why are you A-ing?” by saying, “No particular reason.” In this way, the bereaved might
respond by saying, “I’m wandering aimlessly through the streets for no particular reason.” But even
if this response is available to the bereaved, the point of the Anscombian model (and Vogler’s model
along with it) is to show that thoughts and actions share a logical structure when the latter are done
in an end-directed manner. If that is right, saying “I am A-ing for no particular reason” is only
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actions in this way is contrived. The natural response, and the response that explains
the actions of individuals in the grips of emotion, does not appeal to ends. Instead,
the response that explains the action appeals to the emotion being expressed. “Why
are wandering through the streets?,” “Because I feel lost at my loss”; “Why are
you singing in the rain?,” “Because I’m in love!” In such cases, the agent’s appeal to
emotion is what explains the action, not any presumed ends directing its performance.
As a result, there must be actions that express states of emotion that are not
governed by thoughts ordered by the structure found in the Anscombian model of
action explanation. We might want to frame them that way, but to do so is to insist
on a theoretical position that seems at odds with what really lies behind such actions.
3.5 Toward an Alternative
Since I am about to suggest a different way to think about expressive actions, it
will be useful to pause and recapitulate. I began by outlining the Anscombian model
of action explanation. According to it, intelligent actions are performed with practical
knowledge. In other words, when an agent knows what he is doing, and is able to
locate and articulate what he is doing in terms of a part-whole or means-end relation,
his thought and his actions are unified by a form of description that shows his action
to be intentional. Vogler characterizes this form of description as calculative, and I
have just finished arguing that her model can only represent expressive actions by
distorting them. This leads to a dilemma: she can either ignore the distortions and
stick to the Anscombian model; or give up the distortions by finding a different way
to model expressive actions. In this section, I want to gesture at a way to think about
the latter half of that dilemma.
a legitimate answer—that is, one that shows the action to be done intentionally—if, after further
thought, the individual could articulate her action according to the calculative form of thought
governing it. The idea, then, is to suggest that even when the ends governing one’s thought and
action are not immediately before one’s mind, they are still there governing the action. On this way
of understanding things, the action of the bereaved is intentional even if he resists articulating some
particular end as the one at which his action is aimed because it is still governed by some end or
other. This suggestion, however, is precisely the one I am arguing against. When an agent resists
providing a calculative articulation of his or her actions, it is a mistake to insist that that structure




In the case of artistic expression, it is clear that the actions of the artist are more
than merely spontaneous outbursts of emotion. Indeed, I want to suggest that such
actions are, instead, ways of ordering and clarifying emotion. I will use that suggestion
in a moment to argue that, in general, acts of emotional expression—like singing in
the rain when overcome with joy or wandering listlessly through the streets because
of one’s grief—are constrained by an order of thought similar to that governing modes
of artistic expression. Before I get to that, I need to explain what it means to say
that artistic expression is a way of ordering emotion.
Consider a few different examples of theorists trying to explain art as an act of
emotional expression. John Hospers writes:
[Artistic creativity] is [a process of] clarifying [the feeling] to himself, [an
individual] cannot before expressing it state what he is going to express;
therefore he cannot calculate in advance what effects he wants to produce
and then proceed to produce them. (1954-1955, emphasis in original)
In a similar vein, R.G. Collingwood writes:
Until a man has expressed his emotion, he does not yet know what emotion
it is. The act of expressing it [through art] is therefore an exploration of
his own emotions. He is trying to find out what these emotions are. (1958,
111)
John Dewey embraces a similar view of artistic expression when, in Art as Experience,
he writes:
While there is no expression, unless there is urge from within outwards,
the welling up must be clarified and ordered by taking into itself the values
of prior experiences before it can be an act of expression. And these values
are not called into play save through objects of the environment that offer
resistance to the direct discharge of emotion and impulse. Emotional
discharge is a necessary but not sufficient condition of expression. (1934,
61)
Taken together, these authors seem to be suggesting that acts of emotional expression
are governed by modes of resistance that clarify and order the emotions as they are
expressed. As the thought goes, then, artists do not allow emotion to simply propel
them headlong into spontaneous emotional outbursts, but instead, clarify and order
their emotions by forms of resistance that stem, if Dewey is right, from values of
prior experience. It is by frustrating the uncontrolled discharge of emotion (through
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poetry, painting, sculpting, and so on) that the artist effectively expresses what he
feels.
A similar attitude toward artistic expression is conveyed by Francis Sparshott
when he writes:
the arts of dance use the movements in which human feelings about actions
and situations find expression as the basis of art forms in which these and
like movements are clarified, made more visible, and reduced in order.
(1997, 120)
Again, the idea seems to be that dance is based on forms of emotional expression
that are, in some sense, purified by that style of artistic expression. My point, of
course, is not about particular styles of artistic expression, but is instead about what
it means to give expression to emotion, which is in contrast to having an emotional
outburst. In each of the quotes above, it seems that the form of expression is governed
by modes of resistance that clarify and order feeling and emotion, not by particular
ends or aims. If we can understand the nature of these forms of resistance, we can
get a better sense of how to model the link between thought and expressive action.
3.5.2 Emotion and Thought
So what do these forms of resistance look like? Is there a discernible order to
the way in which emotions are expressed? My own sense is that the order is to be
found in the values that frame emotions themselves. Let me try to explain what I
mean by that. Ronald de Sousa has argued that emotions influence our perception
of a realm of value. An individual’s apprehension of the world is influenced by his
feelings of anger, sadness, grief, joy and so on. This perceptual shift is often expressed
metaphorically: angry individuals see red, everything is sunny and bright to those
in the grips of joy, and to those who are sad and depressed, the world seems grey
and drab. Such metaphorical expressions represent an acknowledged shift in the
significance we attribute to the world when in the clutches of emotion. Assume, then,
that that is right, that the significance we attribute to things shifts with variations
in emotion. The structure of those shifts is what I mean by saying that the order to
be found in the thoughts that govern emotional expression is in the values that frame
emotions themselves.
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Let me try to explain that idea more fully. The fact that we use metaphors to
express the perceptual shift in our worldview when influenced by emotions shows that
we do not understand emotions very well. Nevertheless, such shifts shape our actions,
and I believe it is such shifts that artists are trying to capture by giving expression
to their emotions through art—that is, by various modes of artistic expression,
individuals show the perceptual shift effected by emotion. It is as though the struggle
of the artist is to reveal how things are when the significance they attribute to the
world shifts due to emotion. To accomplish that requires, to use Spicer’s imagery,
to let oneself go and let the feeling flow through one’s pen. Or, as Bacon puts it, to
be carried along by one’s passion without quite knowing what marks the paint will
make on the canvas. Only in this way, both Bacon and Spicer seem to think, will
the artist be able to capture the mystery of reality. That mystery, I am suggesting,
is the perceptual shift in value that originates in emotion, which is only captured if,
as Dewey points out, one resists the direct discharge of emotion by clarifying and
ordering it through action.
That is all very conjectural. Nevertheless, it provides an avenue for making sense
of the idea that individuals, and artists in particular, act intelligently even though
they do not seem to have the type of practical knowledge required by Anscombian
views. Since the perceptual shift typified by emotion is understood, at best, only
metaphorically, actions that give expression to that shift can only be understood
metaphorically. This explains why artists have such a difficult time articulating what
it is that they are doing when they are doing art. The suggestion, then, is that artists
act without practical knowledge because they do not know, until they have expressed
it, what it is that they are giving expression to. The thought governing the actions
of an artist is the emotion it expresses, but since the artist only understands that
emotion metaphorically and through action, he cannot articulate the structure of the
thought that he is giving expression to.
Of course, one thoroughly committed to the Anscombian view is likely to respond
that even if all of this is right, the artist is still trying to do something: he is still
trying to give expression to something that he only understands metaphorically. In
other words, he is trying in some sense to A in order to B (because it is useful,
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befitting, or pleasurable). But that is a mistake. The thoughts that control the
expression of emotion through art are not governed by that structure. They are
governed by the form of the emotions themselves, and it is their reality—that is, the
reality of emotions that give shape to our thought—that artists are expressing when
acting from emotion. To express one’s emotions, an individual has to let go and
act without practical knowledge while, at the same time, clarifying and ordering his
feelings through action.
If I am right, expressive actions stand as a class of counterexamples to the Anscom-
bian thought that intelligent actions have a single structure with which they can be
modeled. Acts of emotional expression call for a different model of action, one that
does not rely on an agent’s practical knowledge. When we give expression to our
emotions, we do not know what we are doing or why we are doing it. Our thought
and action is governed by the emotions themselves. But that does not mean that
such actions are unintentional, unintelligent, or merely spontaneous outbursts of inner
mental states. Wandering through the streets after the loss of a loved one may be an
action governed by the emotion itself, and may seem to be mindless wandering, but
more often than not, the action is an expression of an agent coming to terms with
thoughts that have taken a different form, and such “coming to terms” is done by
clarifying, ordering, and shaping them through action.
3.6 Conclusion
There are limits to what any single representation can portray. The Anscombian
model reaches those limits when it attempts to portray expressive actions with a
model that depends on practical knowledge. As we have seen, it is frequently the case
that we act intelligently without knowing what it is we are trying to accomplish with
our actions. Consequently, modeling such actions with a form of representation built
around the calculative relation will have difficulty portraying them. At best, modeling
expressive actions with the calculative relation leads to a distorted explanation of
the things we do from emotion; at worst, understanding expressive actions with that
structure undermines attempts to explain how emotional thought is tied to the things
we do. I have tried to show what those distortions look like and what is lost when
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we seek to explain expressive actions using the Anscombian model.
Central to what I have said is the idea that portrayals of what it means to act
for reasons—that is, representations of rational agency—are models. As such, they
will be suited to particular purposes. Anscombian models work well for explaining
end-oriented actions, but they struggle to make sense of expressive actions. For that
purpose, we need a different model of action. And that fact is an indication that what
we are trying to understand—that is, our own sense of being rational creatures—is a
complex phenomenon whose nuances cannot be captured in a single, simple model.
And this is a lesson that brings us back to Austin. As he noted:
It must be remembered that there is no necessity whatsoever that the
various models . . . should all fit together neatly as parts into a single, total
model or scheme of, for instance, the doing of actions. It is possible, and
indeed highly likely, that our assortment of models will include some, or
many, that are overlapping, conflicting, or more generally simply disparate.
(151 Austin, 1961, emphasis in original)
Following this thought, I have tried to show that expressive actions are peculiar forms
of human action. If that is right, a fuller picture of intelligent action, and the reasons




Many of the things people know how to do never had to be learned. We never
had to learn how to push things, how to suckle, how to scratch an itch, how to see,
hear, and breathe, or how to think basic thoughts. But a number of other things
that we know how to do, we had to learn how to do. Riding a bicycle, driving a car,
skiing, mountain climbing, playing chess or poker, writing philosophy papers, playing
the piano, and so on are all skills that had to be learned in order to know how to do
them. What explains the difference? What did we have to learn to acquire capacities
of the latter sort that we did not have to learn to know how to do things of the
former sort? In this chapter, I am going to argue that the difference is explained by
the things we must do to coordinate thought with action.
This explanation, however, raises a more fundamental question: is learning to
coordinate thought with action something we do on purpose, as itself a type of action?
If so, what type of action is it? There is not a viable philosophical answer to these
questions, or so I will argue. In fact, to clear the way for answering them, the majority
of the chapter will be spent arguing against views that explain intelligent action by, in
one way or another, presupposing the unity of thought and action. For views of this
sort, the things we do and the things we think are so tightly interwoven that acquiring
information about how to do something entails knowing how to do it. More simply,
acquiring knowledge-how is had by acquiring knowledge-that. But such a view is
problematic: to learn how to ski, ride a bicycle, or drive a car, it is not enough to
learn the information pertaining to the actions that go into effectively skiing, cycling,
or driving a car. In addition, agents must learn to coordinate the things they do
with the thoughts that govern them in a manner that results in the performance
of intelligent action. More generally, learning how to F requires learning both the
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content of the thoughts that go into F -ing as well as how to coordinate those thoughts
with the activities required for effectively F -ing. Learning the latter, I will argue, is
not something that can be explained by appealing to thought alone. Indeed, I think
that explaining how agents learn to coordinate thought with action requires thinking
anew about action itself.
The motivating problem of the chapter, then, is to explain the acquisition of a
certain type of knowledge-how by explaining the things we do to coordinate thought
with action. To get started, it will be useful to clear a bit of terrain. To that end,
I am going to use ideas from Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind to distinguish
two different ways of thinking about how to explain action. In Section 4.3 of this
chapter, I argue against one of these options, which has recently been defended by
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson. According to them, learning-how is learning
a fact.1 I argue that such a view fails to explain what we learn when we learn how
to do things. With their view out of the way, I return to Ryle to get a clearer
sense of the type of knowledge-how we are trying to explain. In Section 4.4, then, I
distinguish between capacities agents simply possess and those that must be learned,
and suggest that, given the former, it might be possible to develop the latter through
thought alone. In Section 4.5, I argue against one way of making the case for that
idea. Recently, Sebastian Ro¨dl has suggested that agents who possess a basic power
for practical thought can learn to do things they have never before done by merely
reflecting on what they already know how to do.2 I believe this view is mistaken,
and I will try to show why. In Section 4.6, I gesture at an alternative framework for
explaining the acquisition of knowledge-how. The shape of that idea depends on an
analogue of induction to explain how thought and action come to be coordinated.
This alternative, I suggest, shows promise for thinking about how to design models
1The meaning of words like ‘fact’ and ‘proposition’ are notoriously controversial. I want to remain
agnostic about controversies and opt instead for a fairly pliant posture. Accordingly, I assume facts
are true propositions, and propositions are the objects believed or asserted when an agent believes
or asserts, for example, that snow is white.
2Although this feature of his view is not obvious, I believe he is committed to it. As a result, I
will spend a good portion of Section 4.5 showing that, in fact, Ro¨dl is committed to the idea that
we can learn new skills by thought alone.
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of action that can explain the things we do to acquire knowledge-how.
4.2 Practical Intellectualism
Ryle allowed that there might be two kinds of knowledge that serve to explain the
performance of intelligent action. On the one hand, the performance of intelligent
actions might be explained by the apprehension of true propositions—that is, by an
agent’s knowledge-that. On the other hand, their performance might be explained
by an agent’s understanding of how to do things—that is, by knowledge-how. The
difference between these two types of knowledge, however, is obscured by the fact that
Ryle uses the term ‘knowledge’ for both. It suggests that both forms of knowledge
are, in some sense, informational, and interpreted this way, they both seem to refer
to the substance of thought, or, in other words, to the type of information contained
in thought.
For reasons that will become clear, I think this way of interpreting Ryle is a
mistake. Nevertheless, I want to flag the idea that intelligent action can be ex-
plained by appealing solely to the content of thought and give it a label. Strong
Practical Intellectualism (SPI) holds that knowing how to do something is knowing
that something is the case; it is knowing facts of one variety or another. According
to SPI, the factual information encoded in propositions is necessary and sufficient
for explaining the thoughts that go into intelligently doing things. This view has
recently been defended by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, and crucially
depends on showing that information about oneself—one’s capacities, dispositions,
and abilities—can be encoded in propositional knowledge and account for everything
that is known when an agent knows how to do something.
But there is another way to interpret Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-that
and knowledge-how. According to this alternative, knowledge-that is characterized
as any and all of the informational content of thought. (Information about the world,
about one’s capacities, one’s dispositions, one’s abilities, how to do things, and so
on are all instances of knowledge-that: in other words, anything that can be stated
with the phrase “I know that . . . .”) In contrast, knowledge-how is not, in any sense,
informational. It is, rather, a capacity for action of one sort or another. (The capacity
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of insects to walk, for example, is knowledge-how on this sort of interpretation. So
too, the capacity of rational agents for thought is, on this interpretation, knowledge-
how.) Now, although putting things this way leaves residual ambiguity in Ryle’s
discussion—after all, if the capacity for thought is knowledge-how, it is far from clear
whether that capacity can be exercised without informational content—as with SPI,
I want to flag the idea that explaining intelligent action requires more than what
can be encoded in the content of thought and to give it a label. Weak Practical
Intellectualism (WPI) holds that propositional knowledge is necessary for explaining
intelligent action, but, in contrast to SPI, it is not sufficient to explain what is known
when an agent knows how to do something. In addition to the information encoded in
thought, WPI requires that those thoughts be governed by a specific capacity, or, to
put that differently, a specific way of thinking, in order to produce intelligent action.
For my purposes, I am going to associate WPI with Anscombian models of intentional
action.
The difference between SPI and WPI, then, turns on the properties of thought
needed to explain intelligent action.3 Proponents of SPI believe that the content of
thought is all that is needed to explain intelligent action; in contrast, proponents of
WPI argue that to explain intelligent action, one must appeal to both the content of
thought and to a specific way of entertaining that content.
From both strands of intellectualism, it seems to follow that agents can learn how
to do things by simply acquiring propositional information. SPI is explicit in this
commitment, arguing that since knowledge-how is knowledge-that, learning-how is
nothing more than learning-that.4 WPI, however, is more subtle. According to it,
3I am going to use the phrase ‘intelligent action’ where the alternative ‘intentional action’ might
do just as well. There are two reasons for this terminological choice. First, the term ‘intention’ has
come to mean many different things in recent philosophical literature, and I want to avoid confusing
associations. Second, many of the ideas I will be engaged with in this chapter are rooted in Gilbert
Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. In that book, and in the second chapter of that book in particular,
he is interested in understanding what an agent must know in order to perform intelligent actions.
I will stick to Ryle’s turn of phrase except in Section 4.5.1, where, for exegetical purposes, I use
‘intentional action’.
4This supposed entailment is stated explicitly by Stanley in the preface of his recent book. He
writes: “The thesis of this book is that knowing how to do something is the same as knowing a fact.
It follows that learning how to do something is learning a fact” (Stanley, 2011a, vii).
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learning truths about how to F results in knowing how to F when the information
encoded in thought is entertained in a particular way, or according to a capacity for
thought of a particular form. On both types of intellectualism, then, learning how to
F can be accomplished by acquiring the information encoded in propositions about
F -ing. I will return to WPI in Section 4.4, but for now, I want to show that SPI
cannot explain what agents learn when they learn how to do things.
4.3 Intellectualizing Knowledge-How
Although discussing knowledge-how inevitably requires addressing Ryle’s work,
I am going to postpone doing so until we have worked through SPI. As I have
mentioned, Strong Practical Intellectualists believe that the thoughts that go into
intelligent action can be explained by appealing solely to their propositional content.
The view is developed by Stanley and Williamson in “Knowing How” (2001), and
has since been augmented and defended by Stanley in his monograph Know How
(2011a).5
Both iterations of the view support SPI by defending a particular schema. As
Stanley writes:
To defend the view that knowing how to do something is a kind of knowing
that something is the case, it is sufficient to defend the validity of the
following schema: For every s and F, s knows how to F iff for some way
w of F-ing, s knows that w is a way to F. If this schema is valid, then
knowing how to do something is a species of knowing that something is
the case. (Stanley, 2011a, 71, emphasis mine)6
As I read this schema, it is necessary and sufficient for knowing how to F that an
agent knows at least one way in which he could successfully F .
But what does it mean to know a way of doing something such that we would
ascribe to an agent knowledge-how? According to proponents of SPI, the meaning of
“John knows how to F” is determined by analyzing the informational content of the
thoughts tied to F -ing. This content includes, first, the information known when an
5Stanley has also responded to criticisms and developed his ideas in “Knowing (How)” (2011b).
In addition, he defends the idea that knowing-how is a species of knowing-that in a co-authored
piece; see (Pavese and Stanley, 2011).
6For the earlier iteration, see (Stanley and Williamson, 2001, 430).
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agent knows the answer to a question embedded in an ascription of knowledge-how.
For example, if John knows how to ski, he knows of at least one way to ski such
that doing things in that way could result in his successful action. The agent, then,
relates to the information encoded in the proposition in virtue of knowing an answer
to the embedded question how does one ski? Second, the information known by John
is first-personal information. When John knows how to ski, he knows that it is he
himself who knows that there is a way to ski such that doing things in that way could
result in his successfully skiing. So when John knows how to ski, the information
contained in the thought that goes into skiing is first-personal thought about what
he himself knows how to do. Third, the infinitival phrase “to ski” has a certain
modality. In the case at hand, for John to know how to ski is for John to know of all
the many ways one could ski that there is at least one way in which he himself could
ski successfully. In other words, of the various ways in which individuals effectively
ski, John need not know them all; rather, his knowing how to ski only depends on
his knowing at least one way in which he himself could ski. So in sum, on this
account, the information encoded in an individual’s knowledge-how is represented by
the semantical information contained in propositions understood by the agent. When
this information is possessed by a particular agent—that is, when an agent stands
in the right relation to the information encoded in these propositions—we ascribe to
him knowledge-how.
I do not want to resist the general idea that agents who know how to do things
typically possess some or all of the information specified by Stanley and Williamson.
It seems right to say that ascribing knowledge-how to an individual generally depends
on that individual grasping information about how to do whatever it is we say he
or she knows how to do. Furthermore, I do not see any reason to resist the idea
that that information, whatever it turns out to be, can be encoded in propositions.
Yet, even granting this, and even granting that the relevant information may be
indefinitely rich and complex, there seems to be an obvious objection to make to SPI.
In particular, it seems that the informational content of thought is not itself sufficient
to account for the capacities involved with knowing how to do things. Even if it
is true that possessing propositional knowledge is necessary for knowing-how to F ,
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that information is not sufficient for F -ing. This is most straightforwardly seen by
considering the manner in which knowledge-how is acquired.
4.3.1 Acquisition
It is very easy to acquire the informational content of propositions. After all, if
that information is what is common to the thought ‘snow is white’ and the sentence
‘snow is white’, there is little reason to think that it cannot be had by simply reading
the sentence. Information is easy to come by. So if knowledge-how is propositional
(as proponents of SPI would have it), agents should be able to learn how to do things
simply by acquiring the relevant information.
But such a view of learning how is problematic because translating information
about ways of doing things into a capacity to do them seems to require much more
than simply obtaining information. Consider John’s sister, Hannah, who is trying to
learn how to ski. She pesters John incessantly about ways of skiing (which, recall, are
the facts known when an agent knows how to F ). She asks about techniques for skiing
in different snow conditions, the postures needed for effectively navigating one’s way
downhill, methods for stopping, for controlling oneself, and so on. In addition, she has
watched videos of John skiing while he has pointed out all the various nuances used to
navigate runs in different conditions, she has watched countless instructional videos on
line, she has read books, and she has spent hours memorizing information about the
positions and techniques required for skiing. In short, she has done everything except
ski in order to learn how to ski. Yet all this information is insufficient for acquiring the
capacity to ski. Her first time out, she confidently clicks into her bindings, struggles
toward the chairlift, then, when attempting to load, promptly falls over. She does
the same thing getting off the lift and throughout the remainder of her first day. But
why? After all, we are assuming that she has all the relevant information. Why, then,
does not Hannah know how to ski? Because the information encoded in propositions
about skiing is not sufficient to explain what agents learn when they learn how to ski.
Information alone is not suited to the practical nature of acquiring knowledge-how.7
7Notice the similarity between this argument and Frank Jackson’s well-known argument in
“Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982). Jackson argues that Mary, an individual who has only experienced
the world within a black and white room, but who has all physical information about colors, will
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We learn to do things, as Aristotle pointed out, by doing them, not by acquiring
information about ways of doing them.
4.3.2 Modes of Thought
There are two closely related strategies used by proponents of SPI to get out
of this problem. The first, mentioned by Stanley and Williamson in their original
piece, addresses the issue by arguing that the informational content of proposi-
tions tied to knowledge-how must be thought of according to a “particular mode of
presentation”—alternatively, a “particular way of thinking” or “mode of thought”—in
order to result in successful action. The second strategy is deployed by Stanley alone
when, in his more developed monograph, he argues that differences in the modal
parameters of propositional information explains why an agent like Hannah does not
have knowledge-how, despite the fact that she has what is ex hypothesi all factual
information. Let me consider each in turn.
Stanley and Williamson argue that the content of an agent’s thought must find
expression according to a particular mode of presentation—or a particular way of
thinking—in order to be thought that demonstrates knowledge-how. The idea is to
tie the information encoded in an individual’s thoughts to different ways of thinking in
order to explain how the same information can give rise to different effects. The most
straightforward example of this idea relies on the distinction between demonstrative
and first-personal ways of thinking. Consider the following passage from Stanley and
Williamson:
Suppose that John is looking in a mirror, which he mistakenly believes to
be a window. Seeing a man whose pants are on fire, and not recognizing
that man as himself, John forms the belief that that man is on fire.
Intuitively, however, John does not believe that his own pants are on
fire. That is, relative to the invisaged context, (26) is true and (27) is
false:
(26) John believes that that man has burning pants.
(27) John believes that he himself has burning pants.
learn something new about the world when she is let out. In particular, she will learn what it is like
to experience color. In virtue of that fact, physicalism—the view that all information is physical
information—is false. The argument of this paragraph is similar: if an individual who has all factual
information about skiing must learn something else in order to ski, the view that knowing how to
do something is knowing a collection of facts is false.
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Given that ‘that man’ refers to John, however, the complement clauses of
(26) and (27) express the same proposition, namely the singular proposi-
tion containing John. To distinguish between (26) and (27), contemporary
advocates of Russellian propositions appeal to different modes of presenta-
tion under which that proposition is entertained. In the envisaged context,
(26) is associated with a demonstrative mode of presentation (or guise) of
the relevant proposition, whereas (27) is associated with a first-personal
mode of presentation of that very same proposition. (2001, 428)
To explain how the information encoded in propositions explains knowing how to F ,
Stanley and Williamson make a similar move. Just as identical information presented
in either a demonstrative or first-personal way of thinking leads to different results,
so too, thinking of that information according to a practical mode of thought has
different effects as well.8
Consider, for example, the knowledge possessed by Hannah about ways of skiing.
Presumably, entertaining the information pertaining to skiing according to a demon-
strative mode of thought will not result in her successfully skiing, because that mode
of thought is not tied to the dispositions and abilities necessary for successfully skiing.
Thinking demonstratively about some way, w, that it is a way to ski does not result
in action typical of knowing how to ski, because this way of thinking is not tied to the
skills, dispositions, and abilities required for skiing. In contrast, however, entertaining
that information under a practical mode of presentation does lead to successfully
skiing, because that mode of thought is tied to the requisite dispositions and abilities.
The idea is to argue that thoughts with the same propositional content can have
different effects depending on how they are entertained. Since the demonstrative
mode is not tied to practical capacities, but a practical mode is, entertaining the
information encoded in propositions about how to ski in the latter case, but not in
8It is not entirely clear what, exactly, a “practical mode of thought” amounts to for Stanley and
Williamson. In particular, they never make clear how the distinction between, say, demonstrative,
first-personal, and “practical” ways of thinking can be made by appealing to what seem to be the
different actions resulting from the different modes of thought. If demonstrative and first-personal
modes of thought are distinguished by their effects, are they not both, in some sense, “practical”? I
am not sure how Stanley and Williamson would answer that question, but, regardless, my concern is
only with practical modes of thought, which they seem to think are unique in that they are “related
in complex ways to dispositional states” (2001, 430).
Later in the chapter, when I look at WPI and Anscombian views of action, I will try to spell
out in more detail what a “practical mode of thought” could plausibly amount to. Of course, those
details will be independent of the view endorsed by Stanley and Williamson.
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the former, results in successful action. Stanley and Williamson’s response to the
challenge that information is not sufficient for knowing how to ski, then, is to argue
that Hannah may have all the knowledge necessary for claiming that she knows how
to ski, but be unable to ski, if the content of her thought is not entertained in the
relevant mode of presentation.
In his monograph, Stanley acknowledges that practical modes of thought may
seem unappealing, and, although he maintains his commitment to the idea, provides
another avenue of defense to explain why an agent might seem to have all the relevant
information about how to F while still not knowing how to F . The alternative strat-
egy is to argue that the information encoded in propositions pertaining to knowing
how to do things is sensitive to modal parameters tied to an agent’s physical abilities.
In this way, what an agent knows when she knows how to F is sensitive to what
she is capable of doing. Consequently, an agent can seem to have all the relevant
information about how to F while not knowing how to F , if the information built
into the relevant propositions is not transparently tied to the right modal parameters.
Once the latter are taken into consideration, however, the difficulty is resolved, or so
Stanley argues.
To see the problem, and Stanley’s solution to it, more clearly, consider two
propositions (altered from Stanley (2011a, 126)).
15a) Hannah knows that the way John skis is a way in which she could
ski.
15b) Hannah knows how to ski
Ignoring for a moment what Stanley calls the modal parameters tied to Hannah’s
physical abilities, the information contained in either 15a or 15b should be sufficient
to account for Hannah’s knowing how to ski. After all, if knowing how to F is knowing
that for some way w of F-ing, w is a way to F, then on either 15a or 15b, Hannah
should know how to ski. But, of course, that seems false: Hannah may know that
the way John skis is a way to ski without knowing how to ski herself. There is an
asymmetry between 15a and 15b and the worry is that Stanley’s view cannot account
for it.
Stanley meets the worry, however, by appealing to the modal parameters tied to
Hannah’s physical abilities. As he writes:
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the difference in meaning [between 15a and 15b] . . . is due to the different
modal parameters governing the uses of the modal constructions in these
sentences. . . . In (15a), the modal parameter is one that takes the world
of evaluation, and yields a set of propositions that characterize Hannah’s
physical state after training for some time . . . In contrast, the natural
modal parameter for the envisaged utterance of (15b) is one that takes
the world of evaluation, and yields a set of propositions that characterize
Hannah’s physical state at the moment. That is why the two utterances
express different propositions—because the modals in the two sentences
are interpreted via distinct modal parameters. (2011a, 126)
Stanley seems to think that the informational content of propositions tied to knowledge-
how may include what one is physically capable of doing, and that by building
this information into the thoughts that go into knowing how to do something, an
agent’s knowledge-how can be represented wholly by appealing to what is encoded in
propositions.
Notice that both the earlier appeal to particular modes of expression and the later
appeal to modal parameters rely on the idea that the information encoded in propo-
sitions is sensitive to an agent’s dispositions and abilities. This is how proponents of
SPI retain their commitment to the idea that the propositional content of thought is
sufficient to explain what an individual knows when he knows how to F . According to
the first response, the information encoded in propositions is sensitive to its mode of
presentation. Only if the information is thought of in a particular, practical way, will
it result in actions that demonstrate knowledge-how. The second response is similar:
the content of the information encoded in knowledge-how is sensitive to contexts
of interpretation, which take into account the physical dispositions and abilities of
agents in particular contexts. As a result, a proper interpretation of the informational
content of thought depends on understanding what the agent can do—that is, on the
modal parameters framing the agent’s know-how. The shared idea, then, is expressed
in arguments aimed to show that an agent knows how to F only if she knows at
least one way of F -ing such that that way is a way to F , and she has the relevant
dispositions and abilities required for performing the action in question.
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4.3.3 Impending Regress
It is difficult to see how these responses are adequate to the problem faced by
proponents of SPI. The problem is that explaining knowledge-how using only what can
be encoded in the propositional content of thought presupposes an agent’s capacity
to know how to entertain that information in a manner that leads to the relevant
actions. Such a presupposition cannot be maintained if one is trying to articulate
what it means to know how to do something. This should be familiar to anyone
acquainted with the work of Ryle. What Ryle noticed was that to explain intelligent
action, one cannot appeal solely to propositional knowledge, because, in addition to
it, intelligent action requires agents to possess certain dispositions and abilities, which
cannot be explained propositionally. That may sound similar to what proponents of
SPI have to say. After all, they argue that in addition to the informational content
of propositions, one must know how to entertain it according to a practical mode of
thought, or know how to execute it with the dispositions and abilities one possesses
according to the relevant modal parameters. But, in contrast to Ryle, SPI tries to
show that knowing how to entertain the informational content of thought according
to a practical mode of thought can be accommodated with information about facts,
or knowledge-that. This solution, however, leads to an explanatory problem foreseen
by Ryle.9
If knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, the content of the thoughts that
go into knowing how to think according to a practical mode of thought must be
specifiable with further propositional information. But adopting this strategy results
in a failure to explain how it is possible to entertain that information in the first place.
To see why, suppose that it is true that the thoughts that go into knowledge-how are
fully specifiable with propositional information. If that is right, then the thoughts that
go into entertaining the information encoded in propositions with a practical mode
of thought must be explained by specifying the information encoded in propositions
(this, of course, is just to repeat the commitments of SPI). But to think of the
9The problem was identified long before Ryle by Lewis Carroll in “What the Tortoise Said to
Achilles” (1895). Carroll demonstrates that the reason to accept the legitimacy of an inference
cannot be a further premise to the inference.
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information encoded in knowing how to think with a practical mode of thought
requires that the information be thought according to a particular mode of thought.
Consequently, an agent must know how to think of the information encoded in
knowing how to think according to a practical mode of thought using a practical mode
of thought. But since thinking according to that mode of thought is something we
know how to do, that information can be fully specified with the information encoded
in propositions as well. Consequently, to entertain the propositional information
specifying the mode of thought used to entertain it, we must use the mode of thought
we are aiming to specify. The problem should be clear: if thinking is an intelligent
action, the thoughts that go into it cannot be fully specified by appealing to the
information encoded in propositions without leading to a vicious regress. Adopting
this route, as proponents of SPI do, fails to explain how it is that agents think the
thoughts required for doing the things they do, because it presupposes, and does not
explain, the capacity of agents to know how to do things.
Ryle makes a nearly identical point when he writes:
The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of
which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any
operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had
first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical
impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. (1949, 30)
To get thought up and running, it seems, there must be something more than the
propositional content of those thoughts; there must be some basic dispositions or
abilities tied to an agent’s capacity for thought, which are used to execute the
information encoded in propositions. This, of course, is Ryle’s solution. From the
paragraph before the one just cited, he writes:
It is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of
operations when they are not yet able to consider any propositions en-
joining how they should be performed. Some intelligent performances are
not controlled by any anterior acknowledgments of the principles applied
in them. (1949, 30)
Ryle characterized the dispositions, or abilities, to perform some type of intelligent
operations as a distinct type of knowledge.10 Indeed, for Ryle, knowledge-how is
10I think Ryle’s appropriation of the term ‘knowledge’ to describe these dispositional states may
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dispositional knowledge, which is intended to be a type of knowledge that can make
sense of being and acting intelligently without depending on one’s grasp of proposi-
tional truths. To explain what is known when agents perform intelligent actions, Ryle
offers two different types of knowledge: one is dispositional, the other propositional.
Proponents of SPI seem forced to a similar conclusion, yet they maintain that
the content of thought can do all the explanatory work. But that is a mistake,
because it cannot avoid the regress problem Ryle was worried about. Furthermore,
trying to avoid that problem by appealing to practical modes of thought, or to the
modal parameters governing knowledge-how statements, is not a solution either. If
proponents of SPI appeal to either—that is, to either practical modes of thought or
modal parameters—as a disposition or capacity necessary for knowledge-how, and
if neither are reducible to propositional information, then by their own lights, the
schema that proponents of SPI aim to defend is false: it is not the case that s knows
how to F iff for some way w of F-ing, s knows that w is a way to F. If an agent
does not possess the capacity or ability to think about the information encoded in
propositions in a manner productive of action, he or she may have all the relevant
information and still not know how to F.
4.3.4 Learning to Act
So SPI cannot, without regress, explain the knowledge-how possessed by an agent
when he or she knows how to think practically—that is, SPI cannot explain the basic
capacity of rational agents to entertain propositional information in a manner that
leads to action. But that is not SPI’s only problem. In addition, there are a pair of
problems pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge-how.
The first problem is closely related to the regress problem. To explain what
agents learn when they acquire knowledge-how, SPI must assume something that
needs explaining. In particular, the view must assume that, given an agent’s capacity
to think according to a practical mode of thought, providing new propositional
have been a mistake. Be that as it may, his point that we need to understand how to do things and
that this understanding cannot be encoded propositionally was not. In other words, even if it is not
accurate to describe certain basic capacities for action as states of knowledge, Ryle was certainly
correct to distinguish the idea as something required for intelligent action.
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information is sufficient to account for the acquisition of knowledge-how. But that
assumption cannot be justified unless we can explain how the power to entertain
information according to a mode of thought produces such knowledge. In other words,
appealing to the information encoded in propositions cannot explain how individuals
acquire knowledge-how unless we already understand how intelligent action results
from “practical modes of presentation,” “practical ways of thinking,” or the “modal
parameters” required for interpreting practical thought. Without explaining what
these phrases mean and how they lead to intelligent action, SPI cannot explain the
acquisition of knowledge-how by appealing to propositional information. The capacity
to entertain information according to a practical mode of thought cannot be assumed
when attempting to explain the things we learn how to do, because, for all that
has been said, entertaining information in that way might itself be something we
must learn how to do. If it is, we cannot explain what we learn when we acquire
knowledge-how by appealing to it.
In addition to explanatory regresses, SPI runs into yet another difficulty pertaining
to the acquisition of knowledge-how. In particular, the view entails that knowledge-
how can be acquired by inference. To see this, suppose SPI is true. That is, suppose
it is true that knowing how to do something is just knowing that something is the
case; it is knowing information that can be encoded in the content of thought. Given
such an assumption, an agent should be able to derive knowledge-how by inference.
Suppose, for example, that Jones knows how to do two different things, each of
which can be done without an understanding of how to do the other. For example,
Jones knows how to ski (S) and Jones knows how to perform backflips on a trampoline
(B). Given the assumption that SPI is true (and this means that we are assuming
that SPI does not have the regress problem), the thoughts involved with his doing S
and the thoughts involved with Jones’s doing B should be fully specifiable with the
information encoded in the relevant propositions. Furthermore, since we are assuming
that the information encoded in thought can also account for its mode of presentation,
that information should be sufficient to account for what is learned when Jones learns
a new capacity, say, SB-ing. In particular, Jones should be able to derive from the
information pertaining to S and from the information pertaining to B, the information
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pertaining to SB-ing. From two independent skills, an agent should be able to derive
a third, composite skill since, by hypothesis, he has all the information.11 In other
words, given the truth of SPI (and ignoring the regress problem), an individual should
be able to simply conjoin the propositional information responsible for his knowing
how, and, in virtue of that conjunction, know how to do something else.
Given SPI, this follows from fairly uncontroversial assumptions about propositions.
After all, it is standardly accepted that the content of propositions is subject to
basic principles of logic and can be manipulated by those principles to derive new
propositions. If I know that “this is snow,” that “this is white,” and that “this is
cold,” then it is uncontroversial that the knowledge that “this snow is white and cold”
can be derived by thinking about the information encoded in the propositions. But
such powers of inference do not seem to apply to cases of knowing how: if I know how
to entertain the information pertaining to skiing with a practical mode of thought,
and I know how to entertain the information pertaining to doing backflips according
to the same mode of thought, and if I know how to ski and I know how to do backflips,
I still will not be able to derive the knowledge needed to do backflips while skiing
simply by reflecting on the information that I already know and can entertain with
a practical mode of thought. This fact suggests that there is something more to the
combined capacity than the information encoded in the thoughts pertaining to either
skiing or backflipping, and this is true no matter how rich and complex we make that
information.
4.4 Basic Powers and Intelligent Actions
Given the points of the previous section, it looks like we need more than what
can be accounted for with propositional information to explain the acquisition of
knowledge-how. In addition, we need (minimally) to explain what it means to
11One might worry that there must be additional information required for the performance of
the composite skill. For example, it seems plausible to suggest that in addition to the information
pertaining to the individual skills, one must also know information pertaining to how they are
integrated in the performance of a single activity. Maybe that is right, but if it is, we should
wonder how that information is acquired. I am suggesting that it cannot be acquired by obtaining
information merely. Indeed, much of the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to explaining how
the information pertaining to integrated skills may (and may not) be acquired.
98
entertain thought according to a practical mode of presentation. This, I think, is
a point recognized by Ryle, and in this section, I want to return briefly to Ryle’s
account. Doing so will help clarify the issue before us and frame the discussion of
WPI, which is still to come.
Ryle uses the term ‘knowledge-how’ to refer to two seemingly distinct things. In
response to what I am calling his regress argument, Ryle argues that there must be
basic dispositions, skills, or abilities for intelligent action that do not rely on the
“anterior acknowledgment” of the information governing their performance. I am
going to call these basic powers.12 Candidates include things that agents know how
to do that were never learned, yet seem to be instances of intelligent action. For
example, the power to push objects, to suckle, to scratch an itch, and to think and
reason (in some minimal sense) seem to be candidates for such basic powers. They
are things an agent either knows how to do or does not, and if he does not, there
is no information that is going to help him learn. If I do not know how to make an
inference, for example, there is no information that could show me how.13
In contrast to basic powers, there are skills and abilities that agents must acquire.
I will call these further abilities, following Ryle, intelligent capacities or skills. Con-
tenders include any skilled activity: making an omelette, mountain climbing, skiing,
riding a bicycle, driving a car, and so on. Ryle characterizes intelligent capacities by
contrasting them with habits. He writes:
When we describe someone as doing something by pure or blind habit,
we mean that he does it automatically and without having to mind what
he is doing. He does not exercise care, vigilance, or criticism. . . . But
a mountaineer walking over ice-covered rocks in a high wind in the dark
. . . thinks what he is doing, he is ready for emergencies, he economises
in effort, he makes tests and experiments; in short he walks with some
degree of skill and judgment. (1949, 42)
Intelligent capacities, or skills, require agents to think about, and to be aware of,
what they are doing while they are doing it. Yet it is clear that the performance of a
12It does not matter for my purpose whether Ryle actually held the view I am using him to
develop. As a result, I am going to simply assume that the two senses of knowledge-how I am about
to distinguish were recognized by Ryle, but not adequately separated because he thought they were,
in some sense, too tightly interwoven.
13This, of course, is one lesson of Carroll’s “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” See footnote 9.
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skill or intelligent capacity is not an expression of a basic power. Instead, they seem
to be the products of learning. If that is right, there is a difference between basic
powers and intelligent capacities, though Ryle never adequately distinguishes them.14
Given that they are different, consider again the chapter’s motivating question:
how can we explain the acquisition of knowledge-how? As a question about basic
powers, it is a nonstarter. As Ryle suggests, there must be some intelligent operations
that are performed without an antecedent understanding of propositional truths. This
fact follows from his regress argument. If that is right, our motivating question should
be understood as one aimed at explaining the acquisition of intelligent capacities or
skills. So how can we explain their acquisition? As we have already seen, appealing
to the procurement of information encoded in propositions is not going to do the job.
If it could, it would be possible to learn to ski, mountain climb, or ride a bicycle by
acquiring information or inferring the skills from information pertaining to what we
already know how to do. How, then, do we acquire intelligent capacities?
There is some potential for explaining their acquisition by assuming certain basic
powers. For example, one might assume that rational agents have the power to
entertain the content of thought according to a practical mode of presentation. In this
way, an agent that possesses that power can acquire intelligent capacities by simply
acquiring the information contained in propositions and entertaining it according to
the appropriate mode of thought. But, as we have seen, unless we specify what that
power is and how it works, we do not really have an explanation of how acquiring
information can result in the acquisition of intelligent capacities. This is one of the
problems that sunk SPI.
So what could a basic power for action be? Is there a basic power of thought that,
when combined with propositional information, causes intelligent action? Anscom-
bians believe that they have an answer to this question because they have tried to
provide a substantive account of practical thought—that is, they have tried to specify
the form of thought that causes action. For Anscombians, when thought is entertained
14In the sense I am using the terms, both basic powers and intelligent capacities or skills can
produce intelligent actions. For example, I can use the basic power to push things to push open a
door in order to go shopping. Similarly, if I possess the skill to mountain climb, I can use that skill,
and the knowledge-how associated with it, to maneuver up a rock-face.
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according to a specific pattern, it results in action. Despite their more robust view
of action explanation, however, I do not believe that they can use it to explain the
acquisition of intelligent capacities or skills.
4.5 Intellectualized Action
As I have argued, the problem with SPI is that it tries to explain the know how
needed to perform intelligent actions by appealing solely to the content of thought.
But the view collapses in the face of what it cannot explain. One way to try to salvage
the view is by moving to a type of practical intellectualism that does not rely solely
on thought’s content to explain knowing how to do something. To that end, I want
to sketch a version of WPI, which, recall, is the idea that thought must be governed
by a particular formal structure—that is, the content of thought must be entertained
in a particular manner—in order to produce intelligent actions. As we will see, the
idea aims to specify what it means to entertain thought’s content according to a basic
power for practical thought, one whereby thinking thoughts in that way causes action.
The work of Elizabeth Anscombe and her contemporary followers is, I think,
representative of the type of Weak Practical Intellectualism (WPI) that I want to
use as a target. For Anscombians, the possibility of intelligent action depends on
the unity of one’s thought with one’s action. When an individual does something
on purpose for a reason, thought and action unfold together according to a shared
structure. A commitment to this type of unity, however, seems to imply that new
skills and intelligent capacities can be acquired through thought alone. In other
words, if thought and action share a tight enough connection, one should be able to
figure out how to perform skilled actions by acquiring the information about how to
perform them. (It is not obvious that this is an implication of the view. The argument
that it is will be provided in a moment.) But accepting this seeming implication of
WPI is a mistake. Indeed, what I aim to show is that the view of intelligent action
put forward by proponents of WPI presupposes without explanation the capacity of
agents to acquire new skills and intelligent capacities. To make that argument, I
want to show that the basic power for practical thought put forward by WPI cannot
explain what we learn when we acquire new skills or intelligent capacities, because
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it cannot account for the actions performed to acquire them. I begin by delineating
the contours of the type of Weak Practical Intellectualism characteristic of Anscombe
and her recent followers.
4.5.1 Anscombian Action
For Anscombe, the distinguishing feature of intentional action is not the content
of one’s thought, but rather, its form or structure.15 When acting intentionally—that
is, in a manner such that one’s actions are governed by one’s thoughts—the content
of thought must take a particular form; it is this formal feature of thought that ties
it to action. This is not, of course, to suggest that proponents of WPI think that the
substance of thought is irrelevant to an explanation of intelligent action. After all,
it is presupposed that agents who act intentionally have knowledge of what they are
doing. As Anscombe notes, “it is the agent’s knowledge of what he is doing that gives
the descriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intention” (2000,
87). When acting intentionally, one knows what one is doing and can articulate that
knowledge in a manner that demonstrates an understanding of facts. Nevertheless,
it is not the informational content of an agent’s thought that serves to distinguish
intentional action; rather, it is the form or structure of those thoughts. Again from
Anscombe:
the term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description of events.
What is essential to this form is displayed by the results of our enquiries
into the question ‘Why?’ Events are typically described in the form when
‘in order to’ or ‘because’ (in one sense) is attached to their descriptions.
(2000, 84-85, emphasis in original)
The idea is that whatever the content of an agent’s thought turns out to be, it will
provide a description of an intentional action only if it is constrained by a certain
formal structure. In particular, it is in virtue of the progressive (or means-end) form
15Although I am generally using the phrase ‘intelligent action’ instead of ‘intentional action’
throughout this essay, I take exception to that policy in the next couple of paragraphs.
My characterization of Anscombe comes primarily from her Intention. That being said, many
of the ideas found in Intention are, to my mind, more clearly articulated in “Practical Inference”
(Anscombe, 1995). In that piece, Anscombe argues for the idea that the form of thought is important
for distinguishing intentional actions from other things rational agents do.
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of thought,16 and a rational agent’s ability to locate what he is doing in terms of that
structure, that an action is demarcated as intentional. If the progress of thought was
not coordinated with the progress of action—that is, if one’s thought could not take
the means-end or part-whole form typical of actions—it would not be possible for what
an agent is thinking and what he is doing to be tied together in a self-conscious event.
If that is right, saying what one is doing when one is doing something intentionally
presupposes that one’s thought conforms to the formal structure internal to actions.
Recently, a small, but influential, cadre of theorists has endorsed these Anscom-
bian ideas. They argue that to explain the connection between thought and action,
the structure of one must share the structure of the other. Only in this way can
thought and action form the sort of causal unity typified by rational agency.17 I am
going to call this idea—the idea that intelligent action depends on the formal unity of
thought and action—the unity thesis. One implication of this thesis, which presumes
an extraordinarily tight connection between the things we think and the things we do,
is that we can acquire the knowledge-how typical of skills and intelligent capacities
through thought alone. Accepting that implication, however, is a mistake. We cannot
acquire the skill to mountain climb, ski, or ride a bike by reflection merely, because
the form of thought required to unify what one thinks and what one does, even when
combined with propositional information about how to do things, cannot explain how
we come to coordinate thought and action in the first place. Before I can argue for
that, however, I need to sketch the ideas behind the unity thesis, and show that it
16Although Anscombe does not herself adopt this terminology, it will prove apt as we proceed. The
phrasing is taken from recent work by philosophers influenced by Anscombe. Michael Thompson,
for example, writes: “the use of the progressive in the articulation of ordinary event-consciousness
seems somehow to span the present, reaching into the future” (2008, 126). And Sebastian Ro¨dl
seems to support a similar view when he writes: “A progressive thought looks forward in the sense
that it designates a certain end as proper to what it represents” (2007, 30, emphasis in original). The
idea espoused by both authors is that the progressive form of thought shows the unity of thought
and action when agents act intelligently.
17The idea that there is a certain type of causal unity between thought and action may sound
puzzling. The idea, however, is not that bizarre. As Thompson writes: “The nature of intentional
action, or the kind of being-subject-of-an-event that characterizes a rational agent and a person,
resides in the peculiar “synthesis” that unites the various parts and phases of something like house
building, for example, mixing mortar, laying bricks, hammering nails, etc.” (2008, 91). The question,
then, is what makes all these different actions the single, unified action of an agent building a house?
And the response is, I take it, that it is the agent’s thought in doing them.
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entails a commitment to the view that individuals can acquire intelligent capacities
just by thinking.
4.5.2 Anscombe Updated
Anscombe and her recent followers are, I think, distinguishable by their commit-
ment to one or another version of the unity thesis. The different versions, however,
are idiosyncratic enough to be unwieldy if discussed together as a single view. Conse-
quently, I am going to focus almost exclusively on a single iteration of that thesis. To
this end, I will be concerned with the work of Sebastian Ro¨dl. There are, however,
two further reasons for focusing on him: first, his commitment to the unity thesis and
what it entails is straightforward; and second, the view that the unity thesis commits
one to the idea that acquiring knowledge-how can be accomplished by thinking alone is
most easily shown by looking at his work. Nevertheless, to the extent that Anscombe
and her sympathizers accept the relevant aspects of Ro¨dl’s conception of the unity
thesis, the points I make will apply to them as well. By way of segue, let me begin
by saying a word or two about Michael Thompson’s view.18
Thompson argues that the structure of thought “can figure in the order of things
equally as grounded and as ground, as rationalized and as (non-finally) rationalizing”
(Thompson, 2008, 90). The idea is tied to the thought that in the most basic sense, the
concept of ‘intentional action’—that is, the idea that agents are capable of performing
intelligent actions—is explained by an agent’s self-conscious understanding of his
place in a process he causes (Thompson, 2008, 132).19 In this sense, an agent’s
thought and action are unified in an “etiological nexus”20 of which the agent is self-
consciously aware. This nexus of thought and action must share a specific structure,
18That Thompson’s views should serve as a segue to Ro¨dl’s is suggested by Ro¨dl when he writes
in the preface to Self-Consciousness: “I do not think there is a thought in this book that was not
at some time or other the topic of conversations I have had with Michael Thompson. If a thought
in this book is of value, I shall not know that it is not his” (2007, xi).
19As with Anscombe’s view, the idea is not to dismiss the content of thought in explaining the
relation between thought and action, but rather, to show that thought must be constrained by
particular formal parameters in order to be tied to intentional action.
20Thompson goes out of his way to remain agnostic about explicitly causal questions. See, for
example, footnote 3 in part 2 of Life and Action (2008, 86).
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which Thompson demonstrates to be the progressive or imperfect form of event-
consciousness (Thompson, 2008, 125-126). Without the capacity to entertain the
information contained in thought according to the progressive structure, an agent’s
thought and action would be, at best, only coincidentally connected, and such an
agent would not qualify as a rational agent.
Ro¨dl agrees with Thompson that the coordinated unity of thought and action
requires the content of the former to be constrained by the progressive form of event-
consciousness. Ro¨dl, however, is more clearly focused on the peculiarly causal aspect
of this unity. He writes: “if a movement rests on thought, then the unity of its phases,
which constitutes it as a movement, must rest on thought” (Ro¨dl, 2007, 31). Only
in this way can what an agent thinks and what he does be tied together. If that is
right, the unity thesis depends on there being a very tight connection between the
things we think and the things we do when we are doing them intelligently. Indeed,
the connection is so tight that Ro¨dl explicitly adopts causal terminology to mark it.
He writes:
action explanations do not cite further mental causes, but represent a
different configuration of thought, will, and action. When we explain that
someone is doing A because she wants to do B, and add that she thinks
that doing A is a means of doing B, we do not give a further cause;
rather, we specify the kind of causality. We give the sense of the question
“Why?” that we answer. If the explanation is true, then the subject’s
thought constitutes the causal nexus. The causality of the will is thought.
(2007, 50)
This passage entails that practical thought is intelligent action and intelligent action
is practical thought.
That said, the unity of thought and action in rational agency is not solely de-
pendent on the formal structure of event-consciousness. In addition to the shared
structure, the performance of intelligent action depends on the informational content
of thought. This is just to point out Ro¨dl’s commitment to WPI. Indeed, this
commitment is evident in Ro¨dl’s discussion of the elements of practical reasoning. For
him, practical thought is constituted by a practical inference—that is, an inference
that is, by its nature, the cause of action. Such inferences depend on two premises.
The first is “a desire as Kant defines it: a representation through which its subject is
the cause of the existence of its object. The second . . . is a statement of independent
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fact; it purports to be (in the good case it is) speculative knowledge” (Ro¨dl, 2011,
219). These two premises, when combined through a basic power to act for reasons,
are the cause of intelligent action. The overall picture, then, is one according to which
the performance of intelligent action depends on a desire to do something, which is
steered by an agent’s speculative understanding of the means required to satisfy it.
The desire of the first premise and the knowledge content of the second premise serve
to generate movements that reflect the progressive form internal to actions.
An example will prove useful. Suppose an individual wants an omelette and
knows how to make them—that is, he desires an omelette in the Kantian sense and
grasps the means-end relations necessary for omelette making. Given his speculative
understanding of how to make omelettes and his desire to have one, the agent may,
as a matter of practical inference, perform the actions that cause the existence of
an omelette. In such a case, the agent’s thought about omelette making and the
actions involved in making an omelette are tied together by the progressive form they
share. Furthermore, we say that the agent possesses the skill, or know how, to make
omelettes, because his practical inference is an expression of that skill.
That is all well and good, but the question this chapter is addressing is not “What
is practical inference?” but, rather, “how is it that agents acquire intelligent capacities
or skills?” That is, how do agents acquire the skill to make omelettes (or to ski,
mountain climb, bicycle ride, and so on) such that, given a desire for an omelette (or
to ski, mountain climb, ride a bike, and so on), he can perform the intelligent actions
that express that skill? In terms of the details of Ro¨dl’s account, the question is,
“how does an agent come to grasp the knowledge contained in the second premise
of a practical inference such that that knowledge, combined with a desire, effects an
intelligent action?”
Calling the knowledge of the second premise “speculative,” as Ro¨dl does (Ro¨dl,
2011, 219), seems to imply that it is grasped theoretically, as propositional information
about the means necessary to realize one’s ends. If that is right, if the information
contained in the second premise of a practical inference is merely propositional knowl-
edge, then one should be able to acquire intelligent capacities through thought alone.
After all, given a desire for F and speculative knowledge about how to do F , there
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seems to be nothing to stop a practical inference from being effected. But if that is
right, then given the relevant desire, an agent should be able to execute the fulfillment
of that desire without ever having done what he has set out to do—that is, the agent
should be able to perform the actions characteristic of a skill as a matter of practical
inference. Ultimately, I think Ro¨dl is committed to that view, but attributing it to
him straightaway is too simplistic and overlooks important nuances of his account.
Let me explain.
Ro¨dl insists that “the will, being the source of practical reasoning, is the formal
cause of the second premise of practical reasoning” (Ro¨dl, 2011, 224). What this
means is that the speculative knowledge contained in the second premise of a practical
inference is arranged, or structured, by an individual’s capacity as an agent. To
put that differently, “knowledge of means depends on the will for its form; the will
depends on knowledge of means for its matter; the matter is inseparable from its
form” (Ro¨dl, 2011, 224). The idea seems to be that an individual’s understanding
of the progressive structure of action is determined by the will. If that is true, it
would seem that individuals grasp the knowledge contained in the second premise by
exercising their will—that is, agents acquire knowledge-how by doing things.
But on Ro¨dl’s view, that is only half true. To see why, recall the distinction
between basic powers and intelligent capacities. Basic powers are things that agents
know how to do without ever learning how to do them. In contrast, intelligent
capacities are things agents know how to do that have had to be acquired through
learning. And our question has been, “How do agents acquire the knowledge-how
typified by intelligent capacities or skills?” Ro¨dl seems to have two different ways of
answering that question, which also turn on the difference between basic powers and
intelligent capacities.
On the one hand, Ro¨dl agrees with Ryle that there are basic powers possessed by
rational agents as such. He calls them “elementary powers of movement” and ties
them to general knowledge-how. So, for instance, if, as a rational agent, I possess
the elementary power to push things, I thereby know how to push things. From this
general knowledge-how, I can derive more specific knowledge-how. For example, given
that I know how to push things generally, I can derive the specific knowledge-how
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needed to push this door open. In similar fashion, given that an agent already knows
how to perform an intelligent capacity like, for example, skiing, the knowledge-how
required for specific acts of skiing can be derived from that more general knowledge.
According to his conception of practical inference, then, a desire to ski, combined with
general knowledge-how about skiing, may result in the intelligent action of skiing. An
individual’s thought is action, because, on occasions like this, an intelligent capacity
(knowing how to ski) is used to derive specific knowledge-how (knowledge about how
to ski at this moment), which, when combined with a desire to ski, effects a practical
inference that is the performance of skiing as an intelligent action.
But of course, we do not have an elementary power to ski; it has to be acquired.
So the question is, “What other way is there to acquire the knowledge-how typified by
skills?” Ro¨dl has an answer. In addition to deriving it from general knowledge-how, it
can be calculated from other things an agent knows how to do. So, if I have speculative
knowledge of the fact that I can do Z by doing W , X, and Y , and I know how to
do W , X, and Y , I can calculate the knowledge-how required to do Z. In this way, I
can infer or calculate Z from things I already know how to do. Again, according to
Ro¨dl’s conception of practical inference, a desire to ski, combined with the calculative
knowledge-how contained in the second premise of a practical inference, may be used
in practical thought to effect the action of skiing. On occasions like this, thought
is action because the specific knowledge-how (knowledge about how to ski at this
moment) can be calculated from what the agent already knows how to do (the parts
that go into skiing).
The half-truth in Ro¨dl’s view, then, is that the knowledge-how contained in the
second premise of a practical inference is acquired on some occasions by deriving it
from what agents already know how to do. In particular, when the knowledge-how
required to perform a specific action is derived from more general knowledge-how
about performing some skill, or intelligent capacity, it is acquired from previous
exercises of the will. If I have already exercised my will such that I know how to ski, I
can use that general knowledge-how to perform an intelligent action by practical
inference. The mistake in the view, however, is in thinking that the knowledge
contained in the second premise of a practical inference can be calculated or inferred
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by thinking about things I already know how to do. Indeed, given this calculative
method for inferring the knowledge-how contained in the second premise, it follows
on Ro¨dl’s view that, if an agent knows how to do the parts constitutive of a skill or
intelligent capacity, the agent can acquire the relevant skill or capacity by thinking
merely. After all, to calculate a new skill, Z, from what I already know how to do,
W , X, and Y , there is nothing else to appeal to other than thought alone, since I
make that calculation without ever having done Z. His commitment to that view is,
I believe, betrayed by Ro¨dl on a couple of occasions. For example, he writes:
The power to reason about what to do is a power to do things. For, in the
fundamental case, thinking that such-and-such is to be done because . . .
is the causality of an action explanation that one is doing it because . . .
Since practical thinking is, fundamentally, acting, the power of practical
thought is a power to act. (Ro¨dl, 2007, 60, emphasis in original)
In a footnote to this passage, he takes things even further by interpreting Aristotle
and Kant as supporting the view. He writes:
One manifestation of [the power of practical thought as a power to act]
. . . is that deliberation about how to do something terminates in things
one can do. Another . . . is that recognizing that one must do something
is recognizing that one has the power to do it. (2007, 60)
These quotes, I think, betray an implication of the unity thesis. For anyone committed
to that thesis, thought is action when the premises of a practical inference are satisfied.
But an agent can satisfy the premises of a practical inference without actually knowing
how to do what he has set out to do. This fact is a consequence of the idea that agents
can calculate the content of the second premise of a practical inference by reflecting
on things they already know how to do, and from that knowledge-how infer a new
skill or intelligent capacity. If an agent knows how to do the parts of an action, he
can calculate how to do the whole just by thinking about the relation of the parts to
the whole. It follows that agents can learn to perform intelligent actions by reflection
merely, even if they have never before performed the particular action. But that is a
mistake. Knowing how to perform the individual parts of an action is not sufficient
for performing the action as a whole. If that is right, then one cannot calculate
knowledge-how to Z from knowledge-how to W , X, and Y , where the latter are the
constitutive means to the former.
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4.5.3 Learning to Act
To see this, consider an agent with full knowledge of the content of the second
premise of a practical inference, and that that knowledge pertains to the performance
of two distinct intelligent actions, say, skiing and doing backflips. Given an agent in
full possession of such information, is it possible to explain the acquisition of a third,
composite intelligent capacity by appealing to calculation? I think the answer is no,
but there are two ways one might support the alternative view. On the one hand, it
might be that an agent in full possession of the information required for performing
two distinct intelligent actions can simply reflect on his speculative knowledge and
infer the composite skill. Of course, I have argued in Section 4.3 that we cannot
make such inferences. Alternatively, then, it may be that an agent can derive the
composite skill by using the relevant information plus a basic power for progressive
(means-end) thought. In this way, propositional information can, given a power for
practical inference of the sort specified by Ro¨dl—that is, a disposition to entertain
the content of thought according to a specific formal pattern—explain the acquisition
of knowledge-how. This, of course, is to suggest that WPI is the right way to think
about acquiring knowledge-how. This alternative, however, must presuppose without
explanation the intelligent capacities it aims to explain. If knowledge-how is required
for practical inference, and we try to use practical inference to explain the acquisition
of intelligent capacities, we fall into an explanatory circle.
There are, I think, two types of examples that show why WPI cannot explain
the acquisition of new intelligent capacities by appealing to practical inference, but
before turning to the examples, let me provide a more general argument. When an
individual is learning how to do things, there are many things she can know. She can
know information about what it takes to F , she can know information about why
doing A is a means to doing F , she can know what she is capable of doing, what she is
disposed to do, what she is able to do, and she can even know how to entertain all of
that information according to the means-end, or progressive, form of thought. That
last point is, of course, a concession to the idea that means-end thought may very well
be a basic power in the sense espoused by Ryle. Yet even knowing all this information,
and even possessing the power of practical thought, the agent may not know how to
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coordinate the performance of the particular actions necessary for accomplishing what
she has set out to do. The thought, then, turns on the idea that when one is learning
a new skill, there is a gap between the general capacity for progressive, or means-end,
thought, the information encoded in thoughts about how to do things (even granting
indefinitely rich and complex propositional information), and the execution of that
thought in a manner that produces the relevant action. The reason for this is that
the general capacity to think practically cannot itself serve to coordinate an agent’s
actions with the thoughts that produce them—that is, thoughts about what to do in
order to F are not coordinated with the bodily movements required to F by reflection
merely. To acquire the know how that is displayed by the coordinated unity of thought
and action typical of practical inference—that is, to fill in the gap between the general
capacity for progressive thought and the particular actions required to effectively do
something—we must first act without knowing what we are doing.
Two quick examples will demonstrate this point. The first is meant to show
that the basic power for progressive thought cannot yield intelligent capacities or
skills; the second is meant to show that the unity of thought and action required to
perform two independent intelligent capacities cannot be used to derive the unity
of thought and action required for a third, composite skill. Suppose Smith has
speculative knowledge of how to ski groomed runs and he is attempting to learn
how to ski powder. In other words, he possesses knowledge-how about skiing in
a somewhat restricted sense, and he is trying to expand his capacities. Moreover,
suppose he has a basic power for progressive thought—that is, he can think about
the information pertaining to skiing in terms of the progressive form. He can think,
for example, that in the conditions in which he finds himself, skiing effectively requires
his weight to be (roughly) centered over his bindings, that his knees should be bent
so that his shins are pressing on the front of his boots, that his arms should be
extended forward, and so on. These thoughts are what he does. We are supposing,
then, that Smith has all of the relevant information and that he can entertain it
according to the structure relevant to practical thought, which causes his action.
Yet, unless he has, through a multitude of attempts, coordinated the connection
between the particular actions required for skiing and the thought that governs their
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successful execution in powder—that is, unless Smith has forged a connection between
his restricted knowledge-how and the activity he is trying to perform—he will not be
able to ski in powder. The reason for this is that merely thinking on the information
contained in thought with the means-end, or progressive, form is not enough for the
things one thinks to be coordinated with the movements required for action. One
cannot merely think of things according to a certain formal relation and, in virtue
of that thought, execute the movements necessary for performing the action. One’s
thought and the actions required for executing a skill must be coordinated through
a process of learning how to do things, and that process is not one of reflection or
calculation merely. This, I think, shows that it is false to suggest that “deliberation
about how to do something terminates in things one can do” (2007, 60).
This claim is further supported by considering the fact that agents cannot derive
new skills from already possessed skills. I made this point earlier. Even if an
individual has forged the relevant connection between thought and action for two
distinct intelligent actions, he cannot use them to derive a third, composite skill.
But if the general capacity for progressive thought were sufficient to coordinate the
things we think with the movements necessary for action, we should be able to infer,
or calculate, composite skills from already possessed skills. Why? Because if the
general capacity for progressive thought could serve to coordinate thought with the
movements necessary for action, there would be nothing else to learn. We would not
have to learn anew how to coordinate our movements with the thoughts that cause
the performance of the composite skill or intelligent capacity. But, of course, that
seems to be a stretch. To acquire the skill to do backflips while skiing, it is not enough
to know how to ski and to know how to do backflips. Sure, knowing how to do those
things independently may help to acquire the new skill, but it is not sufficient. Agents
cannot learn composite skills by deriving the necessary unity of thought and action
from what they already know how to do, even if the things they already know how to
do are constitutive components of the composite skill. Instead, agents must establish
new connections between their thoughts and the movements required for performing
actions of the more sophisticated type. And that cannot be done through thought
alone. Rather, it must, as Aristotle suggests, be done by doing.
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4.5.4 Coordinated Movement
To coordinate the things we do in performing an action with the structure and
content of the thoughts required for their execution, agents must first do things
without knowing what they are doing. Such action, it seems to me, is a precondition
for learning to coordinate thought with the actions that cause the performance of
intelligent action, and unless that precondition is satisfied, an agent cannot learn to
move his body in a way that characterizes the performance of skills. But if that is
right, some of what we do on purpose will not be governed by the progressive form
of thought. After all, if I must ski in order to learn how to ski, it cannot be the case
that I already know how to perform the action, nor can it be that I already grasp
the connection between the actions necessary for effectively executing the skill and
my thoughts about skiing. This fact indicates that there is a class of actions involved
with acquiring new intelligent capacities that WPI—and Anscombian models of action
more generally—is not suited to explain.
Let me emphasize these points. If the arguments I have been developing are
right, we are faced with an odd result. To acquire new intelligent capacities, and the
knowledge-how associated with them, we must do things on purpose without knowing
what we are doing. Furthermore, these actions cannot be represented, or modeled,
while accepting intellectualist assumptions about action. It looks like there is a class
of intelligent actions, which are tied to acquiring knowledge-how, that theories of
action explanation have ignored. How, then, should we represent such actions? In
the next section, I want to very briefly gesture at what I think is a first step towards
filling this explanatory hole.
4.6 Modeling Explorative Actions
I have argued that neither SPI nor WPI can explain the things we do to acquire
knowledge-how. Their failure to do so is a result of their commitment to intellectualist
assumptions. According to both views, the information encoded in knowledge-how is
required for intelligent action, and, in one way or another, it seems to follow that the
acquisition of intelligent capacities can be had by reflection alone. But the inference
is a mistake, which is betrayed by the fact that intellectualist models of action cannot
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account for the kind of learned coordination between thought and action required
for learning new skills. Since the actions involved with acquiring such skills depend
on individuals doing things without knowing what they are doing, intellectualism of
either variety cannot explain them as intelligent actions. If that is right, giving an
account of the actions involved with learning how to do things demands an account
of action explanation that does not assume practical intellectualism of either variety.
In the face of this argument, intellectualists might respond by simply suggesting
that the things individuals do to acquire knowledge-how are irrelevant to an account
of intelligent action. After all, if they are done without knowing what we are doing,
why bother trying to understand them? They look like ungoverned actions. Indeed,
if such actions are tantamount to behavioral thrashing, they are not worth the effort
to make sense of them philosophically. But that too is a mistake. The actions that go
into acquiring knowledge-how are not mere thrashing, they are actions that call for a
different model to explain their place in a philosophical view of intelligent action and
rational agency. I am not going to argue for that view here, but I do want to gesture
at a framework for thinking about it.
The right way to approach modeling the acquisition of new intelligent capacities is
to think about the actions involved using an analogue of induction. In the theoretical
realm, induction involves transitioning from beliefs that are about particulars to
beliefs that subsume those particulars under a more general belief. For example,
the transition from a belief that ‘this crow is black’, ‘that crow is black’, and so on,
to the general belief that ‘all crows are black’ is a transition typical of induction.
There is, I think, a similar transition in the case of learning how to do things. From
particular instances of doing things, agents transition to more general capacities. The
idea, then, is to represent a practical transition from lesser capacities to more general
capacities using a model of action that relies on the notion of coordination through
a type of agential induction.
Learning to do new things requires learning to coordinate thought with action, but
such coordination requires agents to undertake particular activities without knowing
what they are doing. For example, to learn how to ski, individuals must perform the
particular actions involved in skiing without grasping their relation to the activity as a
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whole and without understanding the content of the thoughts that might characterize
such activities. The process of coordinating the particular movements involved with
skiing with the thoughts that lead to the performance of the action can, of course,
eventually lead to the general capacity to ski, but that process, it seems to me,
involves a certain type of transition. When an agent has acquired the knowledge-how
pertaining to skiing, she has transitioned from particular instances of exercising her
agency to a general capacity to do so. If that is right, then a model of action designed
to explain the acquisition of knowledge-how should be able to make sense of the idea
that learning how to do things is a matter of increasing what one is able to do by
coordinating one’s thoughts with one’s actions.
The idea seems to be anticipated by Aristotle when he writes, “the things we have
to learn before we can do, we learn by doing, e.g., men become builders by building
and lyre players by playing the lyre” (1984, 1103a30-1103b1). It is by performing
particular acts on the lyre—experimenting with different finger positions, plucking
strengths, and so on—that agents discover how those acts fit together in a manner
consistent with being a lyre player. But of course, prior to the acquisition of that
general capacity, individuals do not know how particular actions fit together to effect
the skill of playing the lyre. Acquiring the intelligent capacity, then, is characterized
by learning, realizing, or discovering how particular actions fit with what one knows
by doing things without understanding what one is doing. Only in this way does an
individual discover how particular actions fit with thoughts about lyre-playing.
The idea also seems to be anticipated by Ryle when he writes: “It is the essence of
intelligent practices that one performance is modified by its predecessors” (1949, 42).
Or, again a bit further on, an agent “learns how to do things [by] thinking what he is
doing, so that every operation performed is itself a new lesson to him how to perform
better” (1949, 43). To see what I have in mind, consider, again, Hannah’s attempt
to acquire an understanding of how to ski. As she begins, her balance is hit or miss.
She catches her edges easily and falls over at the slightest provocation. Sometimes,
she can get through three or four turns without losing her balance, but even then,
her actions betray an apprehension characteristic of the novice. Since she has not yet
coordinated the movements needed to ski with the thoughts required to execute the
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skill, she does not really know how to do what she is attempting to do. Nevertheless,
with each fall, each turn, and every trip up and down the ski-hill, she slowly gets
better, more capable, and more coordinated in her activity. Each performance, as
Ryle notes, is a new lesson to her how to perform better.
But what explains the steady improvement of her capacity? Part of the story
might be the propositional information she garners from her experience; part of the
story might be her inborn capacity to think of that information according to the
progressive form of thought. But these pieces of the explanatory story cannot make
sense of the things she does, the actions she undertakes, without knowing what she
is doing. To explain an individual’s improvement as she learns a new skill, we must
account for the things she does without knowing what she is doing. And models of
action built with intellectualist assumptions are not designed to do that. Such models
cannot account for an obvious component of an agent’s acquisition of knowledge-
how—namely, the actions performed without the coordinated unity of thought and
action. To explain that, we need a different model.
Of course, I believe the right way to think about the design of such models is with
an analogue of induction. If agential capacities develop to more general capacities
through a process of discovering, learning, or realizing how some particular action
fits into some bigger, whole action, we should use the parallel insights of induction to
explain an agent’s acquisition of intelligent capacities or skills. From less sophisticated
actions, an agent is, through the coordination of thought and action, able to extend
his or her capacities to more general ones. And it seems to be something analogous
to induction that is governing the process. Consequently, it should frame any model
designed to explain such actions.
4.7 Conclusion
As embodied creatures, we have to learn how to do nearly everything we know how
to do. If practical intellectualism of one variety or another was the right way to think
about acquiring knowledge-how, agents would be able to learn how to F by merely
thinking about what they already know how to do. But such a view is implausible.
And it is implausible precisely because we are embodied creatures. We have to learn
116
to coordinate our thoughts with the actions required for doing the things we do.
This coordination of thought and action cannot be learned by reflection merely, nor
is it, in a very large range of cases, an inborn capacity. Instead, the acquisition of
knowledge-how depends on agents doing things without knowing what they are doing.
Yet we lack an explanation of our capacity to act in this manner. To give such an
explanation, an account of action needs to be able to explain the things we do without
appealing to what an agent already knows. But since nearly all accounts of action
explanation assume intellectualism of one variety or another, this means we have to
rethink the design parameters for models of action in order to explain this class of
action. I have offered what I think might be the right way to do this, but certainly
there are other options. Nevertheless, only by developing such alternative models will





Over the past few chapters, I have been arguing both directly and indirectly for a
model-based approach to problems of rational agency. In this concluding chapter, I
want to tie the ideas motivating the earlier ones together in an effort to frame some
general ideas about the type of agency we possess as human beings. Accomplishing
that task will require sketching a bit of background concerning the unity of agency
and the widespread assumption that a necessary condition for the possibility of being
an agent is being, in some sense, unified. After I have provided that background, I will
draw out the implications of the previous chapters for the idea that unified agency is
required for intelligent action, and, in the final section, conclude with an argument.
To anticipate: to be the type of agents we seem to be requires being disunified in a
distinctive sort of way.
5.2 The Role of Unity
That we must act as unified agents is frequently accepted as a starting place for
theorizing about human beings as rational agents. The idea seems to be that since
individuals have only one body with which to act, doing anything at all requires
sufficiently coordinating the various components of one’s agency—for example, the
desires, plans, preferences, beliefs, and intentions that might cause one to act—so as
to avoid, in one sense or another, self-frustration.1 Since we have only one body with
which to act, we have to resolve conflicts between the thoughts and attitudes that
might move us to act in order to prevent being pulled in more than one direction. To
1The idea that we must be unified in one sense or another shows up across the spectrum of
philosophical views on agency. See for example Korsgaard (1996; 2008; 2009), Bratman (1987;
2007b), Millgram (1997), Velleman (1989; 2000; 2009), Frankfurt (1998; 1999), and Ro¨dl (2007).
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act as a unified agent, then, means coordinating potentially conflicting attitudes and
motivations in a way that will produce effective action. There are, however, several
different proposals for how this coordination might be effected. Indeed, the disparity
between the different proposals for achieving unified agency serve to distinguish a
variety of views of rational agency. Nevertheless, the background idea is roughly the
same: since acting as an agent requires acting as a unit, acting as a rational agent
requires some basis of rational unity.
Given that shared idea, it is worth pausing to reflect on the different ways in which
one’s agency might be unified. Before I do that, however, we first need to ask, aside
from avoiding self-frustration, why is it worth worrying about the unity of agency?
Although it is likely that different theorists will emphasize its importance for different
reasons, at its heart, the issue seems to me to be one of being in control of the things
we do. If an agent fails to act on motives that he endorses, and, instead, acts from
motives that are in opposition to what he wants to do, or that are alien to him, the
drives moving him will, in one sense or another, be foreign to him as a rational agent.
Of course, actions performed from such “alien” drives cannot actually be the agent’s
actions, because what he is being moved by is divorced from the attitudes he endorses
as his own. That is to say that such actions are not actions controlled by the person
performing them. One way of overcoming that difficulty is to ensure that what one
does is endorsed by thoughts and attitudes essential to an individual’s own sense of
agency. In other words, one way to overcome that problem is to ensure that one’s
agency is unified. If that is right, we have some grounds for thinking that unified
agency matters.
But we can go further. As human agents, we face a variety of immediate, near-
term, and long-term challenges that, unless we are sufficiently in control of the things
that move us to act, will be difficult to manage. If our drives get away from us
and act through us as alien causes, managing the lives that we lead will be difficult.
For example, if I intend to stay in Friday night to get some work done, but fail to
coordinate that intention with my immediate desire for some friendly company, I may
act in frustration of myself. If I go out, I frustrate the intention to get work done,
but if I stay in, I frustrate my desire for company. The problem can be managed by
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coordinating my motivational attitudes: I’ll stay in and work for a while, and catch
up with my friends later. To live with an eye toward the future while living in the
here and now, we need to coordinate the components of agency that move us to act.
If that is correct, the unity of agency also matters because, in one way or another, it
seems required to manage practical challenges that we all face as human agents.
Given the relevance of the idea that we must, to one degree or another, be unified
in order to be in control of our lives, we can now consider what we mean when we say
that agency must be rationally unified. There are two central ideas to consider: the
first is that we need a principle of unity to coordinate actions over time as the actions
of a single individual; the second is that we require a principle of unity in order for
the things we do on particular occasions to be actions under control. Both notions
have shown up during the course of this dissertation. On Bratman’s conception of
agency, for example, the self-governing policies that hold particular agents together
over time, and provide authority for what agents decide to do, must meet certain
standards of rationality in order to serve as temporally persisting standpoints of
agency. In particular, one’s self-governing policies must meet standards of coherence,
stability, and consistency. When an agent is satisfied with the self-governing policies
that are the backbone of his agential identity, and when such policies meet the relevant
standards of rationality, he has a principle of control that can serve to coordinate his
actions over time as actions belonging to him. Due to the coordinated unity of his
temporally persisting psychological states, a Bratmanian agent can control the things
he does as actions that reflect his temporally ordered agency. To the extent that such
actions are motivated by desires that are in harmony with the agent’s higher-order
policies, the individual will act as an agent in control of whatever it is that he is
doing.
A similar principle of unity, which serves to provide the control necessary for
acting as an agent, operates in the background of Velleman’s view. For Velleman, an
agent takes control of himself when he acts to satisfy the higher-order desire to be
in control. The idea, of course, is that by reflecting on what one prefers and desires,
and by using beliefs about one’s preferences and desires to make inferences about
what one actually desires and prefers, agents act in a way that is self-intelligible. Of
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course, being intelligible to oneself, and acting on the basis of what one understands
about oneself, seems to be required if one is to avoid self-alienation. If an individual
did not know why he was doing what he was doing, or if his actions were motivated
by attitudes that he failed to recognize as his own, it would be difficult to think
of that agent as one in control of himself. Positioning the higher-order desire for
control as the point of unity, then, places Velleman in a position to explain both the
coordination of action over time and the control necessary for intelligently acting in
the here and now.
On views like those endorsed by Bratman and Velleman, the unity of agency
depends on bringing into harmony potentially conflicting psychological attitudes. To
effect that unity, there must be one or another higher-order conative state that serves
as the focal point. That point, of course, is the grounding consideration for rational
agency: if an agent’s other psychological attitudes fail to operate in the service of
that grounding consideration, the agent’s rational nature is, to one degree or another,
undermined. To be an agent in rational control of one’s life, then, individuals must
align competing psychological attitudes with higher-order attitudes that serve as the
point of unity. When we desire to bring something about, reflectively engage that
desire, and, in one way or another, endorse it as a desire we want to be motivationally
efficacious, we act as unified agents in control of our lives.
But of course, the type of hierarchical framework endorsed by Velleman and
Bratman is only one way to think of the unity of agency. The picture is different
when we turn our attention to Anscombian views. For these views, the notion of
unity is designed to explain the things we do on particular occasions. How is it
that the things we think and the things we do result in actions over which we have
control? For Anscombian views, the requisite unity is had through the practical
knowledge required for intelligent action. Of course, for theorists that endorse such
views, knowing one’s way around practical issues—that is, being able to act in a way
that displays one’s practical knowledge—depends on the formal unity of thought and
action. In contrast to instrumentalist views that rely on the psychological unity of
individuals to ground rational agency, Anscombian views rely on the idea that control
as a single, unified creature depends on the knowledge necessary for accomplishing the
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things one has set out to do. Put differently, individuals take control of their actions
when they act with an awareness of the relation between what they are doing and
what they think they will achieve by doing what they are doing. For theorists of this
stripe, the unity of agency depends on the formal link between what an individual
knows when acting and the structure of the actions themselves. When what we
think we are doing reflects the structure of the actions being performed, we act as
individuals in control of our lives. It is the unity between thought and action, and
the practical awareness presupposed by that unity, that makes us the agents we are.
Of course, there are other proposed principles of unity in the literature, which I
have not dealt with in the course of this dissertation. Christine Korsgaard, for exam-
ple, argues that acting as an agent depends on resolving tension between disparate
psychological proclivities by subjecting them to universalizable principles of reason.
Only when the motivational attitudes of an individual are aligned according to such
principles (rather than, for example, by the ends an individual wants to achieve or
by the shared formal structure of thought and action) are the actions expressed by
that unity constitutive of his or her nature as a rational creature. Only in this way,
she thinks, can we act as free and rational agents.
In all of these views, certain ideas about the unity of agency, and the structures
needed to effect that unity, are central to providing an account of rational agency.
Given the presupposition that we must be unified in order to be agents, the problem
becomes one of figuring out what the criteria of unification must be. And the thought
is that by sorting out what those criteria are, we come to understand what it means
to be a rational agent.
5.3 A Sketch of Disunity
I have been arguing that for one reason or another we cannot do without seemingly
disparate portraits of rational agency. If I am right, my arguments show that we
need different notions of agency to make sense of the diverse aspects of our nature
as rational agents. But since these different notions rely on incompatible conceptions
of agency, my arguments suggest that we cannot be unified. Indeed, in Instrumental
Facades, I argued against the idea that a single theory of instrumental agency is
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sufficient to address the range of problems human agents have a stake in addressing.
Since we all have an interest in managing problems that rely on features of agency
that cannot be integrated, but which are sufficiently deep to make abandoning them
out of the question, we have to settle for a model-based approach. Due to this fact,
there will always be, in some sense, deep fissures between different points of agency
that may serve as the unifying basis of our actions. The result is that whenever we
do anything, we will, in one way or another, be acting against other aspects of our
own agency. In fact, I have argued that it is very unlikely that the deep motivational
attitudes at the heart of our agency can be made fully harmonious. Consequently, in
acting as instrumentally rational agents, it is unlikely that we will ever fully integrate
our conflicting psychological attitudes around a single, unifying point of agency.
Of course, I have also argued that the type of unity required by the Anscom-
bian conception of rational agency is insufficient to make sense of the things we
do as intelligent agents. In “Modeling Expressive Actions,” I argued that acts of
emotional expression—especially those characteristic of artistic expression—cannot
be represented with a view of agency that requires practical knowledge. This, of
course, is in contrast to the Anscombian view, which requires thought and action
to be unified through practical knowledge in order to act as intelligent creatures.
As I demonstrated, painters, poets, dancers and other artists frequently act without
knowing what they are doing. But artists are not unique in this respect—that is,
there is no reason to think that artists possess some form of agency peculiar only
to them. Indeed, common forms of emotional expression seem to be done without
practical knowledge. Since how we see the world shifts under the influence of emotion,
and since those perceptual shifts influence action in a way that we only understand
at best metaphorically, acting from emotion seems to produce actions that are done
without the type of practical knowledge required by the Anscombian model. Instead,
the things we do to give expression to emotion seem to be tied to thoughts that
depend on the structure of emotions themselves. Nevertheless, such actions seem
to be intelligently performed. If that is correct, it looks like we can do things as
agents without the type of unity required by Anscombian views of action explanation.
Consequently, we should think anew about the notion of unified agency and what it
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means to express emotion through action.
A similar conclusion fell out of Chapter 4. There I argued that learning to coor-
dinate thought and action in a manner that results in knowledge-how requires acting
without knowing what one is doing. Such actions, of course, violate the principle
of unity behind the Anscombian view of intelligent action. As with expressive acts,
when we are learning to perform actions that we have never before performed, we
lack the practical knowledge that, on the Anscombian view, is required to explain
intelligent action. Indeed, if it is true that we must perform actions without knowing
what we are doing to acquire knowledge-how, the Anscombian idea that all intelligent
actions require acting with practical knowledge cannot be right. Instead, there must
be actions that are performed on purpose and for reasons without the tight connection
characteristic of the model endorsed by Ro¨dl. In fact, such actions must be governed
by some other way of thinking, which I suggested should be modeled with an analogue
of induction. The idea depends on the fact that there are things we do, and do
intelligently, that cannot be modeled with the type of unity that is thought to explain
the actions of rational agents. As with expressive actions, then, actions performed in
the course of acquiring new capacities seem to undermine the idea that a single type
of formal unity is necessary for acting as intelligent agents.
These later chapters, which show that the Anscombian view needs to be re-
considered, should not be confused as arguments to the effect that some of what
we do is arational, unintelligent, or unintentional. In fact, the alternative modes
of action I have tried to characterize in these chapters are intended to show that
some of the things we do as intelligent creatures—that is, some of our thoughtful
actions—must be represented with different models of action explanation. When an
artist gives expression to his emotions through painting, he is acting as an individual
in control of himself, but the thought governing the actions being performed is not
best represented with traditional philosophical views. Similarly, when an individual
acquires new intelligent capacities by acting without practical knowledge, what he
does seems to be done with control and as an intelligent action. Yet current models
of action explanation fail to capture that fact. These points suggest that the types
of action for which I have argued in these later chapters show different ways in which
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our agency can be tied to the things we do. The principle of control according to
which we express our emotions, and the principle of control behind the acquisition of
new intelligent capacities, need to be accounted for with different models of action
explanation. But again, that does not suggest that such actions are, in some sense,
unintelligent. To the contrary, it suggests that there is more than one way for us to
act as intelligent creatures.
Of course, from all of this, we cannot conclude that there is no overarching
structure that can serve to unify these seemingly disparate ways of acting as agents,
but I do think it gives us reason to be skeptical. In particular, given the fact that
some forms of action seem to be governed by thoughts that do not require practical
knowledge, it is unlikely that our actions as intelligent agents will require doing things
according to universalizable, self-determined laws of reason. After all, to prescribe
a law of action to oneself, which applies to all rational agents as such, one must
be aware of it as a law. But if some of what we do as intelligent creatures is done
without the type of practical self-knowledge required by the views we have been
surveying, it seems implausible to think that those actions could be governed by
such self-determined laws. We seem, then, to have some basis for beings skeptical of
accounts that say otherwise.
5.4 Models of Agency
Before wrapping things up, let me pause for a moment. What I have been
suggesting over the course of this final chapter is that there are different ways to
understand intelligent action. That fact suggests that to the extent that we act
intelligently in these different ways, there are different senses to be given to the idea
of unity of agency. Indeed, I believe that, for one reason or another, all of these
different senses of being unified are needed to make sense of ourselves as the complex
creatures we are. The idea depends on understanding the different notions of agency
as patches in a complex array of disjoint, but still connected, ideas about what it
means to be a rational agent. For instrumentalist views like those of Bratman and
Velleman, understanding agency depends on locating motivational features at the
heart of our psychology and using them as focal points of integration. To be a
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rational agent is for one’s lower-order attitudes to be integrated to the attitudes that
are, in some sense, necessary for agency. For Anscombian views, unity depends on
bringing thought and action together according to a specific formal structure. To be
an agent in this sense is for one’s actions to unfold in the manner typified by one’s
practical thought. Of course, for the alternative type of actions for which I have
argued, being an agent turns out to be a matter of either expressing oneself according
to the structure of emotions or on the basis of practical thoughts that should be
modeled with an analogue of induction. Actions performed on the basis of either
of these ways of thinking depend on a type of unity with which philosophers are
unfamiliar.
What we have before us, then, is a collection of ways of being an agent that, when
combined, suggests a picture of ourselves as agents that is incongruous. Instead,
we are left with a patchwork of representations that are only loosely connected in
the sense that they are all part of an array of concepts necessary for understanding
ourselves as rational human agents. To the extent that we express our emotions in an
intelligent manner without practical knowledge, that feature of our agency cannot be
integrated with the type of intentional actions characteristic of Anscombian views. So
too, because acquiring knowledge-how depends on acting without knowing what we
are doing, and because such actions are more than mere behavioral thrashing, they
too cannot be integrated with the Anscombian view. Nevertheless, some of what we
do should be modeled using the type of structure found in Anscombian models of
action explanation as well. There is a similar point to be made about the models
surveyed in Chapter 2. To make sense of aspects of our agency that seem important
for being the type of agents we are, we need views of instrumental agency that are at
odds with each other. The result, however, is that there is a similar sort of hinderance
to the integration of deep features of our motivational psychology. All of these points
together suggest that, even if we can do different things by being sufficiently unified
in different ways, we cannot be fully integrated as human agents. To be disunified in
this distinctive sort of way appears to be a consequence of the type of agents we are.
Of course, if we cannot in fact be fully unified, then to make sense of ourselves as
creatures capable of intelligent action, we are going to need a variety of representations
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to capture the different ways in which we act intelligently. Models seem like a natural
fit: since no single representation will do, a patchwork of models that allow for a
variety of representations seems like the right way to figure out what it means to be
a rational human agent. I have tried to show over the course of this dissertation how
such a patchwork of models might begin to look, and to provide a clearer picture of
the ways in which we act as creatures capable of moving ourselves for reasons.
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